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Abstract 
 
In the early 2000s, Korea and Japan competitively initiated their preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in response to 
the unexpected progress of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. In 
contrast with China, Korea and Japan initially preferred to negotiate PTAs with individual 
Southeast Asian countries, rather than with ASEAN. In 2003, however, Korea redirected its 
strategy and began the Korea–ASEAN FTA. Japan continued to emphasise a bilateral approach 
to negotiations but sought harmonisation of the individual PTAs through the ASEAN–Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Sharing common international political and economic 
challenges, why did Korea and Japan take diverging negotiation paths? This research 
investigates the factors that shaped Korea and Japan’s respective negotiation methods with 
ASEAN by focusing on the interplay of domestic interests, institutions and ideas.  
The research findings suggest that Korea and Japan initially preferred bilateral PTAs 
because of their efficiency and to minimise the backlash of the agricultural sector. Japan had a 
greater incentive to promote bilateral strategy than Korea, not only to counter China’s move, 
but also to utilise its diplomatic leverages against ASEAN. The direct causes of the two 
countries’ divergence, however, came from ideas and institutions. The influence of ideas 
became evident when Korea’s and Japan’s initial emphasis on the East Asia-based PTAs began 
to head toward the different directions. Japan was path-dependent of its initial step-by-step 
strategy focused in East Asia. In contrast, Korea accommodated the new ideas that aimed at 
cross-regional PTAs, making the Korea-ASEAN FTA a stepping stone for cross-regional PTAs 
rather than East Asia-based PTAs. Institutional factors account for the supply side of PTA 
decision-making processes by demonstrating how the intra-democracy variations, combined 
by bureaucracy discretion, empowered relevant decision-makers, which led to the reversal of 
negotiation progresses between Korea and Japan.  
The empirical research findings significantly contribute to the international political 
economy literature by testing the applicability of the domestic level analysis. They provide an 
alternative perspective to the existing debate on the compatibility of bilateralism and 
regionalism in East Asia and thus to the political economy of trade policy in the region. The 
findings also shed light on the country-specific factors shaping the economic regionalism of 
East Asia. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
 This thesis investigates the factors that shaped the different negotiation approaches 
taken by the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) and Japan in their preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs)1 with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).2 In the early 
2000s, Korea and Japan competitively initiated their respective PTAs with ASEAN in response 
to the unexpected progress of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA; CAFTA) 
negotiations. In contrast with the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), both Korea and 
Japan initially preferred to negotiate PTAs with individual Southeast Asian countries, rather 
than with ASEAN as a regional entity. As the negotiations progressed, however, the two 
countries’ preferences quickly diverged. Korea changed its original strategy and pursued the 
region-based Korea–ASEAN FTA (KAFTA). In contrast, Japan continued to prioritise bilateral 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) while concurrently promoting harmonisation of the 
individual EPAs through the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP).3 
Why did Korea and Japan choose different negotiation strategies in light of China’s move? 
                                   
1 The thesis uses the term PTA to indicate trade agreements with at least two parties, which 
give preferential access to the participating parties involved in the agreement. The term indicates both 
bilateral and regional trade agreements with different labels such as regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs). 
2 ASEAN includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
3 This thesis examines the ASEAN+1 FTAs from the perspective of Korean and Japanese 
domestic politics. Therefore, in regard to nomenclature, it initially refers to their PTAs by 
preferentially citing country names in the titles of agreements. For example, KAFTA was used instead 
of ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA), and Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(JACEP) was used instead of AJCEP. As this research progressed, however, the author came to learn 
that Japan officially uses the term AJCEP instead of JACEP. According to an official in the Ministry 
of Economy, Industry and Trade (METI) (personal communication), Japan did not mind emphasising 
ASEAN in labeling the agreement. In contrast to most of Japan’s other bilateral EPAs, which placed 
its name first, Japan did not seek the same practice with regard to AJCEP. Japan believed that ASEAN 
centrality should be maintained as China emerged as a new actor in the competition for regional 
leadership (former Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official, personal communication), 
and Japan considered ASEAN not as its competitor but as a regional partner for co-operation (METI 
official, personal communication). 
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Existing studies on ASEAN+1 PTAs, elaborated in Chapter 2, suggest that competition 
in negotiating these agreements throughout the 2000s was mainly due to international factors. 
The motivations have been seen as primarily stemming from political rivalry and economic 
calculations. The key analytical focus of these studies was on the behaviour of states; thus, the 
emergence of ASEAN+1 PTAs has been interpreted as a result of structural change in the 
international environment. With regard to negotiation approaches taken in existing ASEAN+1 
PTAs, only a handful of research studies have attempted to examine motivations at the 
domestic level and most have concentrated narrowly on Japan. Thus, existing studies fall short 
in explaining why Korea and Japan chose different negotiation strategies in their PTA 
negotiations with ASEAN, even though the two countries shared common international 
political and economic challenges.  
To resolve this rather puzzling divergence, this thesis adopts a domestic-level analysis 
of international political economy (IPE) to examine trade negotiations in Korea and Japan. 
Framing the approach in terms of Korea and Japan, this thesis contends that the underlying 
intentions and preferences shaping their negotiation pathways were the products of a 
combination of domestic factors, namely, interests, ideas and institutions. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates how each of these factors determined the two countries’ decision-making 
processes in the different stages of negotiations, which in the end comprised their overall 
strategies. The thesis emphasises the examination of processes, rather than results, in tracing 
the development of negotiations and understanding how logic, subjectivity and political 
structures connect.  
A plethora of research has examined the expected outcomes of PTAs, usually either 
before the PTA negotiations begin or after the agreements come into effect. It is rare for 
attention to be given to the middle ground—the decision-making processes—in trade policy 
and IPE literature. PTAs are about politics and human conduct, as well as economic gains. 
Economists generally acknowledge that the more open a PTA is¾meaning, higher 
liberalisation with the greatest number of partners—the greater the gain is for those who engage 
in it. For trade negotiators, however, gaining or succeeding in PTA negotiations has nearly the 
opposite meaning as that ascribed by economists. When negotiators refer to a successful PTA, 
they speak of gaining concessions from their counterparts; as strange as it may sound, they 
strive to preserve existing domestic trade barriers in the sensitive sectors as much as they can. 
To fully understand PTAs, it is therefore essential to think of the processes and practices 
15 
 
involved—and what it means to achieve a successful negotiation—by examining the 
interactions between various domestic stakeholders. 
The contribution of this thesis goes beyond providing domestic-level explanations for 
the negotiation strategies taken by Korea and Japan in regard to PTAs. The research also 
informs policymakers and helps to enhance their understanding of their counterpart’s strategy. 
Policymakers experience numerous uncertainties and lack full knowledge before coming to 
their decisions. For example, it is surprising to find that the Korean government did not fully 
appreciate the reasons behind Japan’s approach to negotiating separate bilateral FTAs with 
ASEAN countries. Although the Korean government’s report for the KAFTA vaguely states, 
“It is considered that there could be domestic factors behind Japan’s path” (MOFAT and Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy [KIEP] 2007, 16), it offered no further reasons to 
account for the two countries’ differing approaches in dealing with ASEAN. Similarly, the 
Japanese government was unsure of the benefits of the different negotiation strategies. As 
Atsuyuki Oike, then-Director for the First International Economic Affairs Division, Economic 
Affairs Bureau at MOFA (Japan), recalls, “At the time, we did not have enough information to 
compare the efficacy of these policies” (2007, 19). As these examples illustrate, uncertainty 
often arises from a lack of information rather than the ambiguity of a situation, and the involved 
parties may be led to agree on a suboptimal arrangement. This study provides information that 
can help fill the gap between theories and the practical world.  
Moreover, understanding the negotiation progress of the ASEAN+1 PTAs provides a 
road map for the countries seeking FTAs with Korea, Japan or ASEAN. The ASEAN+1 PTAs’ 
adoption of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) rules and structure illustrates this point. 
When China initiated its FTA negotiations with ASEAN in 2002, China agreed to adopt the 
AFTA’s system of target setting, in which tariff lines and tariff elimination schedules were 
delicately differentiated between more developed and less developed ASEAN nations. Similar 
approaches were followed by Korea and Japan in their negotiations with ASEAN, with only 
slight modifications (Chin 2010). Even though AFTA’s overall economic influence and 
performance has been subject to debate, it has served as an important building block in the 
formation of ASEAN+1 PTAs. In line with the AFTA, ASEAN+1 PTAs can also be expected 
to provide a model for future regional agreements. 
Finally, this thesis is also about instances when bilateralism is preferred over 
regionalism, and, conversely, when regionalism comes before bilateralism. It explores whether 
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bilateralism and regionalism are compatible with each other in today’s world of burgeoning 
PTAs. The underlying assumption of these inquiries begins from the thesis’s normative 
position that bilateralism and regionalism should be inclusive and mutually reinforcing, which 
will eventually facilitate trade even among non-members of PTAs.  
This view is in accordance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
statement in Article XXIV4 of 1994. The article recommends that bilateralism and regionalism 
should be promoted in the interest of removing substantially all barriers to trade sectors, so that 
the trade barriers applicable to non-members are not greater than before the agreement was 
established (Chand 2006, 87–88). Even though PTAs and regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
are considered the second-best option to multilateral agreements, they can better incorporate 
the member countries by locking in commitments that go beyond the obligations of the existing 
World Trade Organization (WTO) framework¾so long as these agreements are carefully 
scrutinised, negotiated and well implemented. Thus, this thesis contributes to the current 
bilateralism and regionalism debate on East Asian regionalism. 
The rest of this introductory chapter is organised into three sections. The following 
section provides background on Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN in the context of the 
emergence of ASEAN+1 level PTAs and East Asian regionalism. The third section elaborates 
on the research question by specifying the hypotheses to be investigated throughout the 
research and illustrates the research methods to be used. It also explains and justifies the 
                                   
4 See for example, paragraph 4 of GATT Article XXIV, which states the purpose of a customs 
union or an FTA: 
“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of 
the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories 
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.” 
Paragraph 8 (b) further provides the definition of an FTA: 
“A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in 
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, 
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories.” 
The full text of GATT Article XXIV can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm 
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author’s case selection of Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN. Finally, the chapter ends 
with a summary of the thesis’s overall structure.  
 
1.2 Background: Bilateralism and Regionalism in East Asia 
 
1.2.1 The Rise of PTAs in East Asia and the Emergence of ASEAN+1 PTAs. Since 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, various types of PTAs have been negotiated at both 
the bilateral and regional levels. The economic crisis led to state actors actively engaging in 
these initiatives to complement the conventional market-driven integration across the region 
undertaken by private businesses. PTAs differ from East Asia’s conventional market-driven 
economic integration in that they are institution-driven arrangements that give preferential 
treatment to the parties and feature a top-down decision-making process through government 
policies (Urata 2006, 1; Dent 2008, 7). PTAs have been negotiated, implemented and signed at 
different levels of economic integration and under different labels, including FTAs, EPAs, 
comprehensive economic partnerships (CEPs) and new age economic partnerships. The 
number of PTAs has increased dramatically since the financial crisis. In 2000, in Asia, 
including ASEAN, India, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of China (hereafter 
Taiwan), only three PTAs had been concluded. By 2009, this number had risen to 54, while 
another 78 were either proposed or under negotiation (Kawai and Wignaraja 2009, 144). 
One of the leading efforts to enhance regional co-operation has been to create an 
integrated PTA for the wider East Asian region5. This plan would simplify and reduce the 
                                   
5 Two broad types of regionalisms are defined in today’s Asia: one that is based in East Asia, 
and the other, based in the Asia-Pacific region (He 2016). As Dent (2016, 3-8) notes, however, the 
definitions of East Asia and Asia-Pacific can be artificial and may vary depending on the different 
political and economic contexts. To quote Dent (2016: 3), 
“For example, from a ‘map’ perspective it would seem that the Russian Far East should be 
included in the region but invariably it is not considered part of the East Asia regional 
community. This may be because it is a peripheral subnational region within an essentially 
Eurocentric country, Russia, and also because of its at best marginal engagement in East 
Asia’s regional economic dynamic and integrational processes. The latter point is also 
relevant to explaining why Mongolia is so often overlooked as a constituent East Asian nation 
in regional groupings and regional organisation membership.” 
This study refers to the regionalism based in East Asia as the one that includes Northeast Asia 
and Southeast Asia. More specifically, Northeast Asia indicates China, Korea and Japan. Southeast 
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inefficiencies of the complicated and overlapping bilateral trade agreements, a problem widely 
known as the “spaghetti bowl syndrome” (also called the “noodle bowl syndrome”, referring 
to the trade situation in Asian countries). In addition, as one of the leading endeavours to 
accommodate concrete economic integration, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum was formed 
at the second ASEAN informal summit in December 1997; APT comprises the ASEAN nations 
plus China, Korea and Japan (Ravenhill 2008a). However, APT meetings have not resulted in 
the establishment of PTAs among the ASEAN, China, Korea, and Japan; the East Asia Free 
Trade Area (EAFTA) was first proposed by China in 2004, but it was never materialised. Other 
proposed RTA scenarios also are yet to be realised; for example, Japan proposed in 2006 an 
RTA at the ASEAN+6 level (APT plus Australia, New Zealand and India, also known as the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia [CEPEA]). This stimulated the United 
States (hereafter US) to propose the Free Trade Area of the Asia–Pacific (FTAAP) in the same 
year, which would have been a broader RTA extending to the economies of the Asia–Pacific 
region.  
Despite growing intra-regional networks of trade and investment through private 
businesses, East Asia still lacks an economic agreement that ties together the region, and so 
suffers from an “organizational gap” (Calder and Ye 2004). By 2004, intra-regional trade in 
East Asia reached 1.95 trillion USD, accounting for 53.3% of East Asia’s total trade (see Figure 
1.1). That amount is less than the intra-regional trade share in the European Union (hereafter 
EU), which in 2004 was 3.42 trillion USD or 60.3%. However, the intra-regional trade share 
in East Asia is considerable in comparison to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) (1.27 trillion USD or 44.5%), ASEAN (USD 198 billion; 23.2%) and the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR) (26 billion USD or 14.6%) (International Monetary Fund 
[IMF] 2004).  
 
 
 
 
                                   
Asia refers to ASEAN countries. 
The Asia-Pacific region broadly indicates the East Asian countries, India, Australia, New 
Zealand, the United States, and other pacific rim countries. 
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Figure 1.1. Intra-regional trade map, 2004. 
 
Source: Map by author. Data from IMF (2004). 
 
Currently, the most comprehensive form of East Asian regional PTA remains at the 
ASEAN+1 level (see Table 1.1 for summary). The three Northeast Asian countries—China, 
Korea and Japan—signed agreements for trade in goods with ASEAN in 2004, 2006 and 2008, 
respectively. In addition, in 2009, the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) and 
the ASEAN–India FTA (AIFTA) were signed. Other agreements also came into effect in the 
first decade of the new century: CAFTA in 2005, KAFTA in 2007, AJCEP in 2008, and AIFTA 
and AANZFTA in 2010. Agreements for trade in services and investment were signed later in 
2007 and 2009 for both CAFTA and KAFTA, respectively. Under AJCEP, the framework 
agreement includes both trade in services and investment chapters, but as of 2017, the 
provisions are still under negotiation. ASEAN and India have concluded negotiations in these 
two areas of trade but have yet to sign the agreement. As for AANZFTA, agreements were 
signed in 2009 for trade in goods, services and investment.  
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Table 1.1 Timetable of the Five ASEAN+1 PTAs 
FTA/CEP 
Trade in Goods Trade in Services Investment Realisation 
(Trade in 
Goods) 
Signed In Effect Signed In Effect Signed In Effect 
CAFTA 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2018 
KAFTA 2006 2007 2007 2009 2009 2009 2016 
AJCEP 2008 2008 Negotiation in progress 2018 
AIFTA 2009 2010 Concluded but not signed 2016 
AANZFTA 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2015 
Source: MITI, Malaysia (n.d.). 
 
The differences in the five ASEAN+1 PTAs’ timetables for trade in goods, services and 
investment come from the differences in chosen negotiation methods. As shown in Table 1.2, 
China, Korea and India took the sequential approach of negotiation with ASEAN, where 
different issues of trade are addressed regardless of success or failure in negotiating other 
sectors of trade. Japan and Australia–New Zealand preferred to adopt the single-undertaking 
negotiation approach, seeking to fully commit the negotiating parties to engage in the 
liberalization of all sectors of trade. In contrast to AANZFTA, however, which produced an 
agreement for trade in goods, services and investment in 2009, Japan has not been able to 
achieve full coverage at once, as it aimed to do with the single-undertaking approach of 
negotiation.6 Japan also stands apart from the negotiation approaches of China, Korea, Japan, 
Australia–New Zealand and India with regard to ASEAN. That is, Japan negotiated bilateral 
EPAs with individual ASEAN members, while concurrently promoting the region-based 
AJCEP.  
  
                                   
6 As Chapter 4 explains, this was due to Japan’s lack of diplomatic leverage with ASEAN as 
a group, as opposed to its relatively strong leverage with the individual ASEAN countries. 
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 Table 1.2 Negotiation Methods Taken under ASEAN+1 PTAs 
PTAs CAFTA KAFTA AJCEP AANZFTA AIFTA 
Inclusion of 
Trade Issues 
Sequential Sequential Single-
Undertaking 
Single-
Undertaking 
Sequential 
Negotiation 
Approaches 
to ASEAN 
Group Group Bilateral & 
Group 
Group Group 
 
 
1.2.2 The Competitive Nature of PTAs with ASEAN on the Part of China, Japan and 
Korea. Table 1.3 demonstrates the competitive nature of China’s, Japan’s and Korea’s 
proposals for PTAs with ASEAN between 1999 and 2015. The prelude to this East Asian 
competition was an agreement by Japan and Singapore to launch an EPA in October 2000. 
Korea and Thailand had initiated a joint study group on a bilateral FTA after the Asian financial 
crisis, which could have presented an economic or a political threat to other Northeast Asian 
competitors, but it never led to the launch of formal negotiations. 
To counter Japan’s move, China also began to believe that it needed to expand its 
influence within the Southeast Asia region. China thus proposed ASEAN as the forum for the 
creation of CAFTA at the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 2000. Yet Korea and Japan did not 
perceive that China’s proposal as a political or an economic threat; they thought there was little 
chance this FTA would materialise. The real trigger for Northeast Asian competition for 
ASEAN+1 agreements occurred when China formally signed a framework agreement with 
ASEAN in November 2001.7  
  
                                   
7 See Chapter 2 for further details on this event. 
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Table 1.3 Timeline of China’s, Korea’s and Japan’s PTA Negotiations with ASEAN  
Date Korea Japan China 
Nov. 1999 Korea–Thailand FTA 
(KTFTA) joint study 
begins 
  
Oct. 2000  Japan–Singapore EPA 
(JSEPA) launched 
 
Nov. 2000   
 
Formal Proposal for 
CAFTA at ASEAN+3 
summit 
Jan. 2001  JSEPA negotiations  
Mar. 2001 KTFTA joint study ends    
Nov. 2001 ASEAN’s first proposal 
for KAFTA 
 CAFTA framework 
agreed 
Jan. 2002  Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
vision for AJCEP 
framework in Singapore 
 
May 2002   First round negotiations of 
CAFTA 
Mar. 2002  Initiation of AJCEP expert 
group 
 
 
Oct. 2002 ASEAN’s second 
proposal for KAFTA 
 
Korea–Singapore FTA 
(KSFTA) announcement 
  
Nov. 2002  JSEPA in effect Framework agreement 
signed 
Oct. 2003 KAFTA expert group 
announced 
AJCEP framework signed  
Jan 2004  Japan–Malaysia EPA 
(JMEPA) negotiations 
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Feb. 2004  Japan–Thailand EPA 
(JTEPA), Japan–
Philippines EPA (JPEPA) 
negotiations 
 
 
Mar. 2004 
KAFTA formal 
proposal; initiation of 
joint study group 
  
Nov. 2004   Second round negotiations 
Feb. 2005 First round negotiations 
of KAFTA 
  
Apr. 2005  First round negotiations of 
AJCEP 
 
July 2005  Japan–Indonesia EPA 
(JIEPA) negotiations  
Trade in goods in effect 
Dec. 2005 KAFTA Trade in goods 
concluded 
  
Apr. 2006 KAFTA Trade in goods 
implemented 
  
June 2006 KAFTA Trade in 
services commenced 
Japan–Brunei EPA 
(JBEPA) negotiations 
 
July 2006  JMEPA in effect  
Aug. 2006   China–Singapore FTA 
(CSFTA) negotiations 
Jan. 2007   Trade in services signed 
Mar. 2007  AJCEP deadline missed  
June 2007 KAFTA Trade in goods 
in effect  
(Thai exception) 
  
July 2007  Japan–Vietnam EPA 
(JVEPA) negotiations 
Trade in services in effect 
Nov. 2007  JTEPA in effect  
Apr. 2008  AJCEP signed  
July 2008  JIEPA in effect 
JBEPA in effect 
 
Dec. 2008  AJCEP in effect  
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JPEPA in effect 
Jan. 2009   CSFTA in effect 
May 2009 KAFTA Trade in 
services in effect 
(except for Thailand, 
Indonesia and Laos) 
  
Aug. 2009   Agreement on investment 
signed 
Sept. 2009 KAFTA Agreement on 
investment in effect 
(Vietnam in November) 
  
Oct. 2009  JVEPA in effect  
Jan. 2010 Target date for trade in 
goods 
 Target date in effect for 
ASEAN+6 
Mar. 2012 
 
Korea–Indonesia FTA 
(KIFTA) negotiations 
  
 
Aug. 2012 
 
Korea–Vietnam FTA 
(KVFTA) negotiations 
  
Jan. 2015   Target date for all ASEAN 
nations 
Dec. 2015 KVFTA in effect   
Source: Author’s compilation from respective governments’ websites. 
 
Korea and Japan feared losing their economic or political influence within ASEAN if 
CAFTA materialised. Japan was already negotiating an EPA with Singapore, set to go into 
effect in November 2002, so it decided to promote further bilateral EPAs separately with each 
ASEAN member. However, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced in January 
2002, during his tour of Southeast Asia, that Japan would promote the region-based AJCEP as 
well. In response to China’s and Japan’s move toward ASEAN, Korea also announced an FTA 
with Singapore at the ASEAN+3 Summit in October 2002. Like Japan, Korea was reserved 
about approaching the entire ASEAN for an FTA, even though ASEAN had been proposing 
one with Korea since 2001. 
Domestic politics debated the pros and cons of the different approaches to negotiation, 
and Korea’s and Japan’s strategies soon diverged. In October 2003, Korea announced a change 
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to the region-based approach of a KAFTA. Japan, in contrast, continued to promote both 
AJCEP and bilateral EPAs. The framework agreement for AJCEP was signed in October 2003. 
Japan’s EPA negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines began at the beginning 
of 2004 and progressed in parallel. Negotiations for the KAFTA agreement for trade in goods 
concluded by the end of 2005. Following ratification, KAFTA entered into force in June 2007, 
with the exception of Thailand. Korea negotiated additional bilateral FTAs with Indonesia and 
Vietnam beginning in 2012, although only KVFTA has concluded to date.  
Overall, Japan’s negotiations concluded later than those of Korea. The JMEPA came 
into effect in July 2006, but the AJCEP deadline was missed due to delays in the negotiation 
process. By the end of 2007, JTEPA also went into force. The year 2008 saw the effective dates 
for JIEPA, JBEPA and AJCEP. Japan’s last bilateral EPA, JVEPA, came into force in October 
2009. 
 
1.3 Research Design 
 
1.3.1 Hypothesis. The main hypothesis of this thesis posits that:  
Domestic factors, rather than systemic factors, account for the different negotiation 
approaches taken by Korea and Japan in their PTAs with ASEAN. Korea’s and Japan’s 
preferences vary at the different stages of negotiations, depending on the relative 
influence of domestic interests, ideas and institutions. 
 
The dependent variable is Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation approaches, which can be 
further specified as the choice between the region-based approach and the bilateral approach. 
The independent variables are the three domestic variables, namely, interests, ideas and 
institutions. Today’s international relations (IR) scholars commonly recognise that all three 
variables play important roles in determining the decisions of policymakers. Thus, the key 
analytical focus of the thesis is on identifying the relative importance of each independent 
variable under a specified context, as the suppliers of and the demanders for trade policies.  
First, on the demand side, there are the domestic actors who wish to reflect their 
political and economic interests in the process of trade policymaking. Because the 
redistribution effects of PTAs are greater than those of any other foreign policies, private 
sectors tend to be more involved in the decision-making processes. In the cases of Korea and 
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Japan, agricultural groups predominantly led the argument for protectionist trade policies due 
to their relatively weak comparative advantage in comparison with the ASEAN side. By 
contrast, both countries’ manufacturing industries have held strong comparative advantage 
against ASEAN. Industrial groups in Korea and Japan, therefore, have been at the forefront of 
promoting liberalising PTAs. At another level, Korea’s and Japan’s governments have held 
goals distinctive from the private sectors. While seeking to balance the interests of various 
societal groups, they have had broader national and international goals, seeking welfare 
maximisation as a nation. In selecting a PTA negotiation approach with ASEAN, they 
considered a range of political and economic goals, such as realising trade gains, achieving 
negotiation efficiency, utilising diplomatic leverage and accomplishing foreign policy 
objectives.  
Second, while the interest-based factors help identify the causes that are upfront and 
static, ideational factors are more useful in determining the origins of PTAs’ policies in the 
long term and under flexible situations. In particular, their roles stand out when policymakers 
face uncertainty due to the unavailability of information in international negotiations. If ideas 
are not valid variables, domestic actors’ political and economic interests alone should act to 
determine Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation approaches. Furthermore, changes in their decisions 
may only occur under circumstances when their initial interest-based calculations are proven 
wrong or under conditions of structural change in the international political economy. In this 
context, the divergence between Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation preferences provide side-by-
side comparative cases to examine whether their changes or status quo in ideas determined 
their preferences. Defining ideas as policy paradigms, the thesis traces their roles in a temporal 
context. It examines why the two countries’ divergence did not occur immediately after the 
Asian financial crisis, which could have been the critical juncture. As Chapter 3 specifies, the 
antecedent conditions help identify how the background of Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs 
determined what viable range of policy options policymakers had when confronted by the 
crisis. Their policy trajectories, then, couple with the reinforcements, so that the two countries’ 
respective PTA experiences lead to path-dependency or path-creation of ideas. 
Third, institutions explain the supply side of trade policy. They act as filters, 
determining whose ideas and interests matter most and how they influence Korea’s and Japan’s 
PTA negotiation preferences. Different institutional structures empower domestic actors with 
contesting ideas and interests to varying degrees, which ultimately produce the dissimilar 
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outcomes in the decision-making processes. To determine the distribution of decision-making 
power across the different institutions, the thesis focuses on Korea’s and Japan’s executive–
legislative–bureaucratic relationship. It examines how the balance of power between the 
executive and the legislative branches influence centralisation or decentralisation in the PTA 
strategies of Korea and Japan. Inclusion of bureaucracy allows for Korea’s and Japan’s strong 
bureaucracy tradition and discretion to be taken into account in the respective country’s 
decision-making processes. A region-based PTA should be perceived as less costly under a 
centralised institution than a decentralised institution, due to the shorter time it takes to draw 
domestic consensus compensates for the inefficiencies involved in a multi-party negotiation.  
 
1.3.2 Research Method. No studies to date have strategically framed the motivations 
underlying East Asian countries’ choices between bilateralism and regionalism. The reason is 
that negotiation processes for PTAs have been under-highlighted and have limited data 
available. There are currently five PTAs at the ASEAN+1 level, but only Japan took a 
negotiation approach different from the other four PTAs. Therefore, existing studies have 
focused only on Japan.8 Studying Japan alone, however, does not provide information as to 
whether the country’s strategy was determined exogenously or endogenously. For this reason, 
this research adopts the comparative case study method to examine the counter-intuitive 
scenario demonstrated in the case of Korea, which better helps illuminate the domestic factors 
behind Korea’s and Japan’s choices of PTA negotiation approaches with ASEAN. 
As with many comparative case studies, conducting interviews was necessary to gather 
primary data for the research. Fieldwork was carried out from 2014 to 2017, with 36 interviews 
conducted in London, Seoul, Sejong and Tokyo. The interviewees included government 
officials, scholars, researchers in government policy institutions, and individuals representing 
private businesses or interest groups.  
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way with open-ended questions to 
stir discussion on topics about which interviewees had specialised experience or knowledge. 
To ensure consideration of all variables, including alternative explanations, the interview 
questions were not confined to domestic factors. Rather, the questions started from a broader 
level, such as “What were the factors that shaped Japanese/Korean negotiation strategy in the 
                                   
8 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of Japan’s motivation for PTAs with ASEAN.  
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beginning?” The open-ended questions allowed the interviewees to freely address the 
international and domestic causes behind their respective governments’ decisions. The 
discussions then narrowed to specific topics, depending on the interviewee’s position and 
experience. For example, to the Japanese negotiators, the author asked the questions such as 
“Did Japan consider promoting broader regional economic integration through the bilateral 
EPAs and AJCEP?” and “How were Japan’s negotiation approaches with ASEAN influenced 
by Japan’s previous trade negotiation experiences?”  
Also, the questions were directed to account for externalities, such as “What were the 
responses from ASEAN? Did they prefer the region-based approach, or the bilateral approach 
of negotiations?” Moreover, the questions addressed both short-term and long-term dimensions 
of Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations. For example, the author did not only ask about the 
micro factors that the interviewees considered were essential in shaping their respective PTAs, 
but also asked how they assessed these PTAs, both before and after the negotiations. They 
helped the author to explain the changes in the two countries’ motivations by examining how 
domestic actors reacted to and accommodated new stimuli.  
The type and duration of contact for the interviews depended on the individual 
interviewee’s circumstances. This included in-depth interviews (30–90 minutes) and shorter 
face-to-face personal conversations (5–30 minutes). Phone and email interviews were also 
conducted. Some interviewees did not mind disclosing their identities within the thesis, but 
many—particularly current government officials—requested anonymity. 
A significant portion of the interviews for the Korean case took place in Seoul between 
March and September 2015, when the author was a visiting fellow at the Korea University 
Asiatic Research Center. From September 2015 to September 2016, the author conducted 
interviews for the Japanese case in Tokyo while affiliated with the Graduate School of Asia 
Pacific Studies at Waseda University, as part of an exchange program offered by the author’s 
home institution (London School of Economics [LSE]). The author’s affiliation with these 
institutions in Korea and Japan made it conducive to reach the interviewees: these institutions 
offered the author their research networks and lent credibility to the author to convince 
potential interviewees to participate.  
In terms of approaching the interviewees, the author conducted interviews in Korean 
with Korean government officials first. The author’s background as a native Korean with prior 
work experience at the FTA Negotiation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
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(MOFAT) made it relatively easy to reach them. The initial interview experiences led to an 
expansion of the interview contact list through the snowballing effect. After contacting the 
Korean individuals or groups relevant for this research, the experience was then leveraged to 
carry out interviews on the Japanese side. Although the author acquired advanced-level 
Japanese skills at LSE for the purpose of this research, the author’s spoken language skills were 
insufficient to conduct smooth interviews in the specialised area of trade. Thus, a majority of 
interviews were conducted in English. Most interviewees in fact preferred to communicate 
directly in English, rather than using an interpreter, though there were cases in which an 
interpreter’s help was required.  
The author’s priority in interviews was to trace the individuals directly involved in 
Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations with ASEAN. Direct participation in these negotiations 
was critical in determining who was involved in the domestic decision-making processes, how 
the processes functioned and what determined their preferences—all of which ultimately 
shaped Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation approaches with ASEAN. In addition, their accounts 
were essential in elucidating the major momentums of the negotiation processes.  
Interviewed individuals included a former minister for trade, the head director of the 
KAFTA negotiations, MOFA (Korea) 9  officials responsible for Korea’s bilateral FTAs, 
directors of Japan’s bilateral EPAs, the director of AJCEP, scholars who participated in 
government meetings to provide policy advice for Korea’s and Japan’s FTAs with ASEAN, 
and the general manager of the Korean Advanced Farmers Federation (KAFF). In particular, 
most key decision makers and influential policy advisors in the two countries were reached 
through the interviews. Such interviews were particularly relevant for this research because 
Korea’s and Japan’s decision-making procedures were very much of a closed process. To quote 
a MOFA (Korea) official, “It is usually the government and the related bureaucracies that hold 
the discretion and the authority on whether they should reflect the discussions held with 
businesses or interest groups” (personal communication). Even though the degrees to which 
the reflections were made differed due to the government structures,10 both the Korean and the 
                                   
9 Korea’s MOFAT was restructured into MOFA in 2013 with the inauguration of the Geun-
hye Park Administration. MOFAT and MOFA are used interchangeably throughout the thesis, 
depending on when the negotiations or interviews were conducted. To differentiate MOFA in Korea 
from MOFA in Japan, the thesis indicates in parentheses the country to which the author is referring. 
10 The decision-making processes within Korea and Japan are discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 6, which accounts for the empowerment of domestic actors in PTAs based on Korea’s and 
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Japanese governments made decisions based on the accumulated demands from and 
consultations with the private sectors, rather than having these sectors directly involved in the 
decision-making processes. 
However, the author also encountered several limitations as the interviews progressed. 
First, Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations occurred between 10 and 17 years ago. Most 
government officials have retired or reached higher bureaucratic ranks, making them difficult 
to contact. Even though the author was fortunate to communicate with many key figures, it was 
still impossible to trace all the important personnel involved in the negotiations. Second, many 
interviewees candidly stated that their memories had faded. They could explain the broader 
strategies or significant events and motivations, but these were limited in detail. Third, it was 
much more difficult to trace the individuals belonging to businesses or private interest groups 
who were involved in Korea’s and Japan’s negotiations with ASEAN. Unlike with government 
documents, interest groups’ statements did not specify the names of the individuals involved; 
thus, it was a great challenge to track them down. As General Manager Min Su Han of KAFF 
said, “No one from back in the early 2000s is working here anymore, except for me; it was 
simply a long time ago” (personal communication). Today’s civic and private interest groups 
in Korea and Japan have undergone significant structural transformations; these changes, 
together with the movement of personnel, meant it was rare for individuals involved in the 
negotiations to have remained in their posts. 
To overcome these limitations, additional interviews were conducted with current 
government officials, scholars, researchers, businesses and interest groups in the related 
fields.11 These additional interviews and personal discussions were helpful in gaining general 
insight into the overall PTA trends in Korea and Japan, how the societal groups interact with 
the government, how today’s domestic actors perceive past events and the general preferences 
                                   
Japan’s institutional structures. 
11 In addition to conducting the interviews, the author participated in the FTA Practitioner 
Programme hosted by Seoul National University in 2015. The programme provided an opportunity to 
participate in lectures taught by 13 experts in trade, including formal officials, legal experts, 
researchers, consultants and scholars, and to discuss the various trade issues with 42 participants who 
came from different areas of trade across Korea, including businesses, research institutes, interest 
groups and government. In Japan, the author participated in various PTA-related seminars to engage 
in discussion with scholars, businesses and government officials with expertise in Japanese trade. At 
Waseda University, the author did coursework on Japan’s PTA policy, which was promoted in liaison 
with METI. 
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of the involved domestic actors. Additional data were acquired to make better sense of the 
negotiators’ accounts within the historical context of the negotiations and to account for the 
relative lack of resources about the private sectors’ preferences in Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs 
with ASEAN. The author retrieved the announcements of societal groups from their respective 
web archives. These resources included announcements made by the Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI), Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), KAFF, Korea Peasants League (KPL) 
and Central Union of Agricultural Groups (JA–Zenchu) in Japan.  
The thesis also used primary data such as unpublished reports and records from the 
archives of negotiating parties, written in English, Korean and Japanese. In the case of Korea, 
most records of trade negotiations are preserved at the FTA website (www.fta.go.kr), managed 
by the Korean government. In the case of Japan, records are divided mainly among four 
ministries: MOFA (Japan); METI; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF); 
and Ministry of Finance (MOF). The thesis also incorporated statistics available from the 
public sectors, such as the ASEAN Secretariat and the governments and research institutes of 
Korea, Japan and ASEAN.  
Secondary data sources also were incorporated, such as published reports, newspaper 
articles, accounts in other media and any other reliable sources of information available in 
English, Korean and Japanese. To compensate for the difficulty in reaching former negotiators, 
the author relied on news media that conducted interviews with government officials from the 
early 2000s. Archival data were collected from the National Assembly Library of Korea and 
the National Diet Library of Japan, which gave the author access to old newspaper articles and 
journal articles published in Korean or Japanese and otherwise unavailable to the public.  
Following the data collection, this research adopted the process-tracing method to 
connect evidence found from primary and secondary resources. Process tracing provided a 
useful tool to 
uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these 
stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occurs; the effect of various 
institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behaviour; and the effect of 
other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour. (George and 
McKeown 1985, 35) 
In other words, it offered techniques to uncover the historical connections among specific 
events and helped the author make sense of the disconnected evidence.  
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1.3.3 Case Selection: Korea and Japan. The previous section elaborated on the use of 
the comparative case study method in this thesis. Does this mean that Korea’s and Japan’s 
cases are in fact comparable? This section justifies the selection of these case studies by: 1) 
eliminating other ASEAN+1 PTA candidates and 2) assessing the economic and political 
background of Korea and Japan.  
First, it is useful to narrow the candidate cases by examining the background of the 
ASEAN+1 PTAs. AANZFTA and AIFTA can be ruled out relatively easily from an 
examination of the time frame in which the negotiations began, the mutual importance of 
ASEAN to its five partners and the geographical definitions of East Asia adopted by this study. 
For ASEAN too, the three Northeast Asian countries were its major trading partners, although 
Japan’s share of ASEAN’s total trade at 15.3% in 2000 was incomparable to that of Korea or 
China (see Table 1.4). China and Korea were newly emerging as ASEAN’s major trade 
partners, taking up 4.3% and 3.9% of ASEAN’s total trade, respectively, in 2000. Japan’s 
political and economic leverage, thus, would have been much greater than that of either Korea 
or China. To include these differences, Chapter 3 takes the political and economic leverage as 
one of the major factors shaping Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation preference between 
bilateralism and regionalism. 
Next, China’s FTA with ASEAN is further ruled out due to the limited scope of the 
thesis and China’s relative dissimilarity to Japan and Korea. Since the signing of the CAFTA 
framework agreement in 2001, China has been Japan’s major rival in competing for regional 
leadership. The differences between Japan’s and China’s international backgrounds, however, 
make it more difficult to trace the domestic determinants of a country’s negotiation preference 
between bilateralism and regionalism.  
As Chapter 2 illustrates, the major differences between China’s and Japan’s negotiation 
approaches are clearly identified by international factors. Politically, China in the early 2000s 
was a newly rising power in East Asia, whereas Japan had been an established regional power. 
Thus, China’s major motivation with CAFTA was more political than economic. 
Economically, CAFTA differs from AJCEP because it is an agreement between two developing 
parties, so designated under the GATT’s Enabling Clause (Higashi 2008). Japan is not 
applicable to this exception, so it was obliged to engage in the PTAs with greater liberalisation. 
Furthermore, China and ASEAN have horizontal economic structures, as low labour cost and 
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abundant natural resources and agricultural products characterise their economies. In contrast, 
Japan and Korea have vertical economic structures with ASEAN, and their PTAs with ASEAN 
in their nature are North–South agreements. Thus, Korea and Japan provide more comparable 
cases to investigate how domestic factors can be separated from international factors. 
Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs, including those with ASEAN, began and developed under 
similar international backgrounds. They were both under pressure to engage in bilateral and 
regional trade due to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the slow progress of the WTO in 
fostering trade relationships and the need to catch up with other countries that were advancing 
with PTAs (see Chapter 2 for detail). They also shared similar values as members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Munakata 2001, 14).  
 
Table 1.4 ASEAN's Exports to and Imports from China, Korea, Japan, Australia–New 
Zealand and India 2000, in billion USD 
  Exports Imports Total Share to ASEAN 
China 127.9 152.5 32.3 4.3% 
Korea 54.5 65.6 29.6 3.9% 
Japan 145.2 128.1 116.2 15.3% 
Australia–
NZ 
41.8 25.9 19.78 2.6% 
India 42.8 25.7 9.6 1.3% 
     
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2013). Data recompiled by author. 
  
For this reason, scholars, media and trade negotiators have compared the two countries’ 
progress in negotiating PTAs. Often, these analysts have viewed Korea and Japan to be in 
competition for PTAs.12 For example, when Korea signed FTAs with the US and the EU, 
                                   
12 For example, see Choi and Oh (2011), Yoshimatsu (2012), and J. Kim (2013). J. Kim 
(2013) provides a case of how Korea’s FTA progress with the US, EU and China heightened the 
urgent need for Japan to promote Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 
The South Korean government concluded its FTA negotiation with the United States in 2007, 
signed with the EU in 2010, and declared the start of its FTA negotiation with China. Given 
this situation, it is apparent that South Korea is actively promoting its FTAs with the United 
States, EU, and China, the three main export markets for Japan. To the Japanese government, 
already fearful of its being left out of the FTA competition in East Asia, South Korea’s recent 
push toward FTAs heightened the sense of crisis about Japan’s economic and diplomatic 
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Japanese commentators and the media engaged in heated debate, calling for fast PTA 
negotiation with larger economies.13 When Japan signed the Trans–Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
the Korean media and members of the public criticised the Korean government for lagging 
behind Japan.14 In the author’s interviews with trade negotiators and scholars in Korea and 
Japan, the interviewees often stated that because they are neighbouring countries with similar 
economic structures, they have naturally compared each other’s PTA progress while pursuing 
their own. Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN were no exception. Because both Korea 
and Japan began their PTAs after China’s move towards ASEAN, the two countries considered 
each other’s negotiation progress as a reference in their own negotiations (Chin 2010).  
In terms of their economic structures, Korea and Japan are both export-oriented 
economies. In trade with ASEAN, both countries have vertical trade relationships, with 
overlapping strengths in manufacturing sectors, such as machinery, electronic devices, 
transportation equipment and similar products. Their imports from ASEAN mainly consist of 
natural resources or products derived from those resources, such as crude oil, wood, chemicals, 
coal, and agricultural and fishery products.  
Even though Japan’s trade dependency is relatively low compared to Korea’s, trade has 
always been important for Japan (Ministry of Internal Affairs and communication of Japanese 
official, personal communication). As Chapter 4 illustrates, in 2002, 18.9% of Japan’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) depended on trade, whereas ASEAN’s share of trade took up 14%, or 
1.22 trillion USD.15 Korea depended far more on trade than Japan; in 2002, 51.7% of its GDP 
relied on trade. In 2002, ASEAN was Korea’s fifth-largest trading partner, taking up 11% of 
Korea’s total trades, or 35 billion USD. The figures suggest that to Japan and Korea, ASEAN 
was an important trade partner that could not have been overlooked despite the variation in the 
two countries’ trade dependency. Furthermore, even though Korea depended more on trade 
                                   
disadvantage. It is worth noting that at the first conference of the EPA project team, Yoshio 
Hachio, the former minister of METI, touched upon “South Korea” and expressed his worries 
about Japan’s falling behind Korea, saying that Japan was facing a turning point in dealing 
with the TPP substantially because the US Congress ratified the KORUS FTA. (5) 
13 For example, see KITA (2009), Hwang (2007) and Hornung (2011). 
14 For example, see Y. Kim (2015) and J. Lee (2015). 
15 On 10 August 2017, 134 trillion JPY converted into 1.22 trillion USD, based on an 
exchange rate of USD/JPY=110.08, as obtained from XE currency converter (http://www.xe.com). 
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than Japan, the absolute trade volume between Japan and ASEAN was approximately four 
times greater than between Korea and ASEAN. 
Finally, Korea and Japan are particularly interesting cases because they are currently 
the only instances of bilateral agreements that involve the same multiple partners. Neither had 
prior experience negotiating with multiple partners, nor did they have examples to learn from 
other than CAFTA. Prior to their PTAs with ASEAN, Korea–Chile FTA and Japan–Mexico 
FTA were the only cases in which the two countries experienced substantial opposition from 
the agricultural sector. Their similarities in the lack of precedent suggests that the two countries’ 
decisions are more likely to depend on domestic factors rather than external factors.  
 
1.3.4 The Externalities: Responses of ASEAN. The thesis’s primary interest rests on 
how the domestic variables in Korea and Japan interact. However, foreign economic policies, 
particularly PTAs, are not shaped unilaterally. They are an outcome of processes involving 
mediation among the member parties to arrive at mutual terms involving conditions and 
benefits. Therefore, they are inevitably affected by counterparties’ domestic circumstances and 
their willingness to participate in negotiations. The nature of ASEAN, which requires co-
operation among multiple parties, also added another complication to the FTA negotiations. In 
this thesis, these factors caused by the ASEAN side are considered to be externalities. 
As one example, the ASEAN side’s varying domestic conditions could have become a 
barrier to Korea’s and Japan’s trade negotiations. Chapter 4 demonstrates that Japan chose the 
bilateral approach of negotiations because it aimed to achieve high-quality trade agreements 
with individual ASEAN members. While Japan had political and economic leverage against 
the individual ASEAN members to achieve generous concessions in its agricultural sector, this 
leverage did not apply in all aspects of trade. For example, Japan considered that liberalisation 
in government procurement was necessary to meet the standards of its EPAs. Thus, Japan was 
to include chapters on government procurement in its agreements with Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. However, the same could not be applied with Malaysia (see 
Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). Malaysia’s bumiputra policy, a race-based affirmative action 
formulation that gives preference to ethnic Malays over ethnic Chinese or Indian citizens, was 
strongly present in government procurement and some service sectors at the time of JMEPA 
negotiations. Even though the Malaysian negotiators considered the EPA necessary to lock in 
domestic reform, the government procurement was considered almost like a sanctuary area 
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within Malaysian domestic politics, and it could not even be brought up at the negotiation table 
(METI official, personal communication). 
In addition, ASEAN is a group of nations that vary significantly in their developmental 
statuses. A condition accepted by one member of ASEAN, thus, may be more difficult to 
extend to another. To accommodate the variation, the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Secretariat 
2008) establishes that those ASEAN members that are ready to participate in an economic 
commitment may proceed, while those that are not ready may flexibly participate at a later 
time. This is specified in the Charter’s Chapter VII on Decision-Making Article 21, which 
stipulates that “in the implementation of economic commitments, a formula for flexible 
participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied where there is a 
consensus to do so.” Because of this policy, KAFTA could proceed without Thailand when the 
agreement regarding trade in goods was signed in 2016 (see Chapter 4). Similarly, most 
ASEAN+1 PTAs make exceptions for Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam (CLMV),16 
considering their developmental state, and grant them greater flexibility in tariff reductions and 
the reduction schedules.  
Finally, a collective action problem that exists within ASEAN poses another externality 
for Korea’s and Japan’s decision-making processes. Since its establishment, ASEAN has 
pursued the “ASEAN way” of regional co-operation, which emphasises values such as informal 
consensus making through minimal institutionalism and non-interference with the internal 
affairs of other sovereign member nations. The inefficiency attached to such flexibility, 
according to Yoshimatsu (2006, 123–130), should ideally be compensated by peer pressure. 
Instead, implementation of the AFTA was challenged due to attempts by Malaysia, Singapore 
and the Philippines to defect from the agreement. Even as Singapore and Thailand came to be 
the leaders co-ordinating the interest of ASEAN as a group, they showed ambivalence by 
actively promoting bilateral FTAs with non-members to remain competitive in the global 
market.  
Similarly, Corning (2009, 652) suggests that the Philippines and Thailand, in seeking 
bilateralism with Japan, worried that if AJCEP negotiations were concluded, other ASEAN 
members may free ride on their privileges with regard to Japan. The difference between AFTA 
                                   
16 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are often grouped together as the CLMV 
countries for their relatively late development statuses in ASEAN. 
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and ASEAN+1 agreements, however, is that ASEAN+1 agreements require all ASEAN 
members to co-operate with one voice against a non-member country. Hence, Yoshimatsu 
(2006, 115) demonstrates that “although ASEAN countries have not intended to establish a 
supranational body to resolve collective action problems, they have gradually developed 
feasible enforcement mechanisms by intensifying the centralized nature of regional 
organization.” Yoshimatsu (2008, 155) confirms that ASEAN did not welcome Japan’s 
bilateral approach, as the group approach would raise ASEAN’s bargaining power against a 
large economy such as Japan.17  
These externalities will be discussed as the research progresses in the following 
chapters. However, it should be emphasised here that the focus of this study is the domestic 
politics of Korea and Japan; thus, it is beyond the scope of this research to discuss domestic 
politics in ASEAN in detail. ASEAN perspectives will be incorporated when necessary, but 
only to resolve the gap that cannot be explained by Korea’s and Japan’s domestic politics alone. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 This introductory chapter began by providing a comprehensive overview of the East 
Asian regionalisms and plans for this research. The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. 
In Chapter 2, an extensive literature review is conducted on East Asian regionalism, 
compatibility between bilateralism and regionalism in East Asia, and Korea’s and Japan’s 
FTAs with ASEAN. It demonstrates that existing studies attribute the absence of regional 
economic institutions and the emergence of the ASEAN+1 PTAs primarily to international 
factors. When it comes to the scholarly debate on whether bilateralism and regionalism are 
compatible with one another, most scholars present pessimistic perspectives. This chapter finds 
this view is based on results rather than processes of East Asian trade agreements. Furthermore, 
domestic approaches toward IPE have only recently emerged in the literature of East Asian 
FTAs. Hence, the study of Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation processes fills a gap in the existing 
literature and adds a new perspective to the existing bilateralism versus regionalism debate. 
                                   
17 Despite ASEAN’s reaction, Japan was supportive of both bilateral EPAs and AJCEP, as 
Chapter 4 will illustrate. As a matter of fact, Japan has been a strong supporter of ASEAN unity. 
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Chapter 3 builds a theoretical foundation on which the thesis’s empirical evidence will 
be tested. The chapter first examines the strengths and weaknesses of systemic IPE theories. 
While acknowledging that theories such as neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism account 
for the broader changes of Korea’s and Japan’s trade policies, they are limited in explaining 
similar but unequal responses of the two countries toward international pressures. To explain 
this endogeneity, the chapter further explores the theoretical basis presented by domestic IPE 
approaches. Adopting an analytical framework based on the three I’s, it hypothesises that a 
combination of factors, namely, domestic interests, ideas and institutions, have led to the 
divergence of Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiation approaches with ASEAN. Sub-hypotheses 
on each of the three I’s are also established. 
Chapter 4 presents the first empirical chapter that investigates the influence of domestic 
interests on Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations with ASEAN. The chapter begins by 
providing a brief comparative background on how Korea’s and Japan’s interests changed 
throughout the post-war period. Then, based on the analytical framework presented in Chapter 
3, the author examines Korea’s and Japan’s private interests and government interests. In the 
private sectors, agricultural interest groups and industrial groups present conflicting interests 
for profit-driven reasons. At the government level, Korea and Japan calculate the costs and 
benefits of a bilateral versus regional approach to negotiation based on different political and 
economic motivations. They include achieving negotiation efficiency, enlarging market access, 
using diplomatic leverage and strengthening political ties. The findings of the chapter suggest 
that the two countries’ governments displayed notable differences in their interests, particularly 
in using diplomatic leverage and strengthening political ties, but both initially chose to promote 
bilateral approaches of PTA negotiations with ASEAN. 
Chapter 5 then provides ideas-based explanations for why the negotiation strategy in 
Korea suddenly changed from the bilateral approach to a region-based approach, whereas 
Japan’s strategy remained consistent. The chapter examines the changes in ideas about 
bilateralism and regionalism by defining the long-term and short-term momentums in the two 
countries’ historical trajectories in trade since the 1990s. In the long term, the chapter 
demonstrates how the domestic actors in the two countries arrived at different perceptions 
regarding East Asian identity and the importance of the WTO-based multilateral regime. In the 
short term, it illustrates how Korea’s earlier FTA experiences with Chile and Japan’s earlier 
FTA experiences with Singapore and M
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response to domestic opposition. Through an examination of these developments, the chapter 
contends that Japan’s emphasis on East Asian identity, which originated from its attachment to 
WTO-based rules and positive experience in gaining mutual acceptance around the agricultural 
sector, led it to continue its existing strategy. In contrast, Korea was less attached to the idea 
of East Asian identity or achieving more through PTAs than required by WTO standards. It 
also sought ways to negotiate more efficiently in the face of strong domestic opposition. Thus, 
under the path-breaking leadership of a new trade minister, Korea quickly shifted its bilateral 
strategy to the region-based KAFTA. 
Chapter 6 presents the final empirical chapter on the institutional dimensions of Korea’s 
and Japan’s FTA policies. It questions why Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation progresses were 
reversed, even though Korea changed its initial negotiation approach to the region-based 
strategy that was considered relatively inefficient. Also, only a few individuals changed policy 
direction in Korea. In Japan, the decision-making process involved numerous key players, 
which thus tended to be decentralised and improvised. It argues that the differences in the two 
countries’ institutional structures account for these variations, distributing varying degrees of 
power to the decision makers. To demonstrate this point, institutional backgrounds of Korea 
and Japan are examined, focusing on the development of their respective PTA institutions from 
the late 1990s to the early 2000s. It demonstrates how the differences in the executive and 
legislative branches of the two countries and the internal relationships of their respective 
bureaucracies resulted in a divergence from the institutionalisation of the PTA strategies, as 
illustrated by their PTA strategies with ASEAN.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It revisits the three I’s analytical framework to 
examine when and how domestic interests, ideas and institutions interacted with and influenced 
Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation approaches with ASEAN. It then explains how the empirical 
findings of this research provide an alternative perspective for the bilateralism versus 
regionalism debate. At a more practical level, it also provides implications for policy makers 
on negotiation approaches taken in PTAs. The chapter ends by addressing the limitations of 
the thesis and recommending future research directions. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
When GATT was established in 1947, it set a strong base for non-discrimination for 
all its members. Article I contains an unconditional most favoured nation (MFN) obligation 
for all contracting parties (WTO n.d.).18 However, GATT also left a room for flexibility 
under Article XXIV, which stipulates that customs union and FTA—agreements that are 
discriminatory by their nature—are allowed under specified circumstances. Article XXIV 
states that the exception is permitted, provided that “substantially all the trade” is liberalised 
“within a reasonable length of time”, and that duties and other regulations are “on the whole” 
not higher or restrictive than for the parties in the PTA (WTO, n.d.).19 This room for 
flexibility allowed the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 and the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in 1960. Mirroring the footsteps of the European 
initiatives, there were a number of proposals for PTAs in the 1960s. Bhagwati (1992, 538–
539) defined this phenomenon as First Regionalism.20 
The regionalism revived in the 1980s when the US and European countries redirected 
their attention to PTAs. The US began FTAs with Israel, Canada, Mexico and, further, 
                                   
18 GATT Article I paragraph 1 states that: 
“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect 
to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.” 
See the full text of this Article from the WTO website: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art1_e.pdf 
19 See the full text of GATT Article XXIV from the WTO website: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm 
20 Bhagwati (1992) believed First Regionalism failed because the US was indifferent about 
PTAs and developing countries’ bureaucracies tended to go far ahead of the actual market flow. 
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NAFTA. The European Economic Area agreement was signed in 1991 to promote integration 
between the EU and EFTA. To Bhagwati (1992), the main driver of Second Regionalism was 
attributable to the US’s commitment to engage in PTAs. Baldwin (1993) argued that the 
revival of regionalism could be explained by what he labelled as the domino theory of 
regionalism, suggesting that exclusion from one economic bloc leads non-member economies 
to promote other PTAs—as a result, bilateralism proliferates.  
As the number of PTAs increased globally, debates surrounding the phenomenon also 
intensified. These were framed around Bhagwati’s (1992, 543) question, “[w]ill regionalism 
lead to nondiscriminatory multilateral free trade for all, through continued expansion of the 
regional blocs until universal free trade is reached, or will it fragment the world economy?” 
The question asks, in essence, whether the proliferation of bilateralism and regionalism is a 
building block or a stumbling block to multilateralism.21  
While the new wave of PTAs flourished in the West, East Asia continued to adhere to 
WTO-based multilateralism throughout most of the 1990s. It was after the 1997–1998 Asian 
financial crisis that the East Asian countries began to seek PTAs. Despite a decade of delay in 
the proliferation of bilateralism, the Bhagwati dilemma has taken centre stage in debate in 
East Asia, without exception.  
Therefore, the first part of this chapter examines the emergence of bilateralism and 
regionalism in East Asia and how each evolved. It reviews the literature that explains why 
East Asia’s regionalism began later than that of the EU and the US, and what was the 
rationale for the emergence of PTAs in the region. It also addresses competing scholarly 
views on whether the different levels of “lateralisms”—bilateralism, regionalism and 
multilateralism—have been compatible in East Asia, including the ASEAN+1 PTAs.  
The second part of this chapter focuses on Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations with 
ASEAN. It reviews the literature on the political and economic factors that drive these FTAs. 
Finding these factors to be focused more on results than processes, the chapter investigates 
studies conducted on the negotiation processes of KAFTA and AJCEP. It then assesses the 
contributions and limitations of existing explanations. Finally, this chapter concludes by 
locating the thesis within the literature of East Asian regionalism and recapping the 
contribution of the thesis to the existing body of literature.  
                                   
21 See Schott (2004) for an overview of the debate between FTA advocates and critics. 
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2.2 The Development of East Asian Regionalism  
 
When did the concept of East Asian regionalism first emerge and how did it develop 
over the years? Baogang He (2017) traced back the origin of East Asian regionalism as early 
as the 1900s. East Asia cultivated a sense of Pan–Asianism to “preserve the traditional 
cultures of Asia in response to Western imperialism in the early twentieth century” (He 2017, 
26–27). From this common experience, East Asian countries developed an “Asian-value”, or 
a cultural foundation and regional identity, based on nationalist and statist thinking that 
differentiated the region from the West. For example, Japan distinguished East Asians from 
“white raced” Westerners by emphasising the commonality between Japan, Korea and China 
for being “yellow raced” (He 2017, 28–29). Japan’s approach of race-based thinking was 
criticised by Chinese elites, who considered it a tool for Japanese imperialism. The Chinese 
activist Li Dazho proposed in 1919 that “[a]ll suppressed nations in Asia should gain 
independence and exercise self-determination first, then form an Asian union. Finally, 
together with Europe and America, they would achieve a world federation to enhance human 
happiness” (He 2017, 29–30). 
 Thus, it could be said that a sense of community existed in East Asia, although it did 
not develop as any kind of economic or political co-operative initiative to address the 
region’s common goals. In the postmodern period, the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 
marks the first regional co-operative effort in East Asia. It was followed by some of the major 
regional co-operation efforts, such as the creation of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) in 1989, which expanded the idea of East Asian regionalism to include the Pacific 
Rim countries (He 2017). In trade, AFTA was signed in 1992 as the first FTA in the region.  
Despite these initiatives, East Asian regionalism had been widely perceived as under-
institutionalised compared to regional institutions established in North America and Europe. 
Notwithstanding the high level of economic interdependence and geographical propinquity, 
East Asia has lacked a structure that can enforce co-operative measures (Calder and Ye 2004; 
Friedberg 1993; Calder and Fukuyama 2008; Ravenhill 2008b). As Calder and Ye (2004, 
191) put it, there exists a distinctive “organization gap” in East Asian regionalism. The origin 
of this gap dates back to the 1950s, when a hub-and-spoke form of alliance developed 
between the US and Asia after the advent of the San Francisco System; the US offered its 
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Asian allies access to its market in return for bilateral security agreements and encouraged 
them to join multilateral institutions rather than forming exclusively Asian regional 
institutions (Beeson 2003; Calder 2004; Aggarwal and Koo 2008, 289–290; Terada 2009).  
Throughout the 1990s, the rapid increase of economic transaction in East Asia was 
seen to be dominantly market-driven, witnessing the intensification of intra-regional 
production networks and investment (Promfret 2010). Such a market-driven process of 
regional integration has often been referred to as regionalisation to distinguish the 
phenomenon from regionalism, a term used to indicate institution-driven regional integration 
initiatives (Langhammer 1995; Dent 2006; Urata 2006; Promfret 2010). Dent (2006, 206) 
defined regionalisation as arising from “micro-level processes that stem from a regional 
concentration of private or civil sector activities, such as intensifying international trade 
between firms within a particular regional zone”.  
Proposals for East Asia regional initiatives continued to be strongly opposed by the 
US throughout the 1990s. Its most representative example is Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal for the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) in 1990. 
Thus, the first tide of debate between bilateralism and regionalism concerned whether the 
US’s allies could move away from this hub-and-spoke relationship and form their own 
region-based institution. As Brown (1993) demonstrated, during this time Japan’s opinion 
leaders and elites in business, politics and academics were clearly divided into two groups: 
bilateralists and regionalists.  
The regionalists were stimulated by the rise of regional economic groupings in North 
America and Europe and argued that Japan should similarly take the initiative in Asia to 
foster economic and political ties within the region. They viewed the US–Japan security 
relationship as having faded with the end of the Cold War and American power as on the 
decline due to societal and economic instabilities. The bilateralists, in contrast, argued that 
Japan should maintain its bilateral relationship with the US to keep the region’s security in 
order. They considered the end of Cold War to mean greater insecurity for Asia, as militarism 
was reviving around the world, and Japan should continue the Yoshida Doctrine22 by 
refraining from involvement in sensitive issues of international politics (Brown 1993, 554). 
                                   
22 Hughes (2015) provides a concise definition of Yoshida Doctrine: 
‘Yoshida Doctrine’ (Yoshida Rosen), forged in the aftermath of total defeat in the Pacific War, 
has long emphasised for Japan the need for a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy, a 
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The Asian financial crisis was a direct trigger for change in East Asian regionalism. 
IMF’s strict bailout conditions made the East Asian countries discontent toward the existing 
system, and regional initiatives for trade and finance began to appear in various forms of co-
operation. East Asia growingly perceived APEC and ASEAN as forums to load off the heavy 
reliance on the US (Krauss and Naoi 2011, 52). Increasing intra-regional trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) competition posed by NAFTA and the EU, as well as the inefficiency 
demonstrated in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, added to the mounting discontent 
over the organisation gap (Manger 2005; Solís and Katada 2007). Furthermore, the growth of 
the Chinese market began to supply a new source of opportunities for trade and investment 
based on East Asia (Schott 2004, 6). Dent (2005, 293) added that the shift to bilateralism 
partially related to the shifting trade policy paradigm from mercantilism to liberalism. Trade 
policies in East Asia’s newly developed countries, once based on economic nationalism and 
mercantilism, were increasingly open to neo-liberal norms.  
 Post-crisis East Asia has witnessed regional economic co-operation at the 
institutional level, and its most outstanding feature has been regional and bilateral trade 
agreements. Japan’s proposed Asian Monetary Fund in September 1997 was one of the first 
attempts to initiate regionalism under its leadership; however, it was soon discouraged by 
fierce oppositions from the US and IMF (Terada 2003, 265). Three months later, the first 
APT Summit meeting took place. APT went on to provide a forum for ASEAN countries to 
co-operate on economic and security issues. For example, in 2000 it established the Chiang 
Mai Initiative to prepare the region for future currency crisis by arranging its own currency 
swap for member states. In addition, PTAs also began to emerge in the region to strengthen 
intra- and extra-regional economic networks. 
These regional initiatives triggered IR scholars to speculate on the prospect of an East 
Asian exclusive economic pact. For example, Acharya (1997) presented an optimistic view 
on the expansion of “the ASEAN way” into the “Asia–Pacific way” from a constructivist’s 
perspective: the institution building in the region was a process of identity building based on 
                                   
highly constrained defence posture, reliance but not over-dependence on the US-Japan 
security treaty and the expedient rebuilding of economic and diplomatic ties with East Asian 
neighbours. (2) 
See Chapter 4 for details on the Yoshida Doctrine and Japan’s foreign economic policy. 
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four key ideas of ASEAN: co-operative security, open regionalism, soft regionalism and 
flexible consensus. By giving the examples of APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), Acharya argued that “the ASEAN way” provided an identity to the region beyond 
material interests, facilitating socialisation between policymakers.  
Others pictured East Asian regionalism based on ASEAN+3. Stubbs (2002) 
considered that ASEAN+3 has the potential to become a predominant regional institution in 
East Asia, as APEC and ASEAN suffer from internal division. That is, APEC is divided 
between the Anglo–American economies that value binding and comprehensive trade 
liberalisation, while the less developed Asian economies prefer trade facilitation and 
economic and technical co-operation. ASEAN suffers a similar problem: it is divided 
between the original members and the new members, meaning, the newly democratising 
governments and the authoritarian governments. It has also questioned to what extent 
ASEAN values, such as non-interference and flexibility, should be applied in promoting the 
co-operation within ASEAN. In the meantime, Stubbs argues that ASEAN+3 stands a better 
chance, because East Asian countries share common post-war history, cultural traits, a 
distinctive set of institutions that pursue export-oriented industrial development, the East 
Asian form of capitalism, and increased intra-regional FDI and trade. Moreover, the Asian 
financial crisis strengthened the region’s sense of community by adding a shared experience, 
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of APEC and ASEAN, and causing a sense of common 
resentment toward IMF and the US.  
Terada (2003, 265) also acknowledged the Asian financial crisis’s role in promoting 
the East Asian identity, and he stressed the role of Japan in taking the initiative for this 
approach (267–270). However, he is less optimistic than Stubbs (2002) in viewing 
ASEAN+3’s potential to act as a full-fledged regional community. It has a significant 
implication for East Asia’s acquisition of its own identity but is still premature to draw 
consensus among the member countries on the different levels of issues. Considering its 
informal nature, ASEAN feels uneasy about the possibility of losing the driver’s seat in 
promoting regionalism, and non-member countries such as the US and Australia may voice 
their opposition. Beeson (2003) showed greater pessimism than the aforementioned scholars, 
but for similar reasons: intra-regional tensions and informality stands in ASEAN+3’s 
integration, and the US’s influence would constrain further development of East Asia’s 
regionalism. 
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2.3 The New Bilateralism Versus Regionalism Debate 
 
A decade ago, scholars like Hund (2003) and Maclntyre and Naughton (2005) were 
pessimistic about the full realisation of the ASEAN+1 PTAs. Hund (2003, 396–397) showed 
scepticism toward AJCEP and CAFTA, as they would only add more complication to the 
existing AFTA, which had been exhibiting an inefficient progress of development. In 
addition, Maclntyre and Naughton (2005, 98) argued that the ASEAN-based frameworks 
tended to be consensus-based rather than rule-based; the absence of the US to co-ordinate the 
disagreement among the East Asian countries meant these frameworks would be difficult to 
be achieved.  
Even as different predictions for future regionalisms emerged in the early 2000s, the 
ASEAN+1 level FTAs continued to progress in competition with one another. Thus, the 
debate shifted away from whether East Asia had the capability to form its own regional 
economic initiative free from American influence and towards the compatibility of newly 
emerging bilateral agreements with a more integrative RTA. The second tide of debate 
between bilateralism and regionalism, therefore, questioned whether bilateral agreements 
were compatible with regionalism.  
To address this debate, it is useful to frame the questions embedded in the phrasing 
“compatibility between bilateralism and regionalism”. According to Renard (2016, 22), 
“bilateralism substitutes, complements or competes with regionalism and/or multilateralism”. 
In this context, this debate generates three possible scenarios: 
The first scenario implies that bilateralism comes in when regionalism and 
multilateralism have proved ineffective or inexistent. The sequencing neutralizes 
compatibility concerns. The second scenario implies that bilateralism is compatible 
with and mutually reinforcing with regionalism/multilateralism. The third scenario 
implies that bilateralism is incompatible with and mutually undermining with 
regionalism/multilateralism. (Renard 2016, 22) 
 
Existing studies generally agree that bilateralism and regionalism mutually influence 
one another, falling into either the second or third scenario. When it comes to the 
compatibility between ASEAN+1 PTAs and bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN 
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members, however, scholars are more pessimistic. For example, Corning (2009) argued that 
AJCEP is limited in harmonising Japan’s bilateral EPAs with ASEAN, mainly regarding 
WTO-plus issues and rules of origin (RoO). AJCEP does not include issues such as 
government procurement and labour mobility or other specific issues that are addressed in 
bilateral deals. Moreover, exporters and importers are given the flexibility to choose RoO that 
benefit them the most. Thus, Corning (2009) argued, it is difficult to claim that AJCEP 
harmonises Japan’s bilateral EPAs, even though AJCEP does have some elements, such as 
product-specific rules, that are more liberalising than its bilateral EPAs. Dent (2010, 213) 
also demonstrated the cases in which numerous FTAs were stalled by other agreements. 
Korea’s bilateral FTA with Thailand is one such case in which bilateral FTA was superseded 
by the regional KAFTA. 
With regard to the debate of bilateralism and regionalism at the broader level, which 
envisages a more integrative form of East Asian or Asia–Pacific regionalism, the literature 
consistently presents a negative perspective. Dent (2005; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2013) has been a 
leading critic in this debate. He has been pessimistic about the possibility of existing PTAs 
leading to a more comprehensive form of regional co-operation because of the diversity that 
exists within the region, including technical differences, political and economic differences, 
ideational differences, and rivalry between regional FTA projects (Dent 2010). Dent (2010, 
211) has defined the ASEAN+1 PTAs as a form of “quasi-regional arrangements”, as they 
are agreements between a single country and a regional group. According to Dent (2010), 
however, the approaches taken in these FTAs suffer from a significant gap. For example, 
Japan’s approach to FTAs is more suited to developed economies, whereas China’s approach 
in CAFTA demanded a much simpler framework while giving many concessions to ASEAN 
in the agricultural and forestry sectors through the Early Harvest Program—terms that Japan 
and Korea would have difficulty accommodating (Dent 2005). Dent (2008) has suggested 
that the proliferation of bilateral agreements deepens the “lattice bilateralism”, meaning, the 
complicatedness attached to the tangled bilateral agreements within the region hinder the 
region’s economic integration and exacerbate competition between the countries.  
Baldwin (2008), despite his popular theory advocating FTAs as building blocks to 
regionalism and multilateralism, also showed scepticism when it comes to the discussion of 
East Asian regionalism. He viewed East Asian regionalism as fragile for three reasons. First, 
East Asia’s industrial competitiveness highly depends on the supply chain network. However, 
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the East Asian market is prone to small country conflicts arising from their political, 
economic and cultural diversity, which could threaten the stability of this structure. Second, 
ASEAN and Chinese tariff-reduction are not bound by WTO discipline, which implies these 
countries can nullify their agreements at any time without compromising existing multilateral 
rules. Third, current co-operation efforts in East Asia lack management. For example, the 
ASEAN+1 level FTAs are important elements of East Asian regionalism, but they are 
discriminatory, which makes the region highly vulnerable to the precedents of other regions, 
which leads to exclusion and competition rather than inclusion and expansion of regionalism.  
However, Baldwin (2006, 1–2) also argued that ASEAN+3 provides the best 
institutional framework to manage the tangled web of East Asian PTAs to ease the “noodle 
bowl” syndrome, as it would be time-saving to rely on an existing institution. That is, 
ASEAN+3 has built certain credibility in the region while avoiding sensitive diplomatic 
issues. ASEAN+3 also does not represent a particular regional or non-regional power or 
threaten non-members, and when necessary, it would be easy to include new members. 
Furthermore, ASEAN+3 includes the nations that place emphasis on intra-regional trade. 
However, Baldwin also suggested that in order for ASEAN+3 to develop into a regional 
economic institution, it would need to solve its management issue by devising its own 
secretariat that is equipped with high quality experts.  
The technical analyses of AFTA, ASEAN+1 PTAs and Japan’s bilateral EPAs also 
find these agreements lack consistency and vary significantly in their commitments. Thus, 
harmonising these agreements will consume much effort; although it could also mean that 
further liberalisation from the harmonisation can be expected. Fukunaga and Kuno (2012) 
analysed tariff structures of the ASEAN+1 PTAs and demonstrate that further tariff 
elimination is needed, particularly for the less developed economies of ASEAN, such as 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Myanmar, whose liberalisation in tariff lines are still below 
the 90% threshold, which is the minimum figure generally agreed by WTO member countries 
to meet the requirements of GATT Article XXIV.  
When it comes to RoO, Medalla (2011) finds that Japan’s bilateral EPAs and AJCEP 
have common general rules. The major difference between the two arises from AJCEP’s use 
of regional value content (RVC) and Japan’s bilateral EPAs’ use of qualified value content 
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(QVC) or local value content (LVC).23 Japan’s bilateral EPAs have less restrictive RoO, but 
with more exceptions, particularly in the textile and garment sectors. Therefore, Japan’s 
exporters have the tendency to prefer using bilateral EPAs over AJCEP. Because firms are 
responsible for figuring out the best RoO and complying with them, the different RoO 
intensify the noodle bowl syndrome.  
Medalla (2011) further found there exists significant commonality among the four 
ASEAN+1 PTAs.24 Although they have differences in specific restrictions, 64% of all tariff 
lines by the six digit Harmonized System (HS) codes of the five FTAs have at least one RoO 
in common, 14.8% with four FTAs, and 15.9% with three FTAs. Only 0.4%, or 23 tariff 
lines, did not have HS codes that are in common. These figures indicate that 90% of RoO are 
shared by three or more FTAs. Medalla (2011) also found that CAFTA had the most 
restrictive and different RoO among the five ASEAN+1 PTAs, while AANZFTA had the 
least restrictive. For regional economic integration to take place, Medalla suggested that the 
costs of complying with RoO should be further reduced and the different RoO should be 
harmonised with the most liberal ones used. 
In services, Ishido (2011) demonstrated that commitments in the ASEAN+1 PTAs 
(except for AJCEP which has not negotiated services) are closely correlated but vary 
significantly in the liberalisation of sensitive sectors. Moreover, the ASEAN+1 PTAs are less 
liberalising in general, compared to Japan’s bilateral EPAs’ commitment in Mode 3 
(commercial presence) and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) of the services 
agreements. Thus, he suggests that East Asian regionalism with regards to services should 
begin by engaging in more liberalising bilateral agreements for spillover effects. With regard 
to FDIs, Thangavelu and Lim (2011) examined CAFTA and KAFTA, and their findings 
suggest that FDI policies in manufacturing sectors are much more liberalising than in 
services. 
To the author’s knowledge, the effects of non-tariff barriers or regulatory measures in 
ASEAN+1 PTAs have not been studied in the existing literature due to the difficulty in 
                                   
23 See Medalla and Rosellon (2012, 6) for the advantages and disadvantages of using 
different RoO. 
24  Medalla (2011) excluded the ASEAN–India FTA, because it was being negotiated at the 
time of her research. 
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finding reliable data (Cheong 2005, 145). However, the ASEAN+1 PTAs have been known 
to have very weak non-tariff and regulatory barriers in common (Sally 2013). 
As negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
started in 2012, Fukunaga and Isono (2013) argued that ASEAN+1 PTAs are stumbling 
blocks rather than building blocks to such a partnership. Their level of liberalisation in both 
goods and services is limited, and their complicated RoO would cause the “noodle bowl” 
syndrome. Basu Das, Sen and Srivastava (2016, 253) also saw the five ASEAN+1 PTAs’ 
lack coherence in “negotiating framework, coverage issues, deadlines and depth of 
commitments”. Corning (2011) alternatively suggested that competition for the promotion of 
bilateral FTAs between Korea, Japan and China help the region to overcome cultural 
diversity and political disputes, which in turn will drive East Asian regionalism. Thus, he 
argued that Korea’s cross-regional FTAs with the US and the EU are more realistic drivers to 
East Asian regionalism than the proposals for ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 FTAs, which would 
push China and Japan to promote FTAs with Korea. 
 
2.4 Driving Factors of the KAFTA and AJCEP Negotiations 
 
Previous studies find there are political and economic motivations behind KAFTA 
and AJCEP. In the political dimension, realist scholars explain that it was the Sino–Japanese 
rivalry and the need to balance growing regional economic powers in North America and 
Europe that triggered Japan and Korea to launch these PTAs. In the economic dimension, 
other scholars find that trade creation and diversion effects called for the two PTAs, which 
would not only create absolute economic gains for the involved parties but also compensate 
for the loss caused in Korea and Japan by CAFTA. The following section details the 
rationales of these scholars. 
 
2.4.1 Intra-regional and Cross-regional Power Competition. Scholars have 
repeatedly emphasised the close connection between power politics and East Asian economic 
regionalism, which Pempel (2013, 1) referred to as an “economic–security nexus”. The 
ASEAN+1 agreements have been influenced by political factors as much as economic factors 
(Ravenhill 2008b, 96), which can be observed intra-regionally and cross-regionally. Intra-
regionally, the Sino–Japanese competition has been identified as the main factor driving the 
51 
 
ASEAN-based PTAs. Cross-regionally, scholars show evidences of the East Asian countries’ 
concern over the growing regional powers in other parts of the world, particularly in North 
America and Europe. 
In the background of the Sino–Japan rivalry are the economic-driven changes that 
occurred since the 1990s. After transitioning to a market-oriented economic policy, China 
rapidly emerged as a major player in the international market and sought to participate in 
various international organisations, including its 2001 accession into the WTO (Maclntyre 
and Naughton 2005, 93). In contrast, Japan experienced a prolonged economic recession, 
which persisted throughout the 2000s. During this time, Japan became increasingly conscious 
of China’s growth and increasing influence in the region—and the world.  
Otsuji and Shinoda (2014, 147) noted that Japan’s PTA movement toward JSEPA 
initially directed China’s attention towards ASEAN. However, China’s first proposal of 
CAFTA in 2000 still came as a surprise to Korea and Japan (Aoki 2004, 13), because China’s 
approach had been perceived as unrealistic at the time (Corning 2011, 264). Since then, 
China gradually gained recognition as strategic and diplomatic, as it desired to take the 
leadership role in building East Asian regionalism by constraining American power and 
regional powers, such as Japan, and promoting closer security ties with ASEAN (Hughes 
2006, 129; Yoshimatsu 2008, 127–146; Maclntyre and Naughton 2005, 96; Ravenhill 2008b, 
81). Therefore, Japan perceived China’s trade policy move toward ASEAN as a threat 
(Terada 2009; Corning 2009; Corning 2011; Aoki 2004,13; Dreyer 2006; Yoshimatsu 2008).  
As ASEAN had never been recognised as a PTA partner until China’s proposal 
(Terada 2008, 13–14), Japan’s response to establish a new economic agreement with ASEAN 
was considered reactive to the Chinese policies.25 According to Lim (2005, 141) Japan was 
“losing its polish” on the economic front. The country had concluded only one PTA in 2002 
with Singapore, a country with an economy that lacks significant agricultural interests and 
that has a tariff rate close to zero. JSEPA provided a small share in trade for Japan and 
negligible impact on the overall Japanese economy. 
                                   
25 See Drysdale (1986) and Calder (1988) for further detail on Japan as a reactive/reactionary 
state. The description was first used in the late 1980s to depict Japanese foreign economic policy that 
is highly dependent on US pressure or “American satellite syndrome” (Drysdale 1990, 30). Today, the 
description is used to criticise Japanese policies that are heavily influenced by the policies of other 
states. 
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Drawing from realist-oriented concepts, Yoshimatsu (2008, 149) argued that Japan 
showed power balancing behaviour against China by aligning with ASEAN. The political 
will of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) drove Japan’s commitment to ASEAN, as the 
party’s politicians feared that Japan’s regional leverage would decline. This concern 
outweighed the strong opposition within the party, which had long maintained close relations 
with the agricultural sector (Yoshimatsu 2008, 153).  
As a result of the power play between China and Japan, ASEAN came to be located 
as a natural economic and political medium for connecting the two powers (Lim 2005). 
Accompanied by pursuit of its own interest in the two countries, ASEAN came to take the 
driver’s seat—albeit its limited capacity to be a regional power—in promoting the ASEAN+1 
framework (Terada 2008, 13; Dent 2008, 211). 
In the midst of the Sino–Japanese rivalry, Korea’s move toward KAFTA also had 
strategic implications (Lee 2006, 185). Korea aimed to form a horizontal relationship with 
ASEAN, rather than compete within Northeast Asia where China and Japan have greater 
political and economic leverage in absolute terms. In other words, Y. Lee (2006) argued that 
Korea pursued a strategy that would mediate the two competing powers by playing the 
balancer’s role, which was similar to the tactics of ASEAN. 
 Cross-regional competition is little discussed in the literature compared to intra-
regional rivalry. It has often been taken for granted that East Asia should attempt to build its 
own regional pact, given the on-going co-operation in the EU and NAFTA, and to create a 
tripolar trading system in the global economy (Sohn 2004, 500). However, some scholars 
give evidences that there were apparent intra-regional and domestic concerns about rising 
regional pacts in these two economies. For example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir 
reaffirmed his vision of ASEAN+3 and the creation of ASEAN-based RTAs during Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit in January 2002 as a “necessary balance” to the EU and 
NAFTA (Hund 2003, 387). Ravenhill (2008b, 82–83) showed that Japan was perturbed by 
the progress made through NAFTA in the late 1990s. Witnessing the aggressive expansion of 
European and North American countries and their businesses enjoying preferential access 
through regional arrangements, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)26 
                                   
26 MITI was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2000. 
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was concerned that Japanese companies would be disadvantaged unless the country 
negotiated new regional arrangements that included “WTO plus” issues. 
In short, the growing regionalism in Europe and North America was no doubt a 
critical factor consolidating East Asian leaders to form their own regional forum. However, 
Katzenstien (2000) suggested a softer perspective of what may be considered a tripolar 
trading system. He viewed the concept of “open regionalism” and the East Asian approach to 
regionalism as not discriminating against the regions outside the bloc, thereby embracing the 
US and Europe and leading to a more “plural world” rather than a “tripolar world”. 
 
2.4.2 Economic Factors: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects. From a 
purely economic perspective, it was natural that the ASEAN+1 PTAs or broader RTAs 
should be promoted. As Langhammer (1995, 175) observes, the trades with ASEAN 
countries rose faster with non-member countries, such as Korea or Taiwan, than among the 
member countries from 1980 to 1992. Existing studies find that Korea and Japan benefit from 
the ASEAN+1 agreements through trade creation effect, while at the same time avoiding the 
trade diversion caused by CAFTA.  
A useful departure point evaluating the trade creation effect of the ASEAN+1 
agreements is to examine existing studies on the gravity model of trades27 and the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.28 Studies using these models generally 
                                   
27 See Sohn (2005) for further detail on the gravity model of trades and its implication for 
Korea’s trade patterns. He explained that: 
[the] gravity model becomes in great fashion as it deals with the bilateral trade flows. The 
gravity model is so-named in that it copies the equation of gravity theory in Newtonian 
physics: bilateral trade volume (physical gravitational force) increases with the product of 
economic sizes (physical masses) and decreases with geographical distance (physical 
distance). The gravity equation fitted data [of international trade] remarkably well. It was the 
empirical success that made economists search for the theoretical foundations of the gravity 
model. The gravity equation, thereafter 1980s, was derived theoretically as a reduced form 
from various international trade models… the gravity equation appears to be consistent with a 
large class of trade models. (Sohn 2005, 2–3) 
Moreover, he argues that the gravity model is apt to explain Korea’s bilateral trade patterns, given 
Korea’s economic nature. It is a small country with scarce natural resources but it is also a major 
exporter and producer. Therefore, having a comparative advantage in different industries makes 
Korea’s trade more dependent on inter-industry trade, as noted by the Heckscher–Ohlin model, rather 
than on intra-industry trade that is dependent on economies of scale. 
28 The CGE model in trade analysis uses economic data to conduct simulations on how 
changes in trade policies impact an economy. See Ando and Urata (2006, 2–4) for a detailed 
54 
 
confirm that the creation of PTAs improves economic welfare of all participating members in 
East Asia. For instance, Amin (2009), using the CGE model, showed that inter-industry and 
intra-industry trade creation effect can be achieved through AFTA, and argues that trade 
policies for economic growth should be further promoted. Tang and Wang (2006) also found 
a strong trade creation effect for ASEAN and CAFTA. Estrada et al. (2011) demonstrated 
that all three ASEAN+1 PTAs benefit the parties involved. They further showed that CAFTA 
is expected to bring greater economic gain for ASEAN than KAFTA or AJCEP.  
Another general finding from the existing studies using the gravity model and the 
CGE model is that broader PTAs bring higher economic gains to their members (Ando and 
Urata 2006; Estrada et al. 2011, 17; Gilbert et al. 2004; Kawai and Wignaraja 2008). Ando 
and Urata (2006) compared the different combination of ASEAN, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+2 and 
ASEAN+3 FTAs through the CGE model, and they demonstrated that ASEAN+3 FTA yields 
the best outcome for regional economies at a macro level. Estrada et al. (2011) found that, 
while the ASEAN+1 agreements benefit East Asia and are easier to reach, ASEAN+3 FTA 
(consisting of the ASEAN nations plus China, Korea and Japan) is more ideal for regional 
welfare. Gilbert et al. (2004) demonstrated that the ASEAN+3 FTA would produce higher 
gains than a China–Korea–Japan FTA, and they suggested a broader PTA would bring larger 
benefits to the region. Similarly, Kawai and Wignaraja (2008) showed that greater economic 
gains can be achieved through ASEAN+6 FTA than ASEAN+3 FTA. Congruent with these 
findings, economic interdependence has been intensifying in East Asia; the need to promote 
an integrated PTA has been emphasised repeatedly (Ahn, Baldwin and Cheong 2005; Cho 
and Park 2011). 
Meanwhile, a more direct cause that led Korea and Japan’s negotiations was the 
potential trade diversion effect triggered by CAFTA. In other words, Korea and Japan feared 
that removal of trade barriers between China and ASEAN would disadvantage their 
industries. Perhaps the most renowned explanation for the trade diversion driven PTAs or 
RTAs is Baldwin (1993)’s domino theory of regionalism. In answering the question “Why 
are countries eager to open markets regionally but reluctant to do so multilaterally?”, Baldwin 
suggests that an “idiosyncratic shock” can trigger states to join a regional pact, which causes 
                                   
discussion of general properties of the CGE model and how the model is used to explain the 
application of PTAs in East Asia. 
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regionalism to “spread like wildfire”. This is an alternative to the existing explanations, such 
as the shortcomings of multilateralism and the US’s redirection of its preference from 
multilateralism to regionalism. The creation or enlargement of a regional bloc reduces non-
member firms’ profits, which influences a previously indifferent country to join the pact. 
Baldwin (2006; 2008) later applies his theory to examine East Asian regionalism. He 
argues that the idiosyncratic shock in the East Asian case was CAFTA, which placed Korean 
and Japanese firms at a competitive disadvantage. The trade diversion effect caused by AFTA 
had relatively little impact on Korea and Japan since their export to ASEAN only accounted 
for 13% and 17%, respectively, of their total share of exports. However, the enforcement of 
CAFTA was estimated to discriminate against Korean and Japanese firms up to 43% and 
36%, respectively, of their total exports in 2003 (Baldwin 2006, 32). Thus, Baldwin (2008, 
451) defined the period since 2000 as the phase of real regionalism, and he argued that the 
series of bilateral pacts were triggered like a domino by “China’s FTA démarche toward 
ASEAN”, resulting in the current “noodle bowl” syndrome.  
Korea’s and Japan’s apprehension, caused by Chinese-driven trade diversion and 
other expected negative economic effects, has been noted in several other empirical studies 
(Pempel and Urata 2006; Terada 2009; Yoshimatsu 2008; Y. Lee 2006). Terada (2009) 
showed Japan’s concern toward China taking the leadership role in the region, as Chinese-led 
regionalism would undermine liberalisation in services and intellectual property rights. 
Pempel and Urata (2006, 91), examining the macroeconomic benefits of FTAs, also argued 
that Japan’s change of trade strategy from multilateralism to bilateralism is inevitable 
considering the costs of exclusion from the market.  
Similarly, Korea, as a latecomer in the ASEAN+1 trade talks, quickly preceded its 
negotiations and showed deeper commitment than China or Japan in recognising that 
Southeast Asia is an important market for Korean businesses (Yoshimatsu 2008, 112–113). 
By way of illustration, Yoshimatsu (2008) showed that, in comparison with China, Korea 
simultaneously promoted the Agreement on Trade in Goods and Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, which took an additional two years to conclude. This allowed for MFN 
treatment for all ASEAN members, including non-WTO members, and undertook economic 
co-operation projects in 19 areas—including customs procedures, trade and investment 
promotion, and small and medium enterprises—to provide substantive incentives to ASEAN. 
These quick and decisive moves aimed at gaining the first-mover advantage in the ASEAN 
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market in the presence of the economic competition posed by China and Japan (Y. Lee 2006, 
173). 
 
2.5 The KAFTA and AJCEP Negotiations 
 
Even as the literature on East Asian PTAs highlights the role of domestic politics, the 
paucity of attention given to understanding the different negotiation methods and processes is 
rather astounding. As Devereaux, Laurence and Watkins (2006, 17) noted, the literature on 
international trade heavily focuses on the causes, contents and effects of trade policies, rather 
than the negotiation processes in which “[i]nternational trade rules emerge from, are clarified 
by, and are implemented”. They emphasise the importance of processes, as: 
Trade rules result from the actions of a host of interested parties – domestic, national 
and supranational – competing and cooperating to shape agreements by using such 
tactics as forum shopping, coalition building, agenda setting, and grassroots 
organizing. And signing an agreement is by no means the end of the story – many 
details and ambiguities often remain to be negotiated and sometimes renegotiated 
during implementation. The processes by which agreements are enforced involve 
further strategic efforts to influence outcomes. (Devereaux et al. 2006, 17) 
 
Similarly, the importance of trade negotiation processes has often been undermined 
when it comes to the negotiation approaches taken in the ASEAN+1 PTAs. Existing studies 
have noted the peculiarity of the Japanese bilateral negotiation approach taken towards 
ASEAN, in contrast to the region-based approaches taken by China or Korea. However, these 
studies either focused solely on Japan or made comparison only with China.  
To begin with, Corning (2009) studied the period from 2003 to 2007 and elaborated 
that Japan’s slow negotiation process with ASEAN was due to its domestic politics and the 
individual ASEAN countries concerned that AJCEP would compromise their bilateral deals 
with Japan. With regards to domestic politics, MOFA (Japan) and METI had different 
preferences in their approaches to ASEAN: MOFA (Japan) preferred bilateral deals with 
individual members of ASEAN, while METI advocated for a multilateral approach due to its 
close relationship with the businesses.  
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However, MOFA (Japan) gained the upper hand, as bilateral agreements were easier 
to reach and there was no urgency in pursuing METI’s multilateral agenda. It was only after 
mid-2007, when KAFTA came into effect, that Japan, reinforced by concerns of the rise of 
China, seriously considered approaching ASEAN as a group. In response to the concerns 
raised by ASEAN, Japan suggested they allow exporters to choose whichever agreement 
benefited them the most, raising Corning’s (2009, 652) concern that it would be detrimental 
in realising “a single agreement with harmonized commitments”. 
Choi (2005) hypothesised that the success of a North–South economic integration 
agreement depends on the assertiveness of the developing party and the bargaining leverage 
of the developed party. The more the developing party wants to reach an agreement and the 
stronger the negotiating power of the counterpart developed party is, the more likely an FTA 
will successfully be negotiated. The developing party may pursue an FTA to improve its 
market access, investment environment and foreign credit rating, as well as to facilitate and 
stabilise liberal economic reforms. In contrast, the developed party finds the development gap 
with the counterpart country burdensome and faces opposition from the domestic labour-
intensive industries and traditional manufacturers threatened by the inflow of cheap labour-
intensive goods produced with minimum regulations.  
Therefore, the developed party will find more incentive to negotiate an FTA with the 
developing country when it has greater leverage to derive a more favourable outcome; for 
example, it would call for greater liberalisation in industries where it holds a comparative 
advantage, such as services, high-end technology and knowledge-based industries, and more 
restrictions on environment and labour standards. Using the cases of AJCEP and Japan’s 
EPAs with individual ASEAN countries, Choi finds that Japan chose bilateral agreements for 
the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, because it had the greater negotiating power to derive 
more favourable terms. In contrast, AJCEP was limited in depth, due to the diversity within 
ASEAN and Japan’s limited leveraging power against the ASEAN as a region.  
Terada (2008, 12) added evidence to answer the question of Japan’s bilateral 
approach to ASEAN. For example, a MOFA (Japan) official’s perspective provides that 
Japan already had a close relationship with the ASEAN countries for decades through 
investment and official development aid (ODA). He argued further that Singapore’s 
diplomatic efforts and ASEAN member’s stronger preference to have Japan as its trade 
partner, rather than China or Korea, made Japan continue with its bilateralism. There also 
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existed an expectation within Japan that because there is no common external tariff (or 
Customs Union) established with AFTA, its bilateral FTAs with the ASEAN members would 
eventually be consolidated into AJCEP. Dent (2010, 235) highlighted that Japan, unlike 
China and Korea, chose the “parallel bilateralism approach” as opposed to the “group-level 
method”, as it allowed Japan to negotiate more sophisticated deals with ASEAN, while 
granting it with greater bargaining leverage. 
Higashi (2008, 15–18) demonstrated the difference between China and Japan in their 
negotiation methods. One main difference arises from the fact that CAFTA is a pact between 
developing nations, while AJCEP is a pact between a developed and developing countries. In 
other words, CAFTA is notified under the Enabling Clause,29 and therefore China and 
ASEAN have no obligation for full trade liberalisation. Moreover, Japan and China differed 
in their negotiation approaches. Japan adopted the single-undertaking approach and 
exchanged a request–offer list with ASEAN,30 while China and ASEAN agreed on 
modalities first and proceeded to negotiations by dividing the tracks for normal goods, 
sensitive goods and highly sensitive goods. 
To elaborate, Japan’s request–offer list meant that each party listed the products they 
wished to see reduced in tariff and exchanged them, and the negotiation continued until all 
the listed products had been discussed. Japan’s single-undertaking approach also aimed to 
address goods, services, investment, co-operation and intellectual property rights 
                                   
29 The WTO (n.d.) legal text states that the Enabling Clause allows “derogations to the most-
favored nation (non-discrimination) treatment in favor of developing countries”. In particular, 
paragraph 2(c) states that 
Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for 
the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions 
which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or 
elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another  
permits preferential arrangements among developing countries in goods trade. It has continued to 
apply as part of GATT 1994 under the WTO.” Full text available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm 
Even though China and ASEAN have no obligation for full trade liberalisation under the 
Enabling Clause, these governments have shown “fairly comprehensive product coverage” that will 
be achieved within the interim period (10 years) granted under the WTO (Lim 2011, 44–45). 
30 In contrary to Higashi’s explanation, Chapter 4 demonstrates that Japan used modality 
approach of negotiation in AJCEP, like China’s and Korea’s FTAs with ASEAN. 
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simultaneously, which would lead to a more comprehensive agreement. Japan’s bilateral 
agreements with Thailand and Malaysia illustrate how it overcame the inefficiency caused 
from its negotiation methods; Japan used economic co-operation as a negotiation tool to 
derive Thailand and Malaysia’s consent on liberalisation of the agricultural sector. Higashi 
argues that Japan chose to work on the bilateral agreement with individual members of 
ASEAN first rather than approaching ASEAN as a group, because Japan considered that it 
would be more difficult to bring in the new members of ASEAN. 
Rather than taking the single-undertaking approach, China and ASEAN began with 
the sectors that were easier to agree on and proceeded to more sensitive sectors at a slower 
pace. China and ASEAN removed tariffs on non-processed agricultural products first in 2004 
by adopting Early Harvest Program, and then they agreed to progress to services and 
investment agreements in the later stages of negotiations. The target year for tariff removal 
for products differed depending on their sensitivity; each party had certain amount of 
flexibility on deciding which goods should be considered sensitive. For normal track goods, 
the tariff was to be removed by 2010. For sensitive track goods, the tariff was to be reduced 
to 20% by 2012 and 0–5% by 2018. Tariff son highly sensitive products were to be reduced 
to half by 2015. Instead of exchanging a request–offer list, as in the case of AJCEP, China 
and ASEAN agreed on modalities31 first, which included issues like how much share tariff-
free goods should take in the total trades among the two parties. 
All of the above studies provide a good departure point to answering the initial 
question set out in this research. However, the existing explanations are limited in explaining 
Japan’s and Korea’s negotiation approaches for three reasons. First, these studies do not 
                                   
31 In trades, modalities mean specific formulas or measures to achieve tariff cuts. According 
to the WTO (n.d.): 
“[m]odalities are ways or methods of doing something. Here, the ultimate objective is for 
member governments to cut tariffs and subsidies and to make these binding commitments in 
the WTO. The modalities will tell them how to do it, but first the modalities have to be 
agreed. With 153 members and thousands of products, the simplest way to do this is to agree 
on formulas for making the cuts. These formulas are at the heart of the modalities. Once they 
have been agreed, governments can apply the formulas to their tariffs and subsidies to set new 
ceiling commitments.” 
See further information on the WTO website, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/modalities_e.htm 
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explain why Japan and Korea initially opted or the bilateral approach in negotiations with 
ASEAN in response to the signing of CAFTA, but soon diverged. One reason could be that 
these studies were conducted while AJCEP was still in the process of negotiation. As Higashi 
(2008, 28) noted, the ASEAN+1 agreements were not concluded at the time the study was 
being conducted, therefore is limited in including other areas than trade in goods.  
Moreover, Japan gave stronger support to the region-based AJCEP in the later stages 
of its PTA negotiations with ASEAN, and the factors that influenced these changes are 
worthy of further scrutiny. If, for instance, Japan’s diplomatic leverage against individual 
ASEAN countries—a strategy also preferred by large economies such as the US (Dent 2010, 
234–235)—was the prime motivation for Japan’s initial preference for the bilateral method of 
negotiations, then why was it inefficient compared to the region-based method chosen by 
Korea? Can it be said that the approach taken by Japan was strategically well intended as 
some existing studies describe? In addition, some scholars like Ravenhill (2008b, 96) express 
a different perspective of the effectiveness of Japan’s negotiation approach, stating that 
“China may have secured a temporary advantage over Japan through its offer of a PTA (to 
ASEAN), but Japan’s decision to launch its own negotiation with ASEAN as a whole and 
with individual ASEAN states has come a considerable way toward nullifying this 
advantage.” Both KAFTA and AJCEP having been concluded and in effect at this point, the 
examination of Korea and Japan’s negotiation approach allows one to reassess the 
effectiveness of each negotiation approach from vantage point of the present circumstances. 
Second, even as the existing literature provides crucial evidences to the factors that 
have influenced Japan’s trade strategy, it also raises new important questions. For example, 
Corning’s (2009) domestic politics explanation focuses on the conflict between ministries, 
which increases the puzzle of the mechanisms and rationale underpinning Japan’s approach 
to ASEAN, as Prime Minister Koizumi’s political influence was considerably strong to 
nullify the discord between METI and MOFA at the time. Yoshimatsu (2012, 200–201) 
demonstrated that sectionalism is one of the most distinctive features of Japanese bureaucracy 
that is not only confined to the case of AJCEP. Despite this domestic factor, however, Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s power was strong enough at the time of AJCEP negotiations to pursue a 
strategy in the best interest of the administration’s agenda. At a meeting of the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy in December 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi stated, “it is often 
argued in the business circles that a minister of state for FTAs should be set up. In reality, 
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there will be no change even if such a minister would be established. Accordingly, I myself 
would like to assume the role of the minister (Yoshimatsu 2012, 201).” Therefore, 
Yoshimatsu (2012) argued that it was only after 2007 that FTA policies were negatively 
influenced by political instability, as the three successive LDP cabinets after Koizumi were 
unable to exercise coherent trade strategies.  
So why did the Japanese government choose individual PTAs with ASEAN? To this 
question, Terada (2008) and Choi (2005) set forth a starting point contemplating Japan’s 
diverging negotiation path. Japan’s existing economic ties and relatively strong negotiating 
power might have been an essential element in shaping its preference for bilateral ties with 
ASEAN. If so, then under what conditions was the bilateral approach perceived more 
favourable than the region-based approach? Why is it not always the case that North–South 
PTAs eventually adopt the same negotiation methods, as in the cases of Korea’s and Japan’s 
PTAs with ASEAN? In addition, why did it take four years for the Japanese government to 
change its policy direction, despite constant complaints from ASEAN and METI? How did 
Japan solve the collective action problem or the free rider problem posed by ASEAN? Even 
as these studies examine Japan’s domestic politics, they do not clarify to what extent Japan’s 
strategies were intended.  
Lastly, no studies to the best of the author’s knowledge have been conducted on the 
negotiation choice of Korea or a comparison of Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation methods. 
Most existing research on Korea’s FTAs heavily focus on the country’s more contentious 
FTAs, including those with the US, EU and China, and less with ASEAN. The imbalance in 
the research has left KAFTA much less scrutinised compared to AJCEP. For example, Kim, 
Cho, Jung, and M. Kim (2009, 175–176) assessed the progress of KAFTA after two years in 
effect, and they contended that further research is needed on whether Korea need to sign 
additional bilateral agreement with individual members of ASEAN.  
KAFTA and AJCEP are still the most comprehensive form of economic agreement in 
East Asia, and together with CAFTA they tie up North and South in the absence of economic 
regional institution in the region. Having witnessed China’s region-based initiative toward 
ASEAN, why did the two countries opt for different negotiation strategies? The question is 
particularly interesting as Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation approaches with ASEAN are the 
only existing cases of bilateral agreements that involve the same multiple partners for both 
countries, in which neither had preceding experience dealing with multiple partners. 
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Furthermore, they hold similar economic interest toward ASEAN and both negotiations were 
promoted under strong administrations—President Roh (Korea) and Prime Minister Koizumi 
(Japan)—who were active supporters of bilateralism and regionalism. These similarities 
further spark the question on why Korea and Japan diverged in their negotiation tactics. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the literature on the East Asian regionalism to provide 
background information on the development of regional co-operation in East Asia in general 
and to explore the ASEAN+1 PTAs with a focus on KAFTA and AJCEP. The literature at the 
global level lacks consensus on the compatibility between bilateralism and regionalism, but 
generally agrees the two approaches are incompatible, at least in the cases examined in East 
Asia. Existing studies place their analytical focus on the outcomes of ASEAN+1 PTAs. They 
consider bilateralism and regionalism in East Asia as incompatible, not only because of the 
existing regional problems, but also because of the complications that bilateralism will cause. 
For starters, the East Asian countries have diverse political, economic and cultural 
backgrounds; there are on-going regional political disputes. The studies argue that an 
increasing number of bilateral agreements in East Asia is likely to hinder regional economic 
integration. It becomes increasingly difficult to harmonise the different rules used in 
numerous PTAs. These PTAs are likely to exclude rather than include non-members, which 
will drive competition among the East Asian states.  
As to the causes of the ASEAN+1 PTAs, studies find the direct cause that set off the 
KAFTA and AJCEP negotiations from China’s proposal to ASEAN in 2000. Japan’s prime 
concern was maintaining its competitiveness in the region, both as a regional leader and 
economic power, while Korea was concerned the trade diversion caused by closer 
China/Japan–ASEAN relations would disadvantage its industries. More indirect, yet 
important, drivers of the ASEAN+1 PTAs in the security and economic dimensions include 
increasing awareness of growing regional economic powers, such as the EU and NAFTA, 
and the trade creation and diversion effects. For these reasons, it was in the best interest of 
Korea and Japan to quickly carry out PTA negotiations with ASEAN. Yet others have added 
that opposition from the agricultural groups and the problem of collective action within 
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ASEAN made the ASEAN+1 trade negotiations no less challenging than Korea and Japan’s 
previous PTAs.  
Meanwhile, this chapter also found that not enough attention has been paid to the 
decision-making processes in the East Asian PTAs, including the ASEAN+1 level PTAs. 
First, existing studies have given ample attention to potential regionalisms, rather than 
existing PTAs, with the ASEAN+1 PTAs as the notable case. More needs to be learned from 
the existing ASEAN+1 level PTAs, as they are the most comprehensive form of economic 
regionalism in East Asia that could help build more a comprehensive regionalism in the 
future. More attention needs to be paid to the negotiation processes involved in the 
ASEAN+1 PTAs; currently, attention tend to heavily focus on analysing the negotiation 
outcomes. 
Second, mainstream literature on the ASEAN+1 PTAs has searched for answers in 
international economic and political factors. While these explanations provide partial answers 
to the causes of the competitive emergence of KAFTA and AJCEP, they do not answer why 
Korea and Japan opted for different negotiation approaches given their similar international 
surroundings. The lack of scrutiny on the negotiation processes of these PTAs suggest that 
more scholarly attention on domestic factors is needed to make a fair assessment on whether 
the ASEAN+1 PTAs can be building blocks or stumbling blocks to East Asian regionalism. 
For example, questions such as “Under what conditions did Korea and Japan adopt or change 
a certain trade negotiation method?” or “Can understanding the mechanisms in which the 
ASEAN+1 PTA negotiations work help resolve the organizational gap and noodle bowl 
syndrome in East Asia?” are particularly interesting, given that Korea and Japan share a 
similar political economic environment.  
The remainder of this thesis fills in the gap in the literature by addressing the 
domestic factors involved in Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations. In contrast with the 
existing findings, this research will demonstrate that bilateralism and regionalism can be 
compatible, in the modest context of Korea and Japan, by focusing on the decision-making 
processes of Korea and Japan. The next chapter will introduce an analytical framework based 
on the domestic politics of IPE in order to further analyse the decision-making processes in 
Korea and Japan’s PTA negotiations. 
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Chapter 3 An Analytical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The existing literature suggests that various economic and political factors shaped the 
broad trade policy directions of Korea and Japan toward ASEAN, as demonstrated in Chapter 
2. In particular, the literature suggests that CAFTA directly triggered KAFTA and AJCEP, 
posing an economic and a political threat to Korea and Japan. Given this external condition, 
the diverging negotiation approaches suggest there are further underlying motivations that 
altered each government’s preference. To investigate these motivations, this chapter develops 
an analytical framework based on the domestic approaches of IPE by examining the interests, 
institution and ideas, also referred to as the “three I’s”. 
This chapter begins by examining IPE theories and political economy of trade 
policies. After examining the strengths and shortcomings of the systemic IPE theories, which 
focus on international factors that influence a government’s policy direction, it demonstrates 
how the domestic-level approach of IPE can provide an analytical framework to better 
understand the research question set out in this thesis. Korea and Japan were surrounded by 
similar international threats and opportunities when they began their respective negotiations; 
thus, their diverging policy decisions are more likely due to variations in domestic factors. 
Defining the domestic-level analysis as a decision-making process that involves interaction 
between the three I’s, this chapter elaborates on these variables as the key determinants of the 
KAFTA and AJCEP negotiations. 
Next, a list of testable hypotheses is derived from the analytical framework developed 
in the previous section. Expected motivations on the choice of Korea’s and Japan’s 
negotiation methods are specified according to these hypotheses. The two governments’ 
decisions may not have been the most optimal or the most strategic had they known all the 
possible outcomes of their negotiation approaches, but their choices are reasonably explicable 
on the grounds of a number, or possibly all, of political economic interests and their 
interaction with ideas and institutions presented in this chapter.  
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3.2 Systemic IPE Theories 
 
In the realm of trade policies, the IPE approach can better provide theoretical 
foundations for the multifaceted nature of the PTAs than any other single discipline. It serves 
as a useful analytical instrument to explore economic and political motivations and 
consequences of the PTAs, the impact of economic policies on the international political 
relations, and inversely, the influence of politically motivated policies on the international 
economy. Moreover, the IPE approach connects and advances our understanding in 
normative and positive aspects of trade policies (Rodrik 1993).  
Korea’s and Japan’s trade negotiations with ASEAN also concern various political 
and economic motivations in which IPE can provide a useful analytical tool to understand the 
two countries’ strategies. For example, in the negotiation processes of KAFTA and AJCEP, 
which actors were more relevant under the constraints posed by each institution? What were 
the political, diplomatic and economic motivations of those actors involved in the decision-
making processes? What are the implications of these negotiations for East Asian regionalism 
in general? The study of IPE best addresses these questions by providing theoretical grounds 
for the selection of independent variables, evaluating the value of PTAs from the perspective 
of the different actors in society, and making possible a structured comparison of Korea and 
Japan. 
IR and IPE scholars have traditionally viewed international affairs from outside to 
inside, focusing on the effect of external forces on domestic policy-making. From this view, 
states’ preferences are shaped by exogenous (international) factors. For example, neo-realists, 
or structural realists, argue that the international system is anarchic by nature, and its 
structure is characterised by the distribution of capabilities among rational unitary states 
(Waltz 1979). Under this systematic nature, states consider survival as their primary goal. In 
his influential book Man, The State, and War, Waltz (1959) established the three “images of 
analysis”: individuals, states and the international system. Waltz especially underscores the 
third image—the international system—as the root cause of the inter-state conflict.  
Among neo-realist scholars, hegemonic stability theory scholars argue that 
international economic stability is associated with the role of a single dominant hegemonic 
state (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1975). For Gilpin (1981), a hegemon controls and dominates 
the international system by providing collective good to the international economy for 
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security motivations. The costs for providing stability in the international economic system 
can be offset as the hegemonic state can benefit sufficiently from the arrangement (Griffiths 
2005, 361). When the hegemon is no longer capable of providing public good, the stability of 
the international economy is put at risk. For example, the rise of bilateralism and regionalism 
in East Asia should be attributed to the decline of American hegemony (Mansfield 1998), as 
the US is increasingly perceived as incapable of maintaining an efficient international 
economic system. Moreover, the effort to build a regional trade area in East Asia would 
merely reflect the power-maximising behaviour of states, because East Asia does not have its 
own regional bloc, despite its economic prosperity, as compared to the EU or NAFTA (Dent 
2008, 30). Similar logic applies to the ASEAN+1 PTAs. Korea’s and Japan’s move toward 
ASEAN can be understood as a way of balancing power in the region, as China’s geopolitical 
aspirations were perceived as the main motivation behind CAFTA. The fragmented PTAs at 
the ASEAN+1 level reflect the instability in the region in the absence of a dominant regional 
hegemon.  
Since the end of the Second World War, military power could no longer be 
considered the only means of determining a state’s capability. On top of the changing 
international environment, economic turmoil in the 1970s gave rise to a new stream of 
scholars, referred to as neo-liberal institutionalists. These scholars argue that it is through 
international organisations that the anarchic nature of the international system and the 
subsequent market failures can be overcome.  
Criticising the realist approach of understanding IR, Keohane and Nye (1977) 
reassessed the state-centric analysis approach by bringing in the notion of “complex 
interdependence”. They emphasised the emergence of transnational actors and the multiple 
channels in which these actors interact on a number of issues; they argue that military power 
has become less important for states as security is no longer the primary issue in IR. A case in 
point is the growing role of ASEAN as a regional institution in Southeast Asia. ASEAN acts 
not only as a forum for economic co-operation, but also for addressing comprehensive 
regional issues ranging from security and environment to cultural exchanges, where various 
transnational actors, such as multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), are closely involved.  
In a similar vein, East Asian states’ co-operative behaviour with ASEAN regional 
trade agreements, such as ASEAN+1 PTAs, reveal these states are increasingly 
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interdependent on each other, and their economies can collectively benefit from establishing 
common rules and standards for trades. Moreover, even as these PTAs proliferate, they are 
bound to the rules of GATT and the WTO. That is, the neo-liberal institutionalists would 
argue that the East Asian states pursue bilateral trade agreements that comply with the GATT 
Article XXIV, so that states outside the agreement are not disadvantaged, and the PTAs 
complement the weaknesses of multilateralism by acting as building blocks. 
In short, systemic IPE theories, such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, 
explain the rise of bilateralism in East Asia in the context of IR and the changes that occur in 
the external environment. Structural realists presume that states have autonomy that is free 
from domestic pressure. States are characterised as power-driven actors and thus do not take 
the differences that exist across their regime types, cultural differences or political leadership 
(Mearsheimer 2016, 52). Neo-liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, do not evaluate the 
mechanisms in which domestic factors influence government policies either.  
These approaches can only provide analytical guidance on the broad orientation of 
Korea’s and Japan’s trade policies, while the causes of their diverging negotiation methods 
remain unaccounted for. If such influence is significant in the cases of KAFTA and AJCEP, 
then why did Korea adopt the region-based negotiation approach as China had done, while 
Japan pursued a contrasting negotiation method that could be less efficient in bringing 
together ASEAN as a region? In other words, the systemic approaches of IPE are limited in 
explaining Korea’s and Japan’s different strategies, even if they provide broader explanation 
to their incentives in negotiating PTAs with ASEAN.  
As Katzenstein (1976, 1–3) postulated, domestic factors should be systemically 
included in foreign economic analysis, for “the different international effects will lead to 
similar but not necessarily harmonious policy responses of advanced industrial states”. 
Likewise, the diverging negotiation methods between KAFTA and AJCEP are more 
contingent on the interests and behaviours of domestic actors, which at the same time are 
constrained by institutional differences and the interaction between these actors, rather than 
the power imbalances and regional hegemonic instability caused by China. The following 
section therefore will examine the domestic approaches of IR and IPE and the three domestic 
independent variables—interests, institutions and ideas.  
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3.3 The Domestic-level Analysis and the Three I’s Approach 
 
The political economy approach at the domestic-level analyses interactions between 
actors in decision-making processes in the context of domestic politics. Studies taking this 
approach argue that the discrepancy between economists’ wisdom of free trade and actual 
protectionist policies is primarily determined endogenously (Baccini 2014). The approach 
emerged as a new means to analyse the changes of focus in the international relations since 
the 1970s, when economic issues were increasingly gaining importance in the international 
relations.32 One of the leading scholars to take this approach in analysing foreign economic 
policies was Peter Katzenstein (1976, 2), who contended that the changes in international 
economic relations can be better understood if their studies are “accompanied by a 
corresponding shift from foreign to domestic political analysis.” In contrast with the systemic 
IPE approaches that contend that external conditions shape a country’s economic policies, the 
domestic approach argues that variances in domestic variables shape foreign policy given the 
changes in the international environment.  
The domestic approach, however, does not completely rule out exogenous conditions 
as neutral and insignificant factors. In fact, domestic interests may vary depending on how 
agents interpret these conditions. The approach, therefore, is not confined solely to the 
domestic factors, but rather, explains a state’s behaviour “inside-out” or “outside-in” (Cohen 
1990; Risse 2017). According to Cohen (1990, 268), the levels of analysis this approach 
examines are inclusive of Waltz’s first image and second image. The first image, cognitive 
level of analysis, scrutinises “the base of consensual knowledge or “economic culture” that 
legitimises policy-making at the unit level; and the second image, the unit level of analysis, 
focuses on “the strategic interactions among all domestic actors, inside or outside the 
government, with actual or potential influence on a state’s foreign actions.” In 
acknowledgement of the interaction between domestic and international factors, scholars 
have framed their causal mechanism into formal models (Shelling 1960; Walton and 
McKersie 1965; Putnam 1988; Mayer 1992; Milner and Rosendorff 1996). In IR, Putnam 
(1988)’s famous “logic of two-level games” has had a substantial influence in the 
                                   
32 See Putnam (1988, 430-433) for a comprehensive summary of early development of the 
domestic-level approaches in IR and IPE throughout the 1970s. 
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development of the ways in which domestic factors can be identified, shaping diplomacy 
(see, for example, Iida 1993 and Mo 1995). 
Regarding which domestic determinants shape foreign economic policies, economists 
and political scientists frequently paid attention to interests, institutions and ideas. In 
particular, the role of societal interests is most well established in the literature. The research 
that emphasise societal interests typically focused on making sense of how and why interest 
groups pressure politicians to promote protectionist policies, leading a state go against the 
free trade (see for example, Olson 1971; Ikenberry lake and Mastanduno 1988; Nelson 1988; 
Hiscox 1999; Grossman and Helpman 1995; Milner and Rosendorff 1996; Eckhardt 2015). 
Others turned their attention to the less common cases in which interest groups, namely 
exporters, push politicians toward liberalising trade policies (Dür 2007; Dür 2010; Baccini 
and Dür 2012). In these studies, however, the role of policymakers or domestic institutions 
had often been simplified or minimised (Mansfield and Busch 1995, 727; Dür 2010, 4). 
By contrast, the statist approaches in foreign economic policies has focused on the 
influence of national interest, institutions or policy makers’ ideas. The research that examined 
national interest considered the policymakers as the main actors promoting aggregate welfare 
gain in a society (Katzenstein 1978; Krasner 1987; Domhoff 1990). According to Ikenberry, 
Lake, and Mastanduno (1988, 10), the approach configures “the state as an actor, and focuses 
directly on politicians and administrators in the executive as independent participants in the 
policy process.” Hence, central decision-makers are assumed to have a set of goals that 
focuses on the general utility of a community, which can be distinguished from the 
preferences of any particular interest groups (Krasner 1978, 10-12).  
Another strand of statist literature has emphasised the role of institutions. They 
explored how the variations among democracies affect trade policies, which include the 
topics such as electoral systems, executive-legislative relations, veto points and partisanship 
(see for example, Rogowski 1987; Irwin 1994; Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; Simmons 
1994; Verdier 1994; Keech and Pak 1995; Mansfield and Busch 1995; Henisz 2000; Milner 
and Judkins 2004; De BiÈvre and Dür 2005; Dutt and Mitra 2005; Milner and Kubota 2005; 
O’Reilly 2005; Henisz and Mansfield 2006; Ehrlich 2007; Allee and Elsig 2017). Studies 
focusing on the broader dimensions of institutions examined how the variations in regime 
type affect trade policies; they tested whether democracies are more likely to promote liberal 
trade practices (see for example, Bliss and Russett 1998; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 
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1998; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000; Frye and Mansfield 2004; Milner and Kubota 
2005; Henisz and Mansfield 2006). More recent studies have focused on the influence of 
institutions on the different types of PTAs. For example, Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse 
(2008) argued that leaders in democracies have greater incentive to join regional integration 
agreements that aim to achieve greater integration, but a rise in the number of veto players 
make its realisation more difficult.  
Finally, a relatively smaller body of literature has focused on the role of domestic 
ideas in trade policies (Goldstein 1988, 1989, 1993; Baldwin 1989; Krueger 1997; Morrison 
2012, 2016). The influence of ideas has been emphasised in the cases where information is 
incomplete, thus, the causal relationship between trade policy and its outcome is vague (Dür 
2010, 10). In particular, their role drew attention in explaining why protectionist policies 
prevail despite the economists’ consistent consensus on the benefits of free trade (Baldwin 
1989; Krueger 1997). Scholars diverge on how ideas can be conceptualised—some focused 
on the influence of state identity while others have focused on policy makers’ ideas. Yet, they 
have been consistent in their constructivist foundations (Kaarbo 2003, 159). 
In sum, the attention drawn to the three I’s is not novel. However, earlier theoretical 
and empirical study on these factors has been disjointed and each factor has taken isolated 
development paths. In recognition of this disconnect, more recent literature has focused on 
integrating the three I’s by taking a bird’s-eye view (Kopstein and Lichbach 2006; 
Schonhardt-Bailey 2006). These scholars highlighted the relative importance of the three 
variables shaping preference for a public policy, and they identified the conditions in which 
each of these variables matter the most. They emphasised that a narrow perspective focusing 
on a single variable would inevitably face the problem of omitted variable bias, which would 
undermine the holistic implication of causal linkages between the dependent variable and 
various other independent variables.  
More recently, political scientists have adopted the three I’s approach to explain the 
motivations of states’ cross-border activities from a domestic-level analysis. In particular, 
they have focused on the three I’s as an interdisciplinary foundation to compare cross-country 
variations that cannot be explained by external factors alone (Battala 2010; Aggarwal and 
Lee 2011; Balkir, Bolukbasi and Ertugal 2013). It has become commonly acknowledged that 
interests, institutions and ideas all matter to some extent; thus, today’s IR scholars tend to 
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focus more on reframing the approach to identify how much the three I’s matter in a specific 
context.  
A number of scholars began to pay attention to Japan’s and Korea’s domestic politics 
in trade policies since the mid-2000s. Among the studies on Japan, one of the earliest 
scholars to take a domestic level of analysis was Yoshimatsu (2005), who identified Japan 
Business Federation (Keidanren) as one of the major players in Japan’s trade policy-making 
by acting as a pressure group, information provider and interest co-ordinator. Solís and 
Katada (2010) further scrutinised the role of interest groups. They examined business groups 
and agricultural groups as independent variables shaping Japan’s PTAs, focusing on the 
EPAs with Mexico and Korea. Later studies on Japan’s domestic politics examined the 
interaction between interest groups and government sectors. For example, Yoshimatsu (2007) 
examined how Japan’s inter-bureaucracy conflict, Central Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (JA-Zenchu) and Keidanren together shaped Japan’s FTA policies up to the 
mid-2000s. J. Kim (2008) also explained how inter-bureaucracy conflict impeded Japan’s 
FTA policies, particularly by exploring JSEPA.  
Mulgan (2008) focused on the influence of PTAs on the domestic politics, and argued 
that PTAs, rather than WTO negotiations, have greater impact on both the domestic interest 
groups and the Japanese government; the PTAs have much more direct and concentrated 
impact on domestic actors in both economic and strategic ways. Solís (2010) proposed a 
demand–supply model of Japan’s FTA policy-making, which analysed the influence of the 
international business sector’s lobbying and the domestic institutions on the FTA policy-
making processes. Solís (2010) utilised two models: the preferential trading game that 
reflects lobbying incentives and the logic of principal–agent relations that explains the 
centralisation in trade policy-making. Krauss and Naoi (2011) considered that the presence of 
an influential bureaucracy, namely METI, explained Japan’s shift to regionalism in the 
1990s. From the late 1990s, as they explained, institutional changes, such as Japan’s electoral 
reforms and the prime minister’s increased role, caused division within and between interest 
groups and political parties. 
Studies on Korea, or those that compare Korea and Japan, have focused more on the 
institutional dimensions in PTA policy-making. Rhyu (2011) examined the interactive 
relationship between the domestic ideas, institutions and the existence of hegemony. 
Analysing Korea’s FTAs with Japan and the US, Rhyu (2011) concluded that successful 
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progress of FTA negotiations depends on the strength of institutions and the presence of an 
external hegemony.33 Park and Moon (2006) provided an institutional framework that 
scrutinises the government, political parties, and interest groups as the key stakeholders in 
Korea’s FTA policy-making. They identified and defined the roles of domestic actors through 
the examination of Korea’s FTAs with Chile and the US.  
Choi and Oh (2011) suggested that the ministry level fragmentation explains the 
liberalisation in the Korean and Japanese agricultural sectors. Yoshimatsu (2012) 
demonstrated that it was the individual leadership of the chief executives that caused 
divergence in Korea’s and Japan’s PTA progresses. Fujisue (2013) adopted the core–
executive model to show that the political system distinguished the qualities of PTAs in 
Korea and Japan. Similar to Fujisue’s perspective, Solís (2013), in her policy paper, 
contended that Korea should participate in TPP to keep up its proactive PTA strategy, which 
is built on the strong executive leadership and top-down decision-making.  
 
3.4 An Analytical Framework: Interests, Ideas and Institutions 
 
In parallel with recent scholarly work, this section develops an analytical framework 
using domestic interests, ideas and institutions as explanatory variables determining Korea’s 
and Japan’s trade policy-making with ASEAN. The approach is designed to account for the 
variety of factors involved in trade negotiations and to examine how preferences are shaped 
through the three variables. First, interests, including those of interest groups and 
government, are examined based on the rationalist approach. Interest groups demand specific 
trade negotiation approaches for profit-driven reasons; conversely, a government favours a 
certain type of negotiation approach to achieve aggregate political and economic goals. Then, 
                                   
33 For example, Rhyu (2011) argued that the Korea-Japan FTA was stalled even though it was 
supported by strong political ideas, because of the weak institutions and the lack of Japan’s 
hegemonic leadership. According to Rhyu (2011, 79-80), the executive branch of the government was 
pressured by objections from automobile and electronic conglomerates and nationalistic conflicts that 
included “Japanese Prime Minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, conflicting materials in history 
textbooks, and the issues of to whom Dokdo Island really belongs.” However, he found more 
fundamental cause for the delay in the negotiations from that Japan’s lack of willingness to act as a 
hegemon. In contrast, strong political ideas for the Korea-US FTA was accompanied by strong 
institutions and the US’s strong leadership as a hegemonic power, making the difference in the 
negotiation result. 
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the section on ideas explains when and why interests change by examining how domestic 
actors with competing ideas on bilateralism and regionalism shape their preferences through 
the process of persuasion. The institutions section explains the supply side of the trade 
policies in the context of Korea and Japan. Institutional structures distribute decision-making 
power across domestic actors, but the structure continues to evolve through the demand of the 
domestic actors’ interests and ideas.  
 
3.4.1 Interests. Political and economic interests are necessary conditions for 
preference formation in trade policy. However, the opposite statement does not hold true. As 
Schonhardt-Bailey (2006, 23) noted, “interests are simply one of the essential raw ingredients 
from which preferences are formed”. Interests in the political economy literature concentrate 
around actors’ material gains and losses. Balkir, Bolukbasi and Ertugal (2013, 128) 
summarised the various definitions of coalitions of domestic interests in the political 
economy literature, including: 
 Functional interests (employers and trade unions); 
 Class-based coalitions (upper classes, middle classes, working classes);  
 Factor-based coalitions (abundant–factor coalition vs scarce–factor coalition); 
 Producers’ groups or sectoral interests (including those engaged in industrial, financial, 
domestically oriented and export-competitive sectors); 
 Workers (high-skilled vs low-skilled or white-collar vs blue-collar); 
 Political parties (with given ideological positions for whatever reason); 
 Policymakers (bureaucrats vs politicians); and 
 Diverse (and often competing) interests within bureaucracies (such as treasury officials vs central 
bankers). 
In other instances, domestic interests are examined on two perspectives—those of the 
interest groups and a state or political leader (Milner 1999; Schonhardt-Baily 2006). PTAs 
and regionalisms are institution-driven initiatives, as opposed to East Asia’s conventional 
market-driven trade and regionalisation (Urata 2006; Dent 2008). Overall the political and 
economic gains of a state are as important as the interests of private interest groups.  
In line with this perspective of domestic interests, this section assumes there are two 
types of interests in a society: the revenue-seeking private interests and the social-welfare 
maximising government.34 This simplified analytical approach is based on the rationalist 
                                   
34 This section focuses on the domestic actors that relate directly to trade gains and losses 
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assumption that individuals or groups act strategically to maximise their utilities given their 
fixed preferences. For the private interests, maximising utilities imply attaining the most 
profit from the concession gained through the PTAs. In contrast, the government, or more 
precisely, the executive branch of the government, pursues strategies that achieve national 
political and economic goals to ensure society at the aggregate level benefits from PTAs. 
The following sections examine in detail the rationale for the various private interests 
and government interests regarding Korea’s and Japan’s choices for regional and bilateral 
approaches of negotiations. For the export-competing sectors, market accessibility and 
practical utility of PTAs should be the most important criterion in determining their 
preference. For the sensitive sectors of the economy, political implications of PTAs, size of 
the counterpart’s market and the relative competitive position of producers in the relevant 
sectors should matter most. On the other hand, the government, assuming it is a social 
welfare maximiser, weighs the bilateral approach and the multilateral approach in pursuit of 
numerous economic and political motivations. These factors include: (a) trade gains, (b) 
negotiation efficiency, (c) diplomatic leverage effects and (d) foreign policy objectives. 
 
3.4.1.1 Private Interests. Private interests have been at the heart of the trade policies 
literature to explain the global surge of PTAs (Milner 1999). In particular, economists found 
states’ protectionist measures puzzling as they go against the economists’ general belief that 
free trade improves the overall welfare of a society. Searching for answers, scholars paid 
attention to the demand side of the trade policies and examined the logics that can explain the 
behaviour of the societal groups in support or opposition of a PTA. These logics mainly 
revolve around the factor-based Stolper–Samuelson theory and the sector-based Ricardo–
Viner theory. These trade models vary in detail and make different assumptions, which 
commonly suggests that trade will disadvantage the import-competitive side and benefit the 
export-competitive side, reallocating income across the society. 
Because of the redistribution effects of PTAs, private sectors are more likely to 
engage in the PTA decision-making processes than in any other foreign policies. As Mancur 
Olson’s (1971) famous collective action theory suggests, smaller groups have more incentive 
                                   
from choosing a certain negotiation approach. Details on how these actors exercise power in the 
decision-making processes, in addition to how political parties and bureaucracies are involved in these 
processes, will be discussed further in Section 3.3.3 (on institutions). 
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to take collective action during these processes, due to the relatively low organising costs and 
higher returns from the successful outcome. The higher the political costs from the opposition 
of the interest groups, the government is more likely to opt for an PTA with enhanced 
protection for those sectors, despite its trade diversion effects (Grossman and Helpman 1995). 
Yet, interests in the export-competing side may still mobilise and dominate the import-
competing side when the proliferation of PTAs by foreign countries threatens the domestic 
exporter’s interests (Dür 2007; Baccini and Dür 2012). 
Examining the conflicting domestic private interests, this section pays attention to 
Korea’s and Japan’s trade in goods. Their early negotiation approaches highly focused on 
tariffs in goods, particularly with regard to AJCEP and KAFTA. The first reason is relatively 
straight-forward; the negotiation approaches in the two countries were mainly determined due 
to the issues in goods. Korea and Japan were inexperienced in PTAs, therefore, their early 
agreements tended to be conservative; both focused on tariff reduction and tried to carve out 
sensitive issues as much as possible. Even as the KAFTA and AJCEP progressed, their 
negotiations centred around trade in goods, although Japan’s bilateral EPAs addressed services, 
investment and new issues of trade. Korea’s negotiation for services and investment did not 
start until early 2007. AJCEP only has had the provisions for goods negotiated to date, despite 
Japan’s initial claim to take the single undertaking approach of negotiation.  
The then-chief delegate of the ASEAN+1 PTAs, David Chin (2010, 228), explained 
that the ASEAN side preferred to proceed in the sectors that were easier to negotiate, 
considering the nature of the negotiations that involved states with high development gap. With 
the exception of Singapore, ASEAN in general expected Korea and Japan to make greater 
concessions in negotiations because of their differences in stages of development. Therefore, a 
thorough examination in private interests involved in trade in goods will provide sufficient 
evidences to make an overall assessment of the comparative negotiation developments in Korea 
and Japan. 
Furthermore, major private interests involved in Korea and Japan’s respective PTA 
negotiations with ASEAN clustered around the trade in goods and who would be the winners 
and the losers of free trade. For Korea and Japan, these were the export-competitive industrial 
sector and the import-competitive agricultural and fishery sector (Park and Moon 2006; 
Yoshimatsu 2006). A rather simple industrial sector vis-à-vis agricultural sector comparison 
in Korea and Japan is possible, because the two countries shared very similar economic 
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backgrounds in the early 2000s: both countries held a comparative advantage with ASEAN in 
the industrial sector, while their agricultural and fishery sectors were relatively vulnerable to 
competition due to the cheaper imports from the ASEAN market. In Japan, Keidanren 
represented the industrial sector’s interests, while JA-Zenchu represented the farmers’ 
interests. In Korea, FKI represented the interests of the manufacturing sector, while KPL and 
KAFF represented the farmers’ interests. 
The agricultural groups in Korea and Japan have demonstrated strong opposition to 
PTAs, whether in the form of bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral agreement. Since Korea 
and Japan began actively engaging in PTAs in the late 1990s, the agricultural interest groups 
demonstrated strong opposition to bilateral liberalisations, much resembling the protest 
confronted at the time of liberalising the agricultural sector in multilateral negotiations. While 
agricultural groups may not have a preference for negotiation approaches because they do not 
want trade liberalisation in the first place, the strength of their opposition may vary 
depending on a PTA’s political significance, the counterpart’s market size and the relative 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector.  
For example, opposition from the agricultural groups tended to be stronger in Korea’s 
and Japan’s earlier PTAs, which had greater political implications on domestic society. 
Korea–Chile FTA and Japan–Mexico EPA demonstrate that due to inexperience in PTAs, 
opposition from the agricultural groups was fiercer relative to the agricultural market’s 
exposure, as compared to subsequent PTA negotiations (Parcan 2011, 39–40; Solís and 
Katada 2007b, 295). Korea’s FTA with Singapore confronted little opposition from the 
agricultural sector because of Singapore’s negligible influence in their agricultural markets; 
whereas for Japan, agricultural interests and MAFF opposed JSEPA despite its irrelevance in 
the agricultural sector, as they worried it would trigger more PTAs (see Chapters 4 and 5). In 
other cases, agricultural groups mobilised to stand against trade liberalisation with big market 
and/or influential competitive advantage in the agricultural sector. For Korea, such FTAs 
included Korea–US FTA and Korea–China FTA; whereas for Japan, EPA negotiations with 
Thailand were the case in point (Higashi 2008).  
In the meantime, private actors in the export-competing side generally are more likely 
to favour a region-based negotiation approach in PTAs. Their preferences also would depend 
on how much market access can be gained through a PTA and how much it costs to utilise a 
PTA in practice. First, an RTA provides access to a wider market than a bilateral PTA. The 
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exporting industries can take the advantage of regional trading blocs by achieving large 
returns of scale and cross-border production networks (Chase 2003). An RTA also 
discriminates against outsiders, providing greater incentive for those exporting industries 
within the bloc in expanding the sales market (Chase 2004). One such incentive would be 
gaining first mover advantages. By entering the new market faster than their competitors, 
exporting industries can attain privileges, such as securing brand image, distribution channel 
and local customers.  
Second, an RTA tends to be less costly to utilise than criss-crossing bilateral PTAs. 
For one, an RTA is expected to have less complicated RoO than several bilateral PTAs, 
which gives incentives for those in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the export-
competing sector. According to Brenton (2011, 164), complicated RoO restrict market access 
relative to what is required simply to prevent trade deflection. For example, Cheong and Cho 
(2009a) found that Korean SMEs in export-competitive sectors consider PTAs necessary; 
however, SMEs often find that the utilisation of PTAs in practice is costly due to complicated 
RoO. For this reason, SMEs show the tendency to become indifferent to future PTAs.  
In contrast with SMEs, however, lobby groups from large domestic companies may 
have mixed preferences for RoO depending on the type of the industry, because they have 
greater capacity to absorb the costs associated with complicated RoO. In another example, 
Chase (2008) suggested that industries that profit from economies of scale prefer more 
restrictive RoO to prevent competitors from entering their market, but multinational firms 
seek the opposite to permit foreign sourcing (Chase 2008). For Japan, the use of cumulative 
RoO was a major rationale for promoting AJCEP, in which multinational manufacturing 
industries, such as electronic appliance and automobiles, would benefit from the reduced 
costs of production while strengthening their regional production networks (Yamazaki 2008).  
In sum, the sensitive sectors would oppose any form of PTA that would expose them 
to greater competition. The degree of opposition, however, would vary depending on the PTA 
partner’s market size and the expected influence of trade liberalisation on the vulnerable 
sectors. In contrast, the export-competing industries would generally demonstrate greater 
support for region-based PTAs over bilateral PTAs. Their support for the negotiation 
approach may vary depending on the types and priorities of the industries in their perceived 
importance of gaining market access and the practical utility of such agreements.  
 
78 
 
3.4.1.2 Governments’ Interests. This section examines the goals of the government 
with respect to PTAs. Concerns of the government are distinguished from those of the 
interest groups, as it desires to “promote various national and international goals,” such as 
promoting foreign policy goals or promoting equitable distribution of income (Baldwin 1989, 
126-130). Ikenberry, Lake, and Manstanduno (1988) provide the key features of this state-
centric explanation: 
Its primary emphasis is on the goal-oriented behavior of politicians and civil servants 
as they respond to internal and external constraints in an effort to manipulate policy 
outcomes in accordance with their preferences. An underlying presumption is that 
these preferences are partially, if not wholly, distinct from the parochial concerns of 
either societal groups or particular government institutions and are tied to conceptions 
of the “national interest” or the maximization of some social welfare function.” (10) 
These interests are also both political and economic, which in turn shapes a country’s PTA 
negotiation preferences. 
 
(a) Trade gains. The rationalist approaches assume that a government, or an executive 
branch of government, is a utility maximiser who balances different interests to maximise the 
aggregate welfare of society. Apart from assuaging the diverse actors’ interests such as that 
of interest groups and politicians, a government will seek a certain negotiation strategy to 
achieve national goals to the extent that the price of doing so does not exceed the costs to 
pacify the oppositions directly involved in the PTA negotiations. 
Since the early 1990s, the business environment in Southeast Asia changed 
dramatically and became an attractive relocation site for foreign multinationals. As the 
regional market expanded at a rapid pace, Southeast Asian countries began to further 
facilitate trade liberalisation as a regional entity through ASEAN, easing restrictions for FDI 
and adopting investment-friendly trade policies. Low wages were another attraction for 
foreign industries looking to expand (Athukorala 2008, 482). Consequently, businesses from 
Korea and Japan, which aimed to achieve economies of scale and production and 
procurement networks, began to see ASEAN as an important destination for investment 
(Legewie and Meyer-Ohle 2000, 561–562).  
Therefore, it became vital for Korea and Japan to pursue economic policies that gives 
their businesses pre-emptive entry into the ASEAN market faster than competing countries 
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through PTAs. Even if its home industries fail to achieve first mover advantages, these 
governments still have incentive to promote such policies, as second movers can still profit. 
For example, in the relatively bigger economies of ASEAN, including Thailand, Malaysia 
and Singapore, foreign industries can enjoy second mover advantage by selecting the site of 
relocation where the first movers have established industrial locus, so that they can learn 
from earlier experiences and use the agglomeration advantages (Athukorala 2010, 9).  
Once the local production and procurement market is established, connecting such 
markets and securing the network can further reduce the costs involved in economic 
transactions. At the government-level, one way of achieving such objective is to connect the 
markets that are part of the greater supply chain network. Chapter 4 demonstrates that Japan’s 
use of cumulative RoO in AJCEP can be seen as an effort to reduce the costs attached to the 
noodle bowl syndrome, removing trade diversion effect, and thus improving the overall 
market access to the region.  
 
(b) Negotiation efficiency. Assuming the end goal is the same, a government should 
prefer the negotiation method that will allow it to achieve its goals most efficiently in a 
limited timeframe. A government should have an incentive to prefer bilateral negotiations 
over regional negotiations, if it yields a higher quality agreement through an easier, faster and 
simpler process of negotiation and implementation. In addition, it may consider the regional 
approach less convenient than bilateral negotiations if, as the case of Korea and Japan with 
ASEAN demonstrates, the counterparties’ political and economic circumstances vary 
significantly. It is more difficult to reach an agreement that is mutually beneficial for all, if 
the negotiation involves numerous parties that have different motivations. 
At another level in discussing efficiency of negotiation style, there is an issue of 
making a decision between the single-undertaking approach and the sequential approach. 
Sequential approaches to negotiation allow the involved parties to negotiate the agreement 
separately for goods, services, and investment. Thus, this approach is more timely and 
efficient, and it gives flexibility to both negotiating parties. A major shortcoming of this 
approach is that a PTA is likely to end up less than comprehensive, if any involved party 
decides to change their mind. In contrast, PTAs taking the single-undertaking approach 
usually end up being more high quality in their contents. For this reason, the sequential 
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approach of negotiation is rarely used in bilateral trade agreements in which it is easier to 
negotiate complex issues than in regional agreements.  
The definition of efficiency becomes more complicated when taking each country’s 
negotiation capacity into account. Negotiation capacity here refers to a country’s previous 
experience with PTA negotiations and resources (e.g. human resources and budget) available 
to develop a negotiation at practical level. The more experience a negotiating party has, the 
more likely it is to use its previous PTAs as a template to learn and negotiate the new PTA at 
a similarly acceptable level and to a more progressive extent. Without such experience, a 
country may have its options open but without certainty.  
As Korea, Japan and ASEAN were all novices with PTAs during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, their previous experiences would have had negligible effect on their choice of 
negotiation styles. Therefore, it is more likely that they have been influenced by practical 
limitations posed by the resources available for the negotiations given the policy priority. As 
beginners of the PTAs, all of the three parties were not fully equipped to progress PTA 
negotiations at their desired levels. These limitations suggest that bilateral approach and 
sequential approach of negotiations would be seen as more efficient over the regional 
approach and single-undertaking approach of negotiations.  
When facing practical constraints, negotiating parties may also consider the different 
combinations of negotiation methods. For instance, the inefficiency of the region-based 
approach could be reconciled by the sequential approach of negotiations—an approach 
chosen in KAFTA. In contrast, Japan may have chosen a relatively inefficient single 
undertaking approach in AJCEP but sought to complement the inefficiency through the 
bilateral trade agreements.  
 
(c) Diplomatic leverage effects. Powerful players are more likely to prefer the 
bilateral approach to the regional approach of negotiations, if they believe they can enjoy 
greater leverage and discretion in shaping the rules for trade that is beneficial to their own. 
The US’s utilisation of asymmetric power in its FTA negotiations is a familiar example; as 
Robert Zoellick (2002), a former USTR, states, the US is promoting FTAs as a part of 
“building-block approach to free trade”, by “using the leverage of the American economy’s 
size and attractiveness to stimulate competition for openness”. Because the US’s power is 
driven both by its economic size and military capacity, its diplomatic leverages for 
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competitive liberation have proven to be very effective, particularly in North–South trade 
relations (Ryan-Collins 2009, 2–8). The rationale is that a powerful player provides 
assistance to a weak player and makes up the costs of assistance by the benefits of PTAs that 
favour the powerful player.  
The power imbalances can create leverage for the powerful player through two 
mechanisms. First, they set precedent with one country with a certain level of standard and 
use this case as an example to pressure other small countries. Second, this agreement between 
the powerful and the weak causes a trade diversion effect for other weak countries, 
generating “a chain of reaction in which those left behind are increasingly pressured to 
follow” (Ryan-Collins 2009, 3). Hence the powerful player has a higher chance of deriving a 
favourable agreement through bilateral negotiations, which will also generate a broader 
influence in the region through the domino effect.  
Korea’s and Japan’s influence over ASEAN may be distinguished by their differing 
degrees economic/military capability and trade dependency. First, Korea’s and Japan’s 
varying economic and military power have different implications for ASEAN countries. 
Japan is a major power in the region that can effectively counter and balance the rise of China 
and a major donor country that has contributed a significant amount of aid to Southeast Asia 
since the late 1980s. On the other hand, Korea is perceived more as an economic partner, 
rather than a regional power, that needs surveillance. Second, the two countries have 
significant differences in their trade dependency. According to the World Bank (n.d.), 
Korea’s and Japan’s merchandise trade as a share of GDP was 89.8% and 28.4%, 
respectively, during 2004–2008,35 despite the fact that ASEAN is a major trade partner to 
both. As Japan has a much bigger domestic market and depends less on trade in comparison, 
Korea and Japan may still place different priorities on the Southeast Asian market for their 
economic influences. These differences suggest that the greater a country’s economic and 
military power and the less it depends on trade, it is more likely that it will take the advantage 
of its strengths to derive greater concession from its counterpart country through bilateral 
negotiations. In contrast, the incentives of a bilateral agreement compared to a plurilateral 
                                   
35 Merchandise trade (per cent of GDP) for other years is available at the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS. 
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agreement diminish if a country has a high trade dependency and is a relatively weak 
economic and military power. 
The weak players may still find the incentive to engage in FTAs, albeit the 
concessions made are more often unilateral than bilateral, as they lock in domestic policy 
reform, make the reversal of such commitments costlier and guarantee market access to a 
large market. As a matter of fact, the new wave of regionalism since the late 1980s has been 
marked by increasing one-sided agreements and unilateral reforms where liberalisation is 
achieved primarily by small countries, as big countries or economies only make modest 
concessions (Ethier 1998, 1151). For example, Mexico’s asymmetrical concession with the 
US in the NAFTA negotiation clearly aimed at securing domestic reforms by tying the reform 
measures to international treaty (Whalley 1998, 71–72). Most Scandinavian countries made 
significant concessions in their agricultural sectors by applying for EU membership (Ethier 
1998, 1151). In similar ways, Aremu (2010) suggests that the asymmetrical economic 
relationship between the relatively weaker ASEAN countries and the stronger Korea/Japan 
may have a positive effect on foreign policy behaviour between these countries. That is, the 
more the weaker side depends dependent on the stronger side, which is measured by 
economic indicators such as the proportion of FDI, foreign aid and trade dependence, the 
more often the two parties will engage in diplomatic events. 
When it comes down to negotiation techniques, the single undertaking approach has 
been preferred by the stronger party, most notably the US and Japan, to ensure that the 
counterparty, which are usually developing countries, commits to negotiating all the items at 
the table. The items of discussion can range from traditional trade issues, including goods, 
services and investment, to the WTO+ issues. The arrangement made under the single 
undertaking approach then makes it difficult for the involved parties to bypass the 
requirement for high standards with comprehensiveness. While most bilateral FTAs take the 
form of single undertaking approach because it is easier to negotiate, plurilateral agreements 
tend to take varying forms of negotiation approaches. In the case of the ASEAN+1 PTAs, 
AJCEP and AANZFTA have been negotiated under the single undertaking approach, while 
the rest have opted for the sequential approach of negotiations. 
 
(d) Foreign policy objectives. Tracing back to the Kantian peace hypothesis, liberal-
leaning scholars have long argued that economic interdependence strengthens political ties 
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between states. As such, states have frequently used economic ties to achieve foreign policy 
objectives. For example, the US enacted the US–Israeli FTA in 1985 and continued to 
strengthen economic ties with the Middle East for political purposes. The terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001 were a central momentum for the US to push for these initiatives. After 
the terrorism, the 9/11 Commission (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 378–379) reported that  
 
Economic and political liberties tend to be linked. Commerce, especially international 
commerce, requires ongoing cooperation and compromise, the exchange of ideas 
across cultures, and the peaceful resolution of differences through negotiation or the 
rule of law. 
 
Hence, the US began working toward a Middle East Free Trade Area to promote the rules-
based global trading system in Muslim countries and counter terrorism.  
Likewise, Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation choices with ASEAN may depend on their 
respective foreign policy objectives and ASEAN’s strategic importance in achieving them. 
Japan regards as China having political reasons for approaching ASEAN through CAFTA. 
That is, China reached ASEAN to take the leadership role in building East Asian economic 
regionalism (Hughes 2005). In this respect, Japan’s choice of bilateral negotiation approaches 
is likely to be associated with effectively countering the rise of China through the 
establishment of alternative regional trade rules.  
As Dent suggested (2010, 231), Japan and China have demonstrated contrasting PTA 
models. China adopts the “developing country” FTA model, which is simpler, less 
comprehensive and similar to that of ASEAN. In the meantime, Japan adopts the “developed 
country” PTA model, closer to that of the US, which reflects the interests of transnational 
companies and demands for regulatory measures. Japan’s rationale for such differences could 
be explained if it aims to establish different regional rules and norms through in-depth 
relationships with each ASEAN member. ASEAN had experience with regional PTAs, 
namely AFTA and CAFTA, but lacked experience in more specific, comprehensive and in-
depth bilateral PTAs, except for Singapore. Thus, ASEAN members’ bilateral experience 
with Japan would provide ASEAN states with models for their future bilateral PTAs, which 
would eventually become the standard for East Asia’s PTAs and regional economic 
institutions. 
84 
 
Japan also has security incentives to promote bilateral PTAs and provide country-
specific economic and development assistance to individual ASEAN members. For example, 
Japan promoted closer economic relationship with Southeast Asia to secure its influence in 
the Malacca Strait, South China Sea and East China Sea (Aizawa 2014, 6–7).36 Countries 
such as the Philippines and Vietnam, which claim the rights to the South China Sea, shared 
overlapping interests for securing such economic relations with Japan as a counterbalancing 
strategy against China. Because China's power and capacity to claim the rights to the South 
China Sea is far greater than the individual ASEAN countries, bilateral economic 
relationships were used as means to align with major powers against China. In contrast, 
Cambodia faces the difficulty of being forced to take sides with either China or Japan.37 
In comparison with Japan, Korea’s political interests are rather unitary than mutually 
intersecting with ASEAN. Because Korea does not have any significant historical collision or 
war vestiges with the ASEAN countries, the Korean government perceives ASEAN as an 
important alliance within the region, and its promotion of close economic ties with ASEAN 
can back up its political stance (Choi 2014). “Sandwiched” between Japan and China, 
however, Korea has sought niche diplomacy as a middle power rather than to seize a 
leadership position in East Asia (Zhang 2016). Thus, Korea’s main foreign policy objectives 
with ASEAN do not concern counterbalancing China like Japan. Moreover, Korea focuses on 
gaining support of the ASEAN countries on disputes, such as those concerning the North 
Korean nuclear threats and the naming of the marginal sea bordered by Korea and Japan 
(Choi 2014).38  
 
3.4.2 Ideas.  
The critics of rational choice approaches contend that analysing interests alone cannot 
account for the changing preferences of the actors and the behaviours that are not purely out of 
                                   
36 Japan’s strategic importance of the maritime dispute between China and the Southeast 
Asian countries also closely linked with its economic benefits: 95% of Japan's energy supply and 40% 
of its trade passes through the South China Sea (Aizawa 2014, 6). 
37 In fact, the Philippines and Vietnam exchanged talks for EPA negotiations with Japan as 
early as 2002 and 2005, respectively, while Cambodia was one of the last to issue the notification 
needed for AJCEP to enter into force and has yet to sign a bilateral FTA with Japan. 
38 Korea claims the name of the sea as the East Sea, whereas Japan labels it the Sea of Japan. 
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self-interest. The rational approaches presume that actors know exactly what they want and 
how it will benefit their interests. Thus, they are limited in explaining the changes occurring in 
trade policies because it undermines the interaction and the shared beliefs created between the 
domestic actors; ideas and beliefs supply the availability of viable policy options (Goldstein 
1993). Domestic actors’ interests are often shaped by a variety of non-material factors, 
including experience, beliefs, identities, culture or norms.39 These ideas can be differentiated 
from the rationalist approach of viewing interests, “if acquiring a new idea means changing 
one’s conception of self-interest rather than just reordering one’s preferences, and if different 
agents can hold different mental models regardless of the similarities of their structural 
positions” (Blyth 2003, 697). As Wendt (1995, 73–74) argues, “social structures exist only in 
process”, implicating that historically and socially constructed experience creates a lens 
through which we see the world. In this context, the idea-based approaches complement rather 
than contradict the rationalist explanations by giving account to how decisions become what 
they are, instead of considering the changes as given factors (Nye 2007, 7–8). 
To provide an analytical framework in understanding why Korea’s and Japan’s 
preferences for their initial negotiation approach diverged, this section first defines ideas as 
policy paradigms. It then builds a framework on how the influence of ideas can be captured 
through the comparative case studies by expanding on the role of ideas in both continuity and 
change. Last, this section identifies the conditions in which policymakers make the different 
path selections through identification of the antecedent conditions and the reinforcements. 
 
Ideas as Policy Paradigms. For the purpose of the thesis, ideas are conceptualised as 
policy frames, defined as policymakers’ “normative or cognitive beliefs that are located in the 
foreground of policy debates” (Kangas, Niemelä and Varjonen 2014, 74).40 The scholarship 
focusing on policy paradigms or policy frames highlight the process of policy learning and 
                                   
39 Ideas also take many different forms, including frames, myth, collective memories, 
stories and scripts (Schmidt 2010, 3). Others categorise the different kinds of ideas, such as 
world-views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 7–8; 
Campbell 2002, 21). 
40 For literature that emphasises policymakers’ ideas and strategies, see Goldstein (1988); 
Hall (1989); Hall (1993); Goldstein and Keohane (1993); McNamara (1998); Campbell 
(2002); Blyth (2002); Béland (2009); Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons (2010); and Morrison 
(2012, 2016). 
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formation, which influences the development of government policies (Hall 1993; Berman 
1998; McNamara 1998; Blyth 2002; Béland 2009; Schmidt 2010; Berman 2013). Ideas emerge 
from “policymakers’ experiences with their environment and interactions with other actors” 
(McNamara 1998, 5). During this process, they play the role of defining crisis and shaping 
preferences and identities (Morrison 2016, 182).  
Focusing on key decision-makers’ beliefs and strategies, rather than ideas of individuals 
that form bottom-up micro decision-making processes, also help make a better understanding 
of the path selection during or after critical junctures, as “the researcher is more likely to 
capture the dynamics that in most cases influence the selection of one institutional solution 
over others that were available during the critical juncture” (Capoccia 2015, 150). During the 
critical juncture, defined as a “common exogenous shock” or the “moments of social and 
political fluidity”, policymakers are given greater liberty to shape new policy paradigms 
(Capoccia 2015, 150–156). They are “freer and more influential in steering institutional 
development than during settled times” (Capoccia 2015, 156). In other words, the policy-
making processes are not only about responding to external pressures or societal actors, but 
also about decision-makers’ having to cope with uncertainty (Heclo 1976, as cited in Berman 
2013, 219).  
 
Capturing the Role of Ideas. Today’s literature commonly acknowledges that ideas do 
matter in shaping public policies. Yet, how much they matter in shaping public policies is still 
debatable, mostly due to the difficulty associated with measuring and quantifying the influence 
of ideas (Mehta 2011). For the same reason, the role of ideas has often been highlighted in 
situations where it can be decisively identified under specific political circumstances (Béland 
2009, 702), particularly when actors face complex and uncertain situations with multiple 
equilibriums (Béland 2010, 148). A sudden change in public policy, then, can best be captured 
by the idea-based perspective, in which various political and economic costs and benefits have 
been identified. 
The comparative case studies method offers a useful tool to capture the influence of 
ideas, as it provides a counterfactual leverage on what would have happened without particular 
ideas (Parsons 2002, 49–50). In these regards, Korea’s and Japan’s sudden divergence of PTA 
negotiation strategies with ASEAN, after their initial decision to opt for the bilateral approach 
of negotiations, provide an apt ground to test whether ideas played a significant role in their 
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decision-making processes. The two cases allow an observer to capture what caused the sudden 
change of the perceived interests, as it is relatively easier to capture not only what happens 
when ideas take place, but also that ideas still matter when the policy remains consistent. The 
comparison of Korea’s and Japan’s development of bilateralism and regionalism, therefore, 
allows an observer to trace both the changes and the status quo in their preferences to evaluate 
the impact of ideas. 
To further specify the analytical tool to capture the influence of ideas in Korea’s and 
Japan’s trade policies, ideas are juxtaposed as path-creating versus path-dependent factors. As 
Cox (2004) argues, ideas can influence public policies even if there is no change on the surface 
over time. Likewise, the historical institutionalist approach has been adopted to explain 
continuity in policies through the logic of path dependence, rather than to explain the changes 
in policies (Schmidt 2010, 2). Certain ideas that are highly valued among members of a society 
causes conventional models to persist, leading to the path dependency of ideas. When a policy 
based on certain ideas is highly valued within a society, changes to the policy may occur but 
they will be confined within the boundaries of existing ideas as scholars and policymakers will 
continue to refer back to them (Cox 2004, 216).  
By contrast, old ideas can be replaced by new ideas if actors’ perceptions change 
entirely. In this case, a new policy breaks the inertia of the existing values promoted by the old 
policy. Most existing studies focus on the path-creating role of ideas to demonstrate that 
interests are subject to change (Goldstein 1993; Berman 1998; Blyth 2002; Blyth 2003; 
Morrison 2016). In this case, the idea diffusion processes then become not only about when 
and which ideas matter most, but also about whose ideas are more influential to shift the policy 
paradigm (Acharya 2004). When policymakers with innovative ideas suggest a new policy 
paradigm, it often leads to “a battle of ideas” (Parsons 2002, 57), in which different values 
“compete with other norms and perceptions of interest” between various domestic actors 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). However, it is not always the case that new ideas are 
successful (Parsons 2002, 57), as they “survive implementation into policy only if they are 
politically salient” (McNamara 1998, 5). The greater the key decision-makers’ power and 
authority, the more likely their ideas lead to a shift in policy paradigm. As Hall (1993) states,  
[i]ssues of authority are likely to be central to the process of paradigm change. Faced 
with conflicting opinions from the experts, politicians will have to decide whom to 
regard as authoritative, especially on matters of technical complexity, and the policy 
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community will engage in a contest for authority over the issues at hand. In other words, 
the movement from one paradigm to another is likely to be preceded by significant 
shifts in the locus of authority over policy. (280) 
In either case, once ideas live though the contestation process, they gradually become 
internalised within society, and they “acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a 
matter of broad public debate” (Finnmore and Sikkink 1998, 895). Furthermore, the learning 
process takes place as policy legacies echo in the evaluation of later decisions (Mehta 2011). 
Ideas and norms may also readapt and localise depending on the different societal and regional 
characteristics, which subsequently affect the policy-making trends (Acharya 2004). 
 
Examination of Temporal Processes: Antecedent Conditions and Reinforcements. 
After the Asian financial crisis, both Korea and Japan quickly adopted the idea of bilateralism 
and regionalism. During this period, decision-makers were given greater flexibility and power 
to shape the new policy directions with PTAs. However, the crisis did not lead to an immediate 
divergence of ideas between the two countries. Policymakers in Korea and Japan were still 
conservative, focusing on the co-operation at the East Asian level, even as they adopted PTAs. 
Then, a noticeable gap in Korea’s and Japan’s preference for regionalism and cross-regionalism 
emerged since the early to mid-2000s. What could have possibly triggered the differences in 
the two countries?  
Examining policymakers’ ideas in the development of temporal processes is helpful for 
discovering the dynamics of policymaking processes that occurred over substantial stretches 
of time (Pierson 2004). As Pierson (2004, 2) emphasises, “placing politics in time can greatly 
enrich both the explanations we offer for social outcomes of interest, and the very outcomes 
that we identify as worth explaining”. Understanding temporal contexts allows one to 
distinguish the conditions that determine the different policymaking processes and underscore 
the importance of examining historical development that leads to certain policy outcomes 
(Pierson 2004, 2). Examining these two factors in the temporal processes is particularly useful 
to examine the cases of Korea and Japan, because the two countries’ choices did not diverge 
immediately after the critical juncture. Rather than demonstrating an immediate path departure, 
the two countries’ divergence exhibited a lag. 
During the temporal processes, key decision-makers’ consideration of “past policies 
and the way they assimilate new information” helped resolve the puzzle of how “state actors’ 
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interpretation of both past and present events, as well as their selective screening of 
information, exerted a crucial impact over political outcome” (Berman 2013, 219–220). If ideas 
are significant components that shape Korea’s and Japan’s trade negotiation methods with 
ASEAN, they might as well be able to provide explanations for how such methods are chosen 
at the outset and why they might change (or not change) when international circumstances 
remain equal. Upon reflection of these policy development mechanisms that encompass 
policymakers’ response to both past and present events, two factors can be identified in 
determining the path-dependency or path-creation of ideas: (1) antecedent conditions and (2) 
reinforcements.  
 First, antecedent conditions are factors or conditions that existed prior to a critical 
juncture. They help provide predictive elements in explaining a range of viable economic 
policies after a critical juncture. According to Capoccia (2015), the antecedent conditions need 
to be considered in explaining a path selection because: 
It is the analyst’s task to reconstruct the context of the critical juncture and, through the 
study of historical sources, establish who were the key decision makers, what choices 
were available to them – historically available, not simply hypothetically possible – 
how close actors came to selecting an alternative option, and what likely consequences 
the choice of an alternative option would have had for the institutional outcome of 
interest. (159) 
To determine whether they play a causal role with the critical juncture and the 
subsequent policy outcomes, Slater and Simmons (2010, 889) suggest that antecedent 
conditions should “combine in a causal sequence with factors operating during the juncture to 
produce a divergent outcome”. Their definition of antecedent conditions differs from other 
types of antecedent conditions that either seek direct causal mechanisms through rival 
hypotheses or justify case selection through background similarities,41 as the causal process 
                                   
41 According to Slater and Simmons (2010), there are three alternative logical types of 
antecedent conditions: 
First, antecedent conditions may have nothing to do with a causal process. For those 
seeking to uncover historical causation, attention to such descriptive context sacrifices 
parsimony without any gain in explanatory leverage. A second possibility is that factors 
preceding a critical juncture may be directly responsible for the outcome of interest. 
Antecedent conditions should always be entertained as rival hypotheses, especially if we 
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between the antecedents and policy outcome is “indirect and combinatory” (Slater and 
Simmons 2010, 889). To identify what types of antecedent conditions need to be examined, a 
critical juncture should first be defined and then a question of “how similar or different were 
the antecedent conditions of the cases to be examined” should be addressed (Slater and 
Simmons 2010, 911).  
To explore the antecedent conditions in the instant case studies, the shift (or status quo) 
of ideas to the existing preference is traced back to Korea’s and Japan’s trading environments 
before the Asian Financial Crisis. Chapter 5 addresses how policymakers in the two countries 
viewed multilateralism, bilateralism and regionalism in a broader context through the 
examination of long-term policymaking processes. Korea and Japan both underwent a 
transition period from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism throughout the 1990s, 
which consequently shaped their ideas about PTAs and regional co-operation. As Chapter 5 
demonstrates, both countries were firm supporters of the WTO-based multilateralism, as the 
hub-and-spoke relationship with the US prevented East Asia from developing its own regional 
institution. With the increasing perception that American power was on the decline (Brown 
1993) and the breakout of the Asian financial crisis, the calls for PTAs emerged. However, the 
strength of values and ideas Korea and Japan placed on multilateralism and PTAs varied, 
although they did not cause a direct divergence in the two countries’ PTA strategies, owing to 
the two countries’ different antecedent conditions that preceded the critical juncture. 
Next, reinforcement is defined as experience(s) with one or more events after a critical 
juncture, which relates back with the antecedent conditions to generate either path-dependence 
or path-creation of an idea. As Pierson (2004) conceptualises, path dependence is about 
understanding a self-reinforcing process: 
Path dependence refers to dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which 
generate multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which 
events unfold. Arthur, David, and others have argued that the crucial feature of a 
                                   
have theoretical priors that they might be causally significant. In a third scenario, 
antecedent conditions represent background similarities. Comparative scholars often spend 
considerable time explicating these antecedents to justify a paired comparison research 
design. These ultimately serve as control variables, not causal variables. Antecedent cross-
case similarities cannot logically be responsible for cross-case divergence. (889) 
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historical process that generates path dependence is positive feedback (or self-
reinforcement). (20–21) 
Pierson (2000, 2004) examines the role of positive reinforcements, as a powerful inertia 
that sources the path-dependency of ideas. As each positive experience builds up, step by step 
and over time, towards a certain policy trajectory, the higher the costs of alternative path 
become, making it more difficult to reverse the path (Pierson 2000; David 2000; Hacker 2002; 
Pierson 2004). A reinforcement can also be derived from a negative experience through the 
same logic. A series of negative experiences would decrease the value of existing ideas. In 
other words, they would gradually lower the existing ideational barriers, making it conducive 
for new ideas to enter and eventually change the policy paradigm.  
When Korea and Japan initiated their PTAs after the Asian financial crisis, their experiences 
in the earliest PTAs acted as reinforcements of their initial perception of bilateralism and 
regionalism. They became more direct causes of changes (or status quo) in the two countries’ 
preferences about bilateralism and regionalism. As Chapter 5 illustrates, Korea’s and Japan’s 
first-hand experiences in PTAs—whether or not successful—stirred new internal debate 
among the policymakers in the face of uncertainty; the various domestic responses could not 
have been fully calculated by economic and political costs and benefits through research or 
joint studies because these PTA negotiations were a human construct that involved a process 
of persuasion and consensus-making.  
 
3.4.3 Institutions. An institution is composed of the system that provides rules and 
agents who execute those rules (North 1989). Thus, it acts as a bridge that connects and 
corresponds to the interests and ideas of the domestic agents. Because the link is interactive, 
the function of the institution is not limited to the allocation of decision-making power but 
continues to evolve in response to the shift in societal demands. Since the late 1990s, the 
institutions of Korea and Japan have continued to evolve to equip and build new structures that 
can accommodate the departure from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism. As 
Katzenstein (1976) argues, the comparison of the institutionalisation of two industrialised 
countries with similar political and economic motivation should provide a key to their 
dissimilar foreign economic policies. 
Up to the mid-1990s, market-driven forces had characterised economic co-operation in 
East Asia, where transactions between economic entities took place first, followed by the 
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institutional arrangement to support the growth of economic exchanges (Langhammer 1995). 
In contrast, post-crisis East Asia has witnessed regional economic initiatives taken at the 
institutional level, the most outstanding feature being regional and bilateral trade agreements 
(Urata 2006, 19). Due to the institutional nature of the PTAs of East Asia, the structure in which 
decision makers process various outlying domestic interests and ideas have become critical 
variables for consideration in determining the policy orientation of a government.  
However, previous studies discussing the effects of domestic institutions on trade 
policy in Korea and Japan have not reached a consensus yet. For instance, Choi and Oh 
(2011) argued that the fragmentation of jurisdiction over trade at the ministry level explains 
the different degrees of liberalisation in the agricultural sectors in the two countries. 
Yoshimatsu (2012) added that it is the individual preference and leadership of the chief 
executives that caused divergence at the ministry-level in Korea and Japan by 2010. This was 
despite the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi’s executive power was strong enough to carry 
out the PTA policies, but they were not his personal priorities. Therefore, Yoshimatsu argued 
that it was individual leadership that ultimately led Japan to lag behind Korea in its PTA 
policies. However, Choi and Oh’s and Yoshimatsu’s focus on micro factors fall short in 
explaining the fundamental causes of how inter-ministry conflict or a leader’s policies arise 
in one country and not in another. 
In contrast, Fujisue (2013) assessed that it is the political system that distinguishes the 
overall PTA qualities and length of negotiation of Korea and Japan. Adopting the core 
executive model, he argued that the cause of centralisation in trade policy should be 
highlighted from a broader perspective by examining how the core executives are composed 
under the different political systems. As Fujisue posited, the most rudimental difference in 
the institutional structures of Korea and Japan is marked by their political systems. Korea and 
Japan are both democratic countries with developed economies, but one has a presidential 
system with executive dominance, whereas the other has a parliamentary system where party 
and bureaucracy have significant power in shaping foreign policies. Despite the significance 
of intra-democracy variations shaping foreign economic policies, scholarly interest in this 
area is under-researched in East Asia, particularly when it comes to the study of checks and 
balances between the executive and legislative branches of governments. 
This section goes a step further than Fujisue (2013)’s work and focuses on how intra-
democracy variation influences the centralisation of policy-making authority in regard to 
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Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN in the early 2000s. PTAs have direct economic 
distributional consequence across domestic industries, unlike most other foreign policies that 
attract relatively little domestic attention. As a result, the legislative branch of the 
government is engaged in the decision-making processes more often than other foreign 
policies that assume a strong role of the executive branch for the sake of national unity, 
flexibility and efficiency (Raunio and Wagner 2014). Therefore, an examination of how the 
balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches influences the 
institutionalisation of PTAs provides useful guidelines to trace the causes of centralisation or 
decentralisation in the PTA strategies of Korea and Japan. 
The dynamic systems model of administrative politics developed by Krause (1996) 
provides a useful point of departure for examining how the executive–legislative relationship 
influences the degree of centralisation in the trade policies of Korea and Japan. The model 
examines the institutional dynamics between the two principals—the executive and 
legislative branches—and the agency—the bureaucracy. Krause eases the assumptions of 
conventional principal–agent literature, which has been built on top-down institutional 
designs by criticising the oversimplification of the causal relationship between principal and 
agent (Krause 1996; Meier and O’Toole 2006). The dynamic systems model predicts four 
possible outcomes: bureaucratic influence, bureaucratic autonomy, political influence and 
mutual influence. From the examination of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Krause finds that political principals and agents mutually influence each other; thus, the 
influence of bureaucracy should not be forsaken in explaining the executive–legislative 
relationship.  
Relaxing the hierarchical analogy provides a convenient tool for comparing the 
institutional differences of Korea and Japan because the existing literature either dismisses 
the influence of executive–legislative relations or the discretion of bureaucracy in the 
decision-making of PTAs. For example, in Japan the turf battles between bureaucracies have 
been the centre of discussion when it comes to fragmentation in making PTA policy (Corning 
2009; Yoshimatsu 2011). In spite of the fact that political leadership is closely associated 
with Japanese bureaucracy, the two have often been understood separately from each other 
(Pempel 1992). In contrast, Korean bureaucracy has been understood as an administrative 
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tool instead of a group of discretionary agents, or it has been implied in the FTA policy-
making processes due to the strong presence of the executive branch (Hwang 1996).42  
To fill the gap in the literature, Krause’s two-by-two model of principal–agent 
interaction is revised, as his model is apt to explain the principal–agent dynamics under a 
single government. Hence, the revised model compares the variations that exist across the 
different types of democracy by addressing the power relationship between the executive and 
the legislative branches and how the relative degree of decision-making power interacts with 
the discretion of bureaucracy. Directions in which the presence of bureaucratic discretion 
influences the centralisation of the executive branch are included to explain when an 
administrative agent strengthens or weakens political influence of the principal.  
To fit these variations into the new framework, several assumptions are made about 
executive–legislative relations and conceptualise the nature of bureaucracy. Regarding the 
principals, it is premised, as it has been widely accepted by existing scholarship, that in 
democracies a strong executive branch is associated with the top-down co-ordination of 
foreign policies such that it benefits the aggregate welfare of the economy (Baldwin 1985; 
Milner and Rosendorf 1997). As Table 3.2 illustrates, the executive branch’s subject of 
interest is in advancing the aggregate welfare because its constituency is the entire nation. 
Thus, the scope of trade tends to be more internationalist and liberalising. As an individual 
holds greater decision-making power, foreign policies are more flexible and responsive to 
change. The executive branch’s unilateral control also allows consistency over public 
administrations and in co-ordinating and managing bureaucracies (Moe and Wilson 1994). 
Therefore, when it comes to the length of negotiations, the stages of negotiation, until the 
signing, should take a shorter period of time. In contrast, the ratification process can become 
prolonged by involving more actors in the decision-making process and by involving the 
legislature for the approval of PTAs (Fujisue 2013, 10).43 
The opposite is assumed when the legislative branch holds strong control over foreign 
economic policies. Legislators represent smaller constituencies and are more susceptible to 
pressures from parochial interests. Hence, they tend to be supportive of more protectionist 
                                   
42 See for example, Yu (2006) and Yoshimatsu (2012). 
43 The process in which PTAs take place is generally divided into study period, negotiation, 
reaching an agreement, signing, ratifying and entering the agreement into force. 
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policies. Due to the variety of interests they represent, their strong presence may become a 
source of delay in PTA negotiations. However, the ratification process should be shortened as 
a consensus is drawn during the negotiation processes (Fujisue 2013, 10). 
 
Table 3.1 Executive–Legislative Characteristics in Shaping Foreign Economic Policies 
 
Next, bureaucracy has the capability to influence its principals, rather than being a 
simple agent for processing administrative orders.44 Similar to what Mosher (1982, 113–120) 
defines as the “professional state”, which draws attention to the professional elites in public 
service, the bureaucracy in Korea and Japan is composed of a highly selective group of elites. 
Each individual has an educated background that often includes professional knowledge, but 
the bureaucracy as a group also has its own tradition, culture and goals derived from 
cumulative experience.  
However, the dominance of bureaucracy can contradict the interests of the general 
public by “moving the weight toward the partial, the corporate, the professional perspective” 
(Mosher 1982, 23). Because each ministry has its own independent goals, aside from a 
unified national goal, the interests of the different ministries may clash if given equal 
administrative power over a common policy. Information asymmetry created by professional 
                                   
44 Bureaucracy is often presumed to be an administrative tool, and the chief executive is 
expected to manage bureaucracies objectively and efficiently for broader national interest (Freidrich 
1950; Sundquist 1981). Moreover, competition between bureaucratic agencies mainly involved 
winning budgets rather than politically sensitive issues, due to the fact that bureaucrats are civil 
servants who do not have to compete for seats as politicians do (Peters 2001, 226). 
 Executive Legislative 
Goals of interest Aggregate welfare Constituency groups 
Areas of interest International Parochial 
FTA preference Liberal Protectionist 
Response to change Flexible and responsive Possible delays 
Administrative co-
ordination 
Integrated Fragmented 
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experience can also imbue bureaucracies with the power of their own (Krause 1996). For 
instance, in Japan the bureaucratic discretion in policy-making has often been considered so 
significant that it is seen as an obstacle to promoting coherent strategies under the executive 
leadership. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1995, 5) notes that Japan’s political 
system heavily entrusts “unelected bureaucrats” rather than “elected politicians”. 
Taking these characteristics into account, the new two-by-two model is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. The figure depicts the degree of centralisation in the institutionalisation process of 
the decision making on PTAs, demonstrated by the executive–legislative relations and 
influence of bureaucracy. 
 
Figure 3.1 The Two-by-two Model of Degree of Centralisation in FTA Institutions 
 
  Executive–Legislative Relations 
      
  Executive Legislative 
 
Insignificant  (1) Strong centralisation  (2) Political influence  
 
 
Influence of 
Bureaucracy 
Significant  
(3) Mutual adaptation 
with centralised 
tendencies 
(4) Political influence 
and bureaucracy goals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first and the second cases demonstrate situations where bureaucracy is considered 
a simple administrative tool without particular discretion or expertise. Under these 
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circumstances, a government with a relatively strong executive branch, as illustrated by the 
first case, will readily centralise the institutionalisation of PTAs and experience little 
competition among bureaucratic agencies. The chief executive’s responsibility is limited to 
its classic role of managing bureaucracies objectively and efficiently for advancing broader 
national interests through trade agreements (Friedrich 1950; Sundquist 1981). In the second 
case, the behaviour of bureaucracies is shaped significantly by the preferences of politicians 
in the legislative branch. The typical legislative role is expected, “creating and perfecting the 
decentralized system” by responding to its constituencies (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 
166). Legislators are more likely to intervene in the institutionalisation process by using a 
variety of ex ante and ex post controls, reflecting the clashing interests of the winners and 
losers of trade (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984); thus, decentralised and fragmented bottom-
up decision-making is expected. 
The third and fourth cases describe situations in which bureaucratic discretion 
significantly affects the preferences of political principals, and vice versa. In the third case, 
the executive branch holds greater decision-making power. Thus, it should demonstrate 
relatively concentrated activities of bureaucracies. The executive branch has overarching 
power to shape the PTA policy framework, but the decisions regarding the scope and the 
degree of liberalisation is reliant on the expertise of agents. The fourth case occurs when the 
legislators and bureaucracy agents mutually influence one another under a system with a 
weak executive branch. In the absence of an executive branch to co-ordinate conflicting 
interests, fragmentation is expected—similar to the second case. The degree of fragmentation 
varies depending on how legislators reflect domestic interests and to what degree the 
bureaucracies will reconcile the interests with their own goals, while also giving 
consideration to the unified national goal. However, it is generally expected that the influence 
of bureaucracy will be stronger under the weak executive branch (Nicholson-Crotty and 
Miller 2012). Furthermore, if the ideal of the executive branch is far from that of the 
legislators, then bureaucratic agents are more likely to play the role of legislative allies 
(Warren 2010).  
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
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In the introductory chapter, the thesis laid out the main hypotheses to be examined. To 
investigate further how the domestic factors, rather than systemic factors, account for the 
different negotiation approaches taken by Korea and Japan in their PTAs with ASEAN, this 
section expands the sub-hypotheses on each of the domestic factors, namely, interests, ideas 
and institutions. 
 Table 3.2 summarises the sub-hypotheses on domestic interests. Regarding domestic 
interests, the sub-hypothesis establishes that a bilateral negotiation approach is more likely if: 
(a) sensitive sectors of the economy have more to lose from a liberalized market, (b) a 
government’s interest in a PTA involves achieving negotiation efficiency, (c) a government has 
more political and economic leverage against the negotiation counterpart and (d) a 
government has country-specific foreign policy objectives. Import substitution industries are 
expected to oppose any free trade in principle. However, these industries should oppose less in 
a bilateral PTA, as it would have much smaller political and economic significance compared 
to a regional PTA. In Korea and Japan, the agricultural sector belongs to these industries. 
Hence, strong opposition from the respective agricultural groups is likely to lead these 
countries to prefer a bilateral negotiation approach with individual Southeast Asian countries, 
rather than with ASEAN as a regional entity. Furthermore, the Korean and Japanese 
governments are likely to emphasise the promotion of bilateral trade agreements with 
individual ASEAN members if there is much to gain from speedy and efficient in-depth PTAs 
given the limited resources; if they can utilise asymmetric power through their pre-extent 
relationships with individual Southeast Asian countries; or if they aim to establish in-depth 
political relationships with individual ASEAN members. 
By contrast, a regional negotiation approach is more likely if: (a) export competitive 
industries have more to gain from increased market access and reduced costs attached to 
utilising PTAs, (b) a government’s interest in a PTA involves achieving greater trade gains for 
the overall economy, (c) a government has less diplomatic leverage against the negotiation 
counterpart and (d) a government’s foreign policy objectives are aimed at a targeted region. 
Export-oriented industries in Korea and Japan are clustered around manufacturing. They are 
expected to support a region-based PTA with ASEAN over bilateral PTAs to achieve greater 
market access in the Southeast Asian market and to reduce practical costs attached to the 
noodle-bowl problem. In addition, the Korean or Japanese government will likely to emphasise 
a region-based PTA with ASEAN when there is much to gain through pre-emptive entry into 
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the ASEAN market faster than their competing countries and connecting the production 
network within the region. If they do not have diplomatic leverage over an individual country 
to negotiate favourable terms of trade, then they might as well prefer a region-based PTA that 
yields greater overall gains. In this respect, the Korean government is more likely to prefer a 
region-based PTA with ASEAN than Japan. Lastly, a region-based PTA is more likely if Korea 
or Japan treats ASEAN as a region, rather than as individual countries, to achieve their foreign 
policy objectives. 
 
Table 3.2 Domestic Interests and Their Preference for PTA Negotiation Methods 
 
 
Domestic 
Interests 
Negotiation Approaches 
Regional Negotiation Bilateral Negotiation 
Private 
Interests 
  Sensitive sectors do not 
welcome PTAs of any kind.  
 Opposition may be less for 
a bilateral PTA, depending 
on: (a) its political 
significance, (b) 
counterpart’s market size 
and (c) the competitiveness 
of the relevant industries. 
 Export competitive sectors benefit from 
the enlarged market access (large returns 
to scale, cross-border production 
networks, first-mover advantages) and 
cost-efficient RTA. 
 Export competitive sectors: 
the industries that profit 
from economies of scale 
may exceptionally benefit 
from the tangled web of 
bilateral PTAs, as they 
heighten market entry costs 
for potential competitors. 
Government’s 
Interests 
 Trade gains 
 Foreign policy objectives targeted at a 
region 
 Negotiation efficiency 
 Diplomatic leverage effects 
 Foreign policy objectives 
for a specified country 
100 
 
Even though the interest-based hypotheses account for Korea’s and Japan’s differences 
in the costs and benefits of their negotiation strategy choices, both countries still opted for the 
bilateral negotiation approach in the beginning. Thus, the interest-based explanations do not 
explicate what triggered the sudden divergence between the two countries in 2003. Thus, the 
sub-hypothesis on ideas tests whether ideas have influence over PTA negotiation approaches 
and, if so, under what conditions. The sub-hypothesis establishes that path-creation (or path-
dependency) in ideas for PTA negotiation approaches depend on (a) antecedent conditions and 
(b) reinforcements. In other words, it tests whether the negotiation preferences are determined 
not solely by a pure cost–benefit calculus, but also by the preluding context before a critical 
juncture and the reinforcement mechanism that feeds back to the policymaker’s ideas.  
Neither Korean nor Japanese negotiators were experienced in PTAs. Facing uncertainty 
in the ambiguity of PTA negotiations, policymakers had a range of viable policy options, which 
were susceptible to change through the emergence of new ideas. The comparison of Korea and 
Japan’s context of critical juncture (antecedent conditions) and their early FTA experiences 
(reinforcements) helps distinguish whether the ideas were valid variables. For Korea, it is 
expected that the less constraining antecedent conditions and the negative reinforcements 
enabled domestic actors with new ideas to persuade those with existing ideas, bringing 
substantial change to Korea’s negotiation preferences. For Japan, it is expected that existing 
ideas on bilateralism and regionalism continued to be highly valued. Even when new ideas 
emerge, changes should occur within the boundaries of existing values, leaving Japan’s core 
negotiation preferences remained unchanged.  
 The Sub-hypothesis on institutions aim to account for the remaining puzzle of how the 
decision-making power is distributed across domestic actors, thus enabling the domestic actors 
with different interests and ideas. It focuses on Korea’s and Japan’s executive–legislative–
bureaucratic relationship, in that: 
A strong executive branch of the government is associated with a greater degree of 
centralisation and liberalisation in trade policy-making, making a region-based PTA 
negotiation approach a less costly option. The existence of strong bureaucratic 
discretion strengthens such tendencies.  
Conversely, a weak executive branch of the government is associated with decentralisation and 
protectionism in trade policy-making, making a region-based PTA negotiation approach a 
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costlier option. The existence of strong bureaucratic discretion further intensifies fragmentation 
in PTA decision-making processes.  
In a country-specific context, Korea’s presidential system gives greater discretion to 
the executive side and to the smaller number of decision makers. Therefore, the fast decision-
making process should compensate for some negotiation efficiencies lost in the region-based 
KAFTA. By contrast, Japan’s parliamentary system gives greater decision-making power to 
the legislative branch compared to Korea. The decentralised institution, which involves a 
greater number of veto players, makes the region-based AJCEP costlier than bilateral EPAs. 
The country’s traditionally strong bureaucracy is expected to drive these tendencies further.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Policy-making processes and outcomes are shaped by close interaction between 
individuals and groups within a society, which are contingent on the design of political 
institution and norms and the changes in the international system. IPE theories provide 
explanations from the varying perspectives by highlighting importance of the diverse actors 
involved at the different levels of analysis. Hence, the first part of this chapter has examined 
systemic IPE theories, namely, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. This chapter has 
argued that systemic IPE theories provide explanations to exogenous forces that drive 
Korea’s and Japan’s policy orientations, but they cannot give analytical guidance to the 
detailed decision-making processes involved in cases such as KAFTA and AJCEP. Korea’s 
and Japan’s choices for specific negotiation methods and their subsequent divergence in 
policy outcomes can be better understood by taking the domestic factors into account. 
Therefore, the rest of this chapter has introduced an analytical framework based on 
the domestic-level analysis. It elaborated on the roles of domestic interests, institutions and 
ideas in shaping a government’s preference formation process. The framework has put a 
special emphasis on the relationship between these three I’s and their relative importance 
under the different circumstances. In particular, it has demonstrated that a government’s 
negotiation approach is shaped by the complex interaction of various economic and political 
interests, but ideas and institutions are more decisive factors in explaining the changes of 
Korea’s and Japan’s preferences. 
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Applying the analytical framework from this chapter, the following chapters will 
conduct an empirical analysis of the domestic interests, ideas and institutions in Korea and 
Japan. They will test whether the hypotheses established in this section hold valid in the 
context of the two countries. 
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Chapter 4 Domestic Interests of Japan and Korea 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter built an analytical framework, based on the domestic approaches 
of IPE, to provide a causal mechanism of how domestic interests, ideas and institutions are 
expected to influence Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiation approaches with ASEAN. Based 
on the analytical framework, this first empirical chapter investigates the influence of domestic 
interests. Specifically, it examines private and government interests involved in shaping 
Korea’s and Japan’s preferences for their respective PTA negotiation approaches at the 
different stages of their decision-making processes. Through the empirical investigation, this 
chapter aims to test the sub-hypotheses established in Chapter 3. That is, Korea and Japan both 
pursued bilateral PTAs initially because of their negotiation efficiency and to minimise the 
opposition of their respective agricultural sectors. In addition to these two factors, the Japanese 
government was further motivated to promote the bilateral approach, because of its foreign 
policy objectives and diplomatic leverages against ASEAN. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of Japan’s and Korea’s 
political and economic interests with ASEAN since the post-war period. Then, applying the 
analytical framework from Chapter 3, it examines Japan’s private and governmental interests 
in the ASEAN market. The following section investigates Korea’s private and government’s 
interests. Then, the hypotheses are tested on the cases of Korea and Japan. The final section 
concludes this chapter by comparing the two countries.  
 
4.2 An Overview: Relations with ASEAN Before the Formal Trade Negotiations 
 
This section examines Japan’s and Korea’s broader political and economic 
relationship with ASEAN, from the end of World War II to the early 2000s, which set the 
backdrop for their respective PTAs. Japan established formal relations with ASEAN over 20 
years earlier than Korea. Thus, Japan’s security and economic relations, as well as cultural 
and human exchanges, were much more in-depth than those of Korea’s. Despite these 
significant differences, ASEAN had become an important trade partner to Japan and Korea 
through the initiatives driven both by the market and the government. Furthermore, by the 
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early 2000s, Korea and Japan had established a vertical economic relationship with Southeast 
Asia. Hence, it was logical that the two countries began to consider the feasibility of PTAs 
with other Southeast Asian countries when the tide of bilateralism emerged in East Asia.  
 
4.2.1 Japan 
 
(a) Post-war Japan–ASEAN relations and the Fukuda Doctrine. Since the end of 
World War II, the non-Communist part of Southeast Asia has become one of Japan’s most 
important economic partners for reasons of its geographical proximity, its abundance in 
natural resources, and its ability to serve as an export and FDI destination. On the surface, at 
least, Japan’s purpose in Southeast Asia had been limited to the economic realm because its 
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s foreign policy concentrated on reconstructing the war-torn 
economy while relying on the US for security.45 Japan’s relationship with Southeast Asia in 
its early days, however, had been reserved due to the anti-Japanese sentiment that stemmed 
from the colonial memories and the threat of a rapidly expanding Japanese economy 
throughout the 1960s. The Southeast Asian countries nicknamed Japan during this period as 
an “economic animal” (Susumu 2013, 126).  
The massive influx of Japanese capital in the region culminated in anti-Japanese 
demonstrations in the early 1970s in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and 
Indonesia. Led by university students, anti-Japanese sentiments proliferated in campaigns 
boycotting Japanese goods and demonstrations protesting the domination of Japanese 
businesses in the local market.46 These moves reached a peak when Prime Minister Kakuei 
Tanaka visited Indonesia in January 1974. Later to be known as the “Malari Incident”, violent 
demonstrations resulted in 300 civilian casualties and the burning of Japanese vehicles and 
buildings (Solahuddin 2009). Although these anti-Japanese movements, in part, were tied to 
the demand of Southeast Asian people to reform their governments, Japanese businesses, as 
well as Japan as a nation, were explicitly not welcome in the region. 
                                   
45 The Yoshida Doctrine stood as the central pillar of Japanese foreign policy until the late 
1970s. 
46 A representative anti-Japanese movement is the National Student Centre of Thailand’s 
boycott against Japanese goods in October 1972. 
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Because Japan and ASEAN had become important economic partners, it was in the 
interest of both parties to reduce these conflicts. Their efforts could be seen through the 
numerous dialogues exchanged between Japan and ASEAN during this time,47 including the 
establishment of the Japan–ASEAN forum on synthetic rubber in 197348 and Japan’s 
promise to continue to increase ODA in Southeast Asia (MOFA (Japan) 2015). Against this 
backdrop, a major turning point came when the US decided to withdraw from Vietnam in 
1975. When the US retreated from the region, it hoped that Japan would assume a more 
proactive role in security issues. It was also to Japan’s benefit to expand its role in Southeast 
Asia for natural resources, particularly due to the instability of oil prices after the 1973 crisis 
(Hayashi 2006, 33–34). 
Domestically, the Fukuda administration, which came into office in 1976, played an 
important role in redirecting Japan’s policy toward ASEAN. As opposed to Prime Minister 
Tanaka, who attributed the anti-sentiment to local problems in Southeast Asian countries, 
Prime Minister Fukuda, who was a rival of Tanaka within LDP (Sun 2012), believed that 
Japan should be more actively involved in regional security issues, while continuing to reject 
the role of military power. Moreover, he emphasised that Japan and ASEAN should co-
operate on the goals beyond material ones and connect “heart-to-heart” as “equal partners”. 
These new policy orientations were addressed in Prime Minister Fukuda’s concluding speech 
from his summit meetings with the ASEAN member countries in Manila on 18 August 1977: 
 
It is not enough for our relationship to be based solely on mutual material and 
economic benefit. Our material and economic relations should be animated by 
heartfelt commitments to assisting and complementing each other as fellow Asians. 
This is the message I have carried everywhere on this tour, speaking repeatedly of the 
need to communicate with each other with our hearts as well as our heads, the need in 
other words for what I call “heart-to-heart” understanding among the peoples of Japan 
and Southeast Asia. You, fellow Asians, will understand what I mean. For it is in our 
                                   
47 For details, see Susumu (2013) and Busser (2000, 270–272). 
48 The forum aimed to reduce the dissatisfaction of Southeast Asian nations and region-wide 
anti-Japanese sentiment, as the global price of Southeast Asia’s natural rubber continued to decline 
due to increased Japanese production of synthetic rubber (Sudo 2015, 49). The rubber forum was later 
incorporated into the Japan–ASEAN Forum, which included a variety of other economic issues (Sudo 
1988, 512) in 1977 under the Fukuda administration. 
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Asian tradition, and it is in our Asian hearts, always to seek beyond mere physical 
satisfaction for the richness of spiritual fulfilment. (University of Tokyo 1977) 
 
The policy goals addressed in this speech became known as the Fukuda Doctrine, 
which extended Japan–ASEAN relations to the political and cultural dimensions. It was a 
milestone that led Japan to approach ASEAN as a multilateral partner, rather than from the 
traditional bilateral relations with the individual Southeast Asian countries (Sudo 2015, 5). 
Japan–ASEAN informal relations were soon elevated to full dialogue partners in March 
1977. 
After the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan became, by far, ASEAN’s largest donor; half of 
Japan’s ODA was directed to the ASEAN countries, which aimed to reduce the two parties’ 
development gap and build an “enduring cooperative relationship” (University of Tokyo 
1977). Because Japan’s early economic assistance to Southeast Asia had mostly been in the 
form of war reparations, rather than aid from a developed to developing nations, the Fukuda 
Doctrine was an impetus for Japan’s assistance program for development purposes.49 
Therefore, the ASEAN Cultural Fund was established in 1978, and it was announced in the 
same year that ODA would double every three to five years (Masujima 2008, 5–6). To the 
ASEAN countries, ODA was mainly bilateral and took three forms: grant assistance, 
technical co-operation and Yen loans (MOFA [Japan] 2001, 53). These were mostly 
concentrated in Asia, reflecting the importance of ODA as a diplomatic tool in the region to 
secure not only peace and stability in the region through economic development but also food 
supplies and natural resources after the oil crisis (Tamaki 2013, 272; see Figure 4.1). 
  
                                   
49 Japan began to provide assistance to the Philippines, South Vietnam and Indonesia as early 
as the 1950s, as agreed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952. Japan agreed to provide financial 
assistance to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore and Malaysia as “quasi-reparations”. Having lost 
42% of its national wealth during World War II, however, Japan was also an aid recipient throughout 
the 1950s and the early 1960s, receiving economic assistance from the US, World Bank and IMF. By 
the mid-1960s, Japan had become a donor country as its economy rapidly rose close to the level of a 
developed nation, providing assistance separate from war reparations (Takagi 1995, 5–15).  
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Figure 4.1 Trends in Japan’s bilateral ODA by region. 
 
Source: MOFA (Japan) ODA White Paper (2001). 
 
(b) Expansion of Japan’s political role and emphasis on regionalism beyond the 
ASEAN+1 level. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Fukuda Doctrine remained at the 
centre of Japan’s policy toward ASEAN. Japan continued to emphasise its greater take on 
Southeast Asia’s security in addition to the traditional economic co-operation. ODAs 
continued to be used as political and diplomatic tools to contain Cambodia and Vietnam 
(Takagi 1995, 30).  
Appreciation of the Japanese yen since the Plaza Accord of 1985 was a direct boost to 
trade and FDI between Japan and ASEAN (Akrasanee and Prasert 2003, 65–66). Prime 
Minister Nobuo Takeshita’s announcement of the New Partnership for Peace and Prosperity 
in 1987 stressed the growing economic interdependence and co-operation between Japan and 
ASEAN, particularly in the private sectors (MOFA (Japan) 2006a). Even though Japan faced 
a persistent economic downturn since the 1990s, the trade between Japan and ASEAN 
continued to grow until the Asian financial crisis (see Figure 4.2). While refraining from 
taking a proactive role in regional leadership, Japan initiated on taking the greater leadership 
role in Asia through supporting ASEAN’s integration through the discussion of economic 
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issues at the ASEAN Economic Ministers–Minister of International Trade and Industry 
meeting in 2002. MITI50 held a series of seminars on AFTA and provided policy advice to 
ASEAN to further support development of ASEAN and to enhance confidence between 
ASEAN and Japan’s investors (Munakata 2001, 4). 
The total export to ASEAN in 1995 reached US$82 billion (Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) 2015.), where ASEAN was the second-largest export 
destination for Japan, following America’s US$113 billion (The Observatory of Economic 
Complexity n.d.). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan’s major exports consisted of 
general machinery, electrical machinery, and transportation equipment. Meanwhile, imports 
from ASEAN mainly consisted of natural resources and primary goods, such as oil, coal, 
wood, pulp and food products (Sato 2013, 3). Japan and ASEAN’s vertically divided 
economic structures created incentives for both parties to actively engage in trade (Kwon and 
Kim 2004). 
 
Figure 4.2 Japan’s merchandise trade with ASEAN, 1980–2000. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation of data available at REITI (2015). 
 
                                   
50MITI was reformed and renamed to METI in 2002. 
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As the two parties become ever more engaged with one another, Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto once again emphasised the need to make bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic, economic and cultural arrangements between Japan and ASEAN while in 
Singapore in January 1997; this announcement was labelled the Hashimoto Doctrine (MOFA 
(Japan) 2006a). This doctrine fizzled by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which alerted Japan 
that its leadership role in the region was on the decline and needed reinforcing (Jain 2002). 
Hence, the first Japan–ASEAN Summit was held in December of that year to reiterate the 
importance of the two parties’ relations in the face of economic instability in the region 
(MOFA [Japan] 1997). The crisis also created a momentum that reminded East Asian 
countries how interdependent their economies had become, which led to the establishment of 
the APT Framework in 1999. To further assist the ASEAN countries financially, Japan also 
established the Japan–ASEAN Solidarity Fund in 1999 and the Japan–ASEAN General 
Exchange Fund in 2000 to help Southeast Asia recover from the crisis (MOFA [Japan] 2006). 
Japan’s Southeast Asian policy was moving beyond Japan–ASEAN relations to include a 
wider East Asian perspective. 
 
4.2.2 Korea 
 
(a) Establishment of the official Korea–ASEAN relations. Korea and the ASEAN 
members have long maintained a political distance before their establishment of a sectoral 
dialogue in 1989. Korea has made repeated efforts to build a standing consultative structure 
with ASEAN since the late 1970s, but the ASEAN side has been reluctant to establish formal 
relations with Korea for political and economic reasons. For ASEAN, Korea was still a 
developing country, recovering from the Korean War and in sustained tension with the 
communist DPRK; Korea was, therefore, a country with more risk than potential (Seo 2012, 
288). 
Having suffered from ideological cleavages since the end of World War II, the 
Southeast Asian countries came to value political neutrality. This regional consensus 
resurfaced in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971, where the ASEAN states agreed to 
create a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The goal of ZOPFAN was to 
promote lasting peace in the region by preventing the interference of external powers and by 
promoting co-operation among the member countries (Alagappa 1991, 270). Although the 
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member states had differences on how ZOPFAN should be substantiated, its central goal 
survived the 1970s and 1980s, shaping ASEAN’s co-operative strategy to promote peace. In 
this context, it was logical that ASEAN was reluctant to take sides either with the communist 
DPRK or the democratic Korea. 
Moreover, ASEAN had no record of establishing official relations with any 
developing country since its inception in 1967. Throughout the 1980s, its official dialogue 
partners were limited to developed countries that included Australia (1974), New Zealand 
(1975), Canada, the US, Japan and the EU (1977). The main goal of the establishment of 
these relations was to develop a co-operative financial aid structure with the developed 
countries as donors and ASEAN as beneficiary (Seo 2012, 279). The establishment of a 
sectoral dialogue partnership in November 1989 was an exceptional case for ASEAN, which 
was possibly due to Korea’s improving international reputation and its growing importance 
for the ASEAN economy in the late 1980s. 
When Korea’s economy had a growth spurt throughout the 1970s and 1980s, its 
market structure and economic policy also underwent a transformation, bringing a significant 
change to the Korea–ASEAN trade relationship. In the beginning of Korea’s economic 
development stage, represented by the growth of light industries such as textiles, wigs, shoes 
and plywood in the 1960s, Korea’s growth engine was based on low-wage labour. The main 
export destinations of these labour-intensive goods were developed countries. In the 1970s, 
the Korean government began to subsidise heavy chemical industries based on the economic 
capacity built in the 1960s, which required more technology and capital relative to the low-
wage labour. For this reason, Korea and ASEAN’s trade relationship changed from horizontal 
to vertical, which created incentives for both parties to expand their trades: Korea could 
export capital-abundant goods and ASEAN could export labour-intensive goods (Won 1996, 
15).  
By the late 1980s, Korea–ASEAN trade relations had improved to a significant extent. 
Korea’s total export to ASEAN doubled from US$2.02 billion to US$4.04 billion between 
1987 and 1989. Its total imports from ASEAN showed similar trends, increasing from 
US$2.8 billion in 1987 to US$4.19 billion in 1989 (Korea International Trade Association 
(KITA n.d.).  
The success of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 also improved Korea’s international 
recognition. Until then, it had been hardly recognised by the world, or it had been viewed as 
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one of the poorest countries in the world because of the Korean War. The Olympics was an 
opportunity to draw the world’s attention to Korea’s rapid economic growth—referred to as 
the “Miracle on the Han River” (Yonhap News Agency 1990). 
The establishment of the sectoral dialogue was a positive sign for Korea that its future 
relations with ASEAN could be advanced; economic factors such as its improved economy 
and changing trade structure with ASEAN were the main triggers for this political change. 
Korea’s initiation of an official dialogue with ASEAN was expected to further boost trade 
between the two parties. The dialogue, however, was limited to economic terms that included 
trade, investment and tourism. The two parties were still carefully weighing possible risks 
and benefits before establishing a full-fledged dialogue that included diplomacy in economic 
and political terms.  
 
(b) Korea’s expansion of co-operation since the 1990s. Diplomatic relations between 
Korea and ASEAN rapidly took off with its establishment of the sectoral dialogue in 1989. 
The two partys’ political and economic relations improved at a fast pace, leading to the 
establishment of a full dialogue partnership at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 
1991 in Kuala Lumpur. Korea became ASEAN’s seventh official full dialogue partner. It was 
very timely that the Cold War was ending, and Korea and DPRK jointly entered the United 
Nations in September of the same year, easing the political tension that ASEAN feared when 
it first officially approached Korea. Newly added agendas to the full dialogue partnership, in 
addition to trade, investment and tourism, were information technology, human resource 
development and development co-operation. Korea and ASEAN’s co-operation agenda 
expanded to include security when the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)51 was held for the 
first time in 1994 (Seo 2012, 289–290).  
This period also demonstrated a remarkable rise in trade between Korea and ASEAN 
countries; trade increased at an annual average of 22% from 1990 to 1996, as compared to an 
                                   
51 ARF is an Asia–Pacific regional dialogue that promotes peace and security through 
confidence building and preventive diplomacy. The inaugural meeting was held on 25 July 1994, in 
Bangkok. Its objectives are: 
1. to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of 
common interest and concern; and 
2. to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region (ARF n.d.) 
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annual average of 13% with the rest of the world. By 1995, Korea’s total export to ASEAN 
exceeded that to Japan, reaching $17.9 billion, next to the US’s $24 billion, making ASEAN 
Korea’s second-most significant trade partner (see Figure 4.3 for Korea’s merchandise trade 
with ASEAN). Korea’s major export included electronic devices, machineries, steel, ships 
and synthetic fibres. Its major imports were mainly natural resources or products derived 
from those resources, which included crude oil, petroleum products, coal, copper, wood and 
fine chemicals. Electronic parts also took up more than 10% of Korea’s total import from 
ASEAN (KITA n.d.). 
Korea–ASEAN relations further broadened and deepened when the Korea–ASEAN 
partnership was elevated to the summit level in 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. Throughout the five 
annual summits from 1997 to 2001, the Korea–ASEAN relationship followed in the footsteps 
of ASEAN’s previous official dialogue partners, as important political and economic allies 
and, at the same time, as donor and beneficiary. The Korean side emphasised co-operation in 
the areas of trade, investment and information technology, while also promising to expand 
development assistance to the ASEAN countries. In the meantime, the ASEAN side agreed to 
support the two Koreas’ peaceful relations and settlement and requested Korea expansion of 
the aid and support for the development of the Mekong River (MOFA (Korea), 2013). 
The establishment of official relations between Korea and ASEAN, in sum, mainly 
focused on economic and cultural exchanges, and the closer ties between the two parties have 
stimulated economic growth to a significant extent during a decade’s time. Aside from the 
economic co-operation, the development aid has been a means to not only narrow the 
development gap between Korea and ASEAN countries, but also gain ASEAN’s political 
support on promoting peace between the two Koreas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Figure 4.3 Korea’s merchandise trade with the ASEAN, 1987–2000. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation of data available at KITA Statistics (n.d.). 
 
4.3 Emergence of PTAs: Japan’s and Korea’s Interests since the 2000s 
 
When China proposed an FTA to ASEAN in 2000, the ASEAN side did not welcome 
the offer because it worried that its agricultural market would be heavily damaged. Japan and 
Korea further speculated that CAFTA would be difficult to accomplish because of varied 
development within the ASEAN countries and China’s motivation for the FTA, which ASEAN 
perceived to be more political than economic; China took the initiative in creating a regional 
economic bloc for East Asia in order to take the leadership role in it. Because the CAFTA 
negotiation processes were kept strictly confidential to outsiders, it was difficult for the 
outsiders to access information on its progress (Cheong and Oh 2004).  
On 4 November 2002, China signed the basic framework for the establishment of 
CAFTA at the APT Summit in Phnom Penh. Japan responded the next day by initiating talks 
with ASEAN to create AJCEP. Overwhelmed by the actions of China and Japan, the Korean 
government also officially announced the initiation of a joint study group with Singapore for 
KSFTA, rather than discussing the possibility of KAFTA.  
114 
 
This section examines the involvement of Japan’s and Korea’s private and government 
interests in their choices of negotiation approaches. As Chapter 3 established, private interests 
in the export-competing sectors are expected to consider market accessibility and the practical 
costs of utilising PTAs as the most important criteria in evaluating a negotiation approach. 
Sensitive sectors of the economy are expected to oppose PTAs initially, but the strength of 
opposition is expected to depend on the political implications of the PTA, the counterparty’s 
market size and the degree of exposure of these sectors. Korea’s and Japan’s government 
interests include political and economic objectives in approaching the ASEAN market. 
Assuming that governments aim to maximise national welfare at the aggregate level through a 
negotiation approach, they would consider factors such as trade gains, negotiation efficiency, 
diplomatic leverages and foreign policy objectives.  
 
4.3.1 Japan’s Interest in the ASEAN Market 
 
4.3.1.1 Private interests 
 
(a) Keidanren (Japan Business Federation). Until the mid to late-1990s, Keidanren,52 
had been a strong supporter of the WTO’s rule-based multilateralism. It shared the view with 
the Japanese government that, in order to avoid trade wars, multilateral trading system should 
be at the centre of international economic system. It considered that regional economic pacts, 
such as NAFTA and the EU, would discriminate against other regions and countries, and, 
therefore, it argued that these pacts should be strictly monitored by the GATT Article 24 
(Keidanren 1998).  
The negative view about bilateralism and regionalism gradually shifted in the face of 
concern of trade discrimination caused by NAFTA and the EU. Mexico’s PTA proposal to 
                                   
52 Keidanren is also known as Nippon Keidanren. It was restructured and relabelled when 
Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, established 1946) and Nikkeiren (Japan 
Federation of Employers' Associations, established 1948) merged in 2002. Among the 1,485 members 
of the organisation, 1,329 are companies, 109 are nationwide industrial associations and 47 are 
regional economic organisations. According to Nippon Keidanren, its mission is “to draw upon the 
vitality of corporations, individuals and local communities to support corporate activities which 
contribute to the self-sustaining development of the Japanese economy and improvement in the 
quality of life for the Japanese people” (Keidanren 2015). 
115 
 
Japan in 1998 provided a direct cause for a change to Keidanren’s official position. Keidanren 
(2001) argued that Japan–Mexico EPA is necessary, not to be left out in the competition and 
to gain a better access to the global market. Since then, Keidanren became a supporter of the 
“multi-tiered” trade policy, which pursued a diverse form of trade liberalisation (Keidanren 
2003). Keidanren has been at the forefront of Japanese PTA policy-making, urging the 
government to adopt liberal economic policies and adapt to the changing global environment. 
Keidanren participated in the government’s decision-making process through lobbying, 
providing policy proposals, participating in the government’s EPA study groups and 
maintaining its business connection with its international partners (Yoshimatsu 2005). 
In addition, the launch of AJCEP and Japan’s bilateral EPAs with individual ASEAN 
members were seen at the time as crucial for Keidanren, due to the domestic and international 
economic environments. Domestically, Japan had suffered from the prolonged economic 
recession for more than a decade. Internationally, the realisation of CAFTA put strong pressure 
on Japanese companies that China may soon dominate the ASEAN market. For these reasons, 
Keidanren considered that Japan should promote a trade agreement with ASEAN. In achieving 
the goal, Keidanren strongly suggested Japan should adopt “a dual-track approach, which 
simultaneously pursues bilateral negotiations with individual countries and with ASEAN as a 
whole”, for both diplomatic and economic-driven reasons, which would be ultimately 
associated with fostering a favourable trade and investment environment in the region for Japan 
(Keidanren 2002). 
The regional approach was still seen as more beneficial than the bilateral approach, as 
it would be more profitable for Japanese businesses. As Keidanren (2002; 2003) repeatedly 
stated, AJCEP could be a stepping-stone for the establishment of a wider regional economic 
pact, such as ASEAN+3 FTA, which would further include economic co-operation with China 
and Korea. Keidanren expected this would give Japanese businesses greater advantages in the 
regional market through the deregulation of “flow of people, goods, capital, and services, 
resulting in lower costs” (Keidanren 17 September 2002) and advancing economic 
competitiveness (Keidanren 2003). The region-based approach would also allow Japan to bring 
together ASEAN’s diversity through a comprehensive coverage over a variety of issues 
covering not only trades, but also investment agreements, ODAs, training and education, which 
would be important in providing a stable and facilitating business environment. Keidanren also 
was concerned about Japan’s increasing dependence on China’s low-cost labour. Thus, it 
116 
 
argued that AJCEP would balance out Japan’s heavy reliance on China, through increased 
business transaction with ASEAN. Finally, Keidanren considered that AJCEP could help 
facilitate domestic reform in Japan’s agricultural sector and its relatively uncompetitive 
manufacturing industries (Keidanren 2002; Japan Nogyo Shimbum 2003c). 
Even though Keidanren considered that AJCEP should be comprehensive and in-depth 
agreement, it also understood realistic constraints with the regional approach; due to the 
diversity existing within ASEAN, it would be difficult to accommodate all of Keidanren’s 
demands. Thus, it argued that both bilateral and regional approaches of negotiation should be 
pursued together, which would create synergy effects (Keidanren 2002). To achieve these goals, 
Keidanren suggested that JSEPA should be used as a reference to and a building block for an 
early implementation of AJCEP (Keidanren 2002; Keidanren 2003). Keidanren considered that 
Japan had the leverage to conclude the bilateral EPAs with relative ease, due to the 40 years of 
economic relationship that it had developed with Southeast Asian countries. For example, after 
participating in the Joint Working Group for Japan–Thailand EPA, Keidanren (2003) stated 
that Thailand was “determined to make a special effort to overcome the barriers to bilateral 
economic partnership between Thailand and Japan, among its other negotiation partners”. 
Hence, it contended that  
 
taking advantage of this situation and the progress achieved since May 2002 in the 
preliminary consultations and the working group sessions for the establishment of 
economic partnership between the two countries, Japan should find a constructive way 
to establish JTEP Agreement and enter into negotiations as soon as possible. (Keidanren 
2003) 
 
(b) The Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (JA-Zenchu). 53  Since the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations held under GATT from 1986 to 1994, JA-Zenchu proactively 
                                   
53 JA-Zenchu (n.d.) introduces the organisation as follows: 
“JA-Zenchu is an apex body of Japan's agricultural co-operative movement, representing the 
interests of Japanese farmers and their agricultural co-operative organizations (JA Group).  
The basic objective of JA-Zenchu is to contribute to the sound development of activities of 
the JA Group through formulating the common guideline and programs of their activities as 
well as through promoting implementations of these programs by the member organizations 
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engaged in shaping Japan’s trade policies to protect the interests of farmers. The GDP share of 
agricultural sector, which was as high as 5.14% in 1970, had fallen to 1.98% by 1991 (The 
Global Economy n.d.). Even as the share of the agricultural sector in the Japanese economy 
continued to shrink, JA-Zenchu exerted strong political influence on Japan’s trade policies 
through the agricultural tribes within LDP and MAFF. 
JA-Zenchu maintained a sceptical view of the PTAs with Southeast Asian countries 
since Prime Minister Koizumi’s announcement of the proposal for economic partnership with 
ASEAN in 2002. However, the agricultural groups had also come to reconcile with the 
government on the need for PTAs since the Japan–Mexico EPA,54 as long as (1) issues 
regarding agricultural sector are clearly addressed in the PTA negotiations, (2) product-specific 
concerns are considered and mediated with related sectors in prior to the PTA negotiations and 
(3) Japan’s low self-sufficiency rate and food safety for the Japanese people are carefully 
addressed (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2002b). As JA-Zenchu President Isami Miyata stated in his 
meeting with former Prime Minister Hashimoto, “We recognize the necessity of FTAs to 
Japan’s economy, and therefore we are not opposing them” (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2003b). 
Thus, JA-Zenchu’s criticism was confined to the agricultural sector, rather than 
opposing all PTAs with ASEAN. Together with MAFF and LDP politicians who supported the 
agricultural sector, JA-Zenchu criticised the prime minister and business groups for their 
support for extensive trade liberalisation. They contended that the economic partnership should 
exclude the elements of free trade, as a massive amount of agricultural import from ASEAN 
would have critical influence on Japanese farmers (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2002a).  
To be more strategic in claiming the farmers’ interests, JA-Zenchu established 
evaluation criteria on government’s trade initiatives. On one level, it insisted that JSEPA should 
be the model for subsequent EPAs with Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines (Nihon Nogyo 
Shimbun 2003a). JSEPA did not liberalise agricultural sector any further than it already had 
been under the WTO, and 90% of Singapore’s agricultural products were excluded from tariff 
elimination, including JSEPA’s most contentious goldfish and cut flowers (Ravenhill 2008b, 
                                   
of the JA Group in this country.”  
54 See Chapter 5 for discussion on how agricultural groups came to reconcile with the 
government after the Japan–Mexico EPA. 
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92). Thus, JA-Zenchu expected that the approach could be applied to Japan’s PTAs with 
ASEAN by using JSEPA as precedent and leverage.  
At another level, JA-Zenchu appealed to the ASEAN side by insisting that the PTAs 
should promote the “co-existence of Asia”. A strategy was to gain sympathy from the 
ASEAN side by deploying its representatives to Thailand and the Philippines. JA-Zenchu 
considered that both Japan and ASEAN (particularly Thailand) are family-based farmers 
whose lives centre around rice production; sharing this common ground, Japan and ASEAN 
should seek to promote diversity in farming and exclude sensitive products. More 
importantly, however, JA-Zenchu sought to gain a tariff concession from ASEAN by offering 
ASEAN members support to reduce poverty in rural areas (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2004a; 
2004b). 
Despite these efforts, JA-Zenchu struggled with Thailand’s strong demand for tariff 
elimination in rice, sugar, starch and poultry (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2004d), which were 
considered “sacred agricultural products” in Japan for their exceptionally high level of 
protection. As the worry heightened, JA-Zenchu members decided to visit Thailand and the 
Philippines in April 2004; this was the first time that the group attempted to directly talk with 
the counterparty to derive better terms in Japan’s PTA negotiations. In their meeting with 
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and government officials, the members of JA-
Zenchu emphasised their willingness to exchange their support for Thailand’s poverty 
elimination in rural areas, if Thailand was willing to take a step back (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 
2004c; 2005). Despite the offers JA-Zenchu provided, however, Thailand was unwilling to 
compromise until Japan offered to make further concessions at the broader level.55  
In most other negotiations with ASEAN, the agricultural sector did not pose a serious 
threat to JA-Zenchu. For example, the Philippines, in the beginning, demanded tariff 
elimination in sugar, banana, chicken and tuna, which was expected to conflict with Japan’s 
agricultural sector. These products were soon excluded, however, due to President Gloria 
Arroyo’s demand for the early conclusion of EPA negotiations (Yomiuri Shimbun 2004). 
Malaysia’s case also caused less concern, as stringent sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
                                   
55 See the next subsection (4.3.1.2) for details on how the Japanese government responded to 
Thailand’s demand. 
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(SPS) ruled out the possibility of importing tropical fruits, such as mangos and papayas, to 
Japan for years to come (Yomiuri Shimbun 2005). 
 
4.3.1.2 Government’s interests 
 
(a) EPA with Singapore and Thailand, and the backdrops of AJCEP, 1999–2002. The 
joint study between Japan and Singapore to create an EPA formally began in December 1999. 
Singapore was the third country to propose a PTA to Japan, following Mexico and Korea. In 
October 2000, Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and Japan’s Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori formally agreed to JSEPA. As CAFTA was unforeseen, Japan’s primary goal 
for JSEPA was to test the effects of PTAs rather than to use it as a stepping-stone for a wider 
regional framework, such as the ASEAN+1 PTAs. In fact, JSEPA was a trigger of CAFTA, 
which caused China to propose CAFTA in November 2000 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2001a). 
Singapore was an excellent strategic starting point to convince those who opposed 
PTAs within MOFA (Japan) (Makio Miyagawa, former Director of Regional Division, 
MOFA (Japan), personal communication; Munakata 2001). JSEPA would pose no significant 
harm to the Japanese economy because the tariff rates between the two economies were 
already low enough to satisfy the standards of the WTO (Aoki 2004, 5). In addition, 
compared to the PTAs with Korea and Mexico, JSEPA could progress without much 
domestic backlash; the Japanese and Singaporean market had already been open to a 
significant extent even before the PTAs, and JSEPA would have had a negligible impact on 
Japan’s sensitive agricultural sector. Moreover, Japan could experiment with its new 
approach toward the PTAs with Singapore by going beyond the traditional reduction in tariffs 
to include the free movement between people, capital and information with less risk 
(Munakata 2001, 23–25).  
Thailand was the second among the Southeast Asian countries to propose EPA to Japan.  
Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin proposed the Japan–Thai Economic Partnership 
Framework in the following year, November 2001, when he visited Japan to meet with Prime 
Minister Koizumi. The two leaders discussed finance, investment, trade, information 
technology, and security issues that included the United Nations peacekeeping in Afghanistan 
and Thailand’s concern for Japan’s re-militarisation. However, Thailand’s main interest with 
Japan was maintaining and further promoting Japan’s economic assistance to and investment 
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in Thailand by securing a formal trade agreement. In 2002, Japan had been Thailand’s biggest 
investor, taking up 38 billion Baht (approximately US$ 1.14 billion), or 39% of Thailand’s 
total investment (JTEPA Task Force Team 2003).  
Thailand’s proposal was in part a response to Singapore’s fast move toward Japan. As 
Prime Minister Thaksin stated during this visit,  
 
Japan already has this type of arrangement [EPA] with Singapore. So, why not with 
Thailand? Japan and Thailand will probably be able to start FTA discussions on 
products on which the two nations have no conflicting interests, setting aside more 
sensitive areas such as farm products (Yomiuri Shimbun 2001b). 
 
In addition to the economic arrangement, Prime Minister Thaksin further asked for Japan's 
assistance to control drug trafficking in Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and China:  
 
The activity that probably is most needed to help Myanmar (where most drugs are 
produced by minority groups) is the development of substitute crops to create income-
-to substitute for the income from drugs. We would like to invite Japan to come in to 
help them, find markets (for substitute crops) and find new jobs for those people. 
(Yomiuri Shimbun 2001b) 
 
In January 2002, JSEPA was signed during Prime Minister Koizumi’s tour of the five 
big economies of Southeast Asia. Japan added motivations to JSEPA and JTEPA; they would 
be integral stepping-stones to AJCEP. The change in Japan’s position was unexpected, as when 
Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin visited Tokyo just two months before in November 2001 
and suggested a bilateral FTA, as well as the region-based AJCEP, Prime Minister Koizumi 
only agreed to pursue a joint study only for the bilateral deal and avoided giving an answer to 
the latter (The Japan Times 2002). The change was a reaction to the Chinese proposal for the 
Early Harvest Program for the realisation of CAFTA that was suggested at the end of 2001. 
CAFTA, proposed in 2000, seemed difficult to realise due to ASEAN’s strong opposition; its 
only success was the establishment of the expert group meetings. It was during this time that 
Japan realistically considered the need to approach ASEAN as a region, which was impelled 
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by the concern that its share of the market would soon be taken over by Chinese competitors 
(Yomiuri Shimbun 2001a). 
When officially signing JSEPA, Prime Minister Koizumi emphasised a sincere and 
open partnership between Japan and ASEAN countries. He emphasised the need for “acting 
together—advancing together” in the face of the global challenges, such as the terrorist attacks 
on 9/11 and the Asian financial crisis, and proposed future co-operation between Japan and 
ASEAN. The creation of AJCEP was one of the major initiatives to achieve these goals. 
Koizumi suggested that Japan and ASEAN should create a regional trade area that went beyond 
the traditional trade issues to include more comprehensive agendas. Further, he envisaged 
AJCEP to eventually become a building block for East Asian regionalism within the ASEAN+6 
framework: 
 
I would like to propose an Initiative for Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. Of course, we will cooperate in the new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations under the WTO. At the same time, we must strengthen broad ranged 
economic partnership by stretching further than trade and investment--to such areas as 
science and technology, human resource development and tourism. The Japan–
Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership, which was signed 
yesterday, is an example of such economic partnership. I would like to see us generate 
concrete proposals for endorsement at the Japan–ASEAN Summit Meeting […]  
An important challenge is strengthening economic partnership in the region. The 
Initiative for Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership that I mentioned 
earlier will be an important platform for this purpose. I expect that the ASEAN–China 
Free Trade Area and moves toward economic partnership between ASEAN and 
Australia and New Zealand will make similar contributions. (Koizumi, 2002) 
 
(b) Bilateral EPAs and MOFA’s (Japan) Interests. After Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
announcement of AJCEP in January 2002, an internal debate began to emerge between MOFA 
(Japan) and METI over what negotiation approach Japan should take with ASEAN. MOFA 
contended that the individual EPAs were Japan’s priority; METI argued that AJCEP would be 
economically more effective. Unable to reach an agreement, it was suggested at the vice-
ministerial level meeting held in the Japan–ASEAN Forum, in April 2002, that in the process 
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of considering the realisation of AJCEP, any ASEAN member country could bilaterally 
negotiate an economic partnership with Japan (JTEPA Task Force Report, 2003).  
MOFA and METI’s debate continued until the fall of 2002, when the two ministries 
finally reached a mutual understanding that both approaches could be useful. The MOFA and 
METI negotiators recalled that, although there were differences between the two ministries, 
they considered these differences as minor; it was soon agreed that both approaches of 
negotiation could be useful (METI official, personal communication; METI official, personal 
communication; Makio Miyagawa, former Director of Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), 
personal communication). The final decision for adopting the two-track negotiations was 
officially announced at the Japan–ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Phnom Penh in November 
2002 (Oike 2007). 
Externally, however, MOFA’s position seemingly gained the upper hand because Japan 
already was considering additional EPA proposals from the Philippines and Malaysia; 
President Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines and Prime Minister Tun Mahathir of Malaysia 
additionally proposed EPAs to Japan in May 2002 and December 2002, respectively. JSEPA 
and JTEPA expedited the Philippines’s and Malaysia’s proposals, as Japan had established a 
significant economic influence in the countries by 2002. For example, Japan was the second 
largest trade partner to the Philippines (1.87 trillion yen), the largest investor with a share of 
37% and a provider of 41.8 billion yen in ODA in 2002 (JPEPA Joint Coordinating Team 2003). 
During the same period, Japan was third largest export destination (US$10.4 billion) and the 
largest source of import (US$14.2 billion) for Malaysia. Japan was also Malaysia’s second 
largest investor, in which the value of investment amounted to US$339 million in 2003 (Japan–
Malaysia Economic Partnership Joint Study Group 2003). 
For Japan, there was also a great incentive in promoting closer economic ties with the 
ASEAN countries. Despite inter-ministry discord in the specific negotiation approach toward 
ASEAN, all ministries agreed that Japan should reach out to countries or regions in proximity 
to it and that have a significant economic relationship with it. Hence, the Philippines and 
Malaysia were two of the most realistic partners to contact (METI Official, personal 
communication). Even though only 18.9% of Japan’s GDP depended on trade in 2002, ASEAN 
was a significant trade partner with 14% of the share, or 134 trillion yen, of the total trade. 
Among ASEAN countries, Thailand and Malaysia were most significant in terms of their trade 
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shares with Japan, recording 22% and 21%, respectively; Indonesia, Singapore and Philippines 
followed, taking up 19%, 18% and 14%, respectively (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4 Composition of ASEAN’s trade share in Japan, by country, 2002 
 
Source: Author’s compilation of data from KITA (n.d.). 
 
The bilateral approach was more beneficial than AJCEP in four aspects. First, there was 
the negotiation efficiency. Japan considered that the bilateral EPAs would take less time and 
human resources, but they would yield higher quality agreements than the region-based AJCEP. 
MOFA considered that due to the diversity of ASEAN countries, the bilateral approach of 
negotiations with those who were ready would conclude more quickly. Compared to AJCEP, 
which would involve all the negotiators from Japan and ASEAN countries, the bilateral EPAs 
would consume less human resources (MOFA (Japan) official, personal communication). The 
scope and depth of agreement would be a higher quality than what can be earned through the 
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region-based AJCEP because the bilateral approach can take into account the differences 
among the ASEAN members. As the bilateral agreements with ASEAN+5 (Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines) countries would cover most of the trades with 
ASEAN, comprehensive and in-depth agreements were seen as more beneficial. MOFA viewed 
that EPAs with relatively underdeveloped ASEAN members would limit their quality 
(Tsuyoshi2002).  
In defence of the argument that these individual approaches harm the ASEAN unity, 
MOFA contended that promoting peace and security by strengthening economic ties with 
Southeast Asia is important for Japan, thus, Japan will actively assist the four relatively 
underdeveloped countries—CLMV— in terms of the ASEAN integration initiatives and the 
trade-related capability development so that they would be prepared for a more advanced 
quality of FTA/EPAs in the future (MOFA (Japan) n.d.). 
Second, Japan’s pre-established political and economic relations with the individual 
ASEAN members were considered to grant Japan greater diplomatic leverage. As Section 4.2.1 
demonstrates, Japan was ASEAN’s largest FDI investor and ODA donor. Thus, Japan 
considered that it had a special relationship with ASEAN. Even though Japan did not realise 
how much the leverage would be effective at the time of the negotiations, the negotiation results 
proved it to be influential. The Japanese negotiators recalled that they gained more concession 
than they had originally expected, which was contributed to Japan’s relatively strong 
diplomatic leverage with individual ASEAN members (METI official, personal 
communication).  
An example is illustrated by Japan’s EPA negotiations with Thailand. When JTEPA 
negotiations began in February 2004, Japan and Thailand faced a conflict because of the 
Japanese agricultural sector, particularly with regards to rice, chicken, sugar and starch. Japan 
strongly maintained that tariff cuts could not be made, especially with rice. Faced by Japan’s 
adamant position over rice, Prime Minister Thaksin agreed that rice would be excluded from 
tariff elimination in October 2004. Thailand feared that the negotiation would not proceed 
without accepting Japan’s demands, and it also recognised there would be very little demand 
for Thai’s long-grain rice because Japanese’s staple rice consumption was based on glutinous 
short-grain rice (Higashi 2008, 17; METI official, personal communication); the Thai 
government’s decision, however, was a great disappointment to Thai export-competitive 
sectors (Peamsilpakulchorn 2006, 84). 
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Third, there was Japan’s ability to make its agreement with Singapore as a reference 
point and to induce competition among the ASEAN members. MOFA’s official position, 
according to Makio Miyagawa (personal communication), then-Director of Regional Division, 
MOFA (Japan), was that: 
 
Japan already has an advanced and comprehensive EPA with Singapore, Japan will first 
conclude bilateral EPA frameworks with major ASEAN countries (Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia), namely, those that have shown active interest 
towards Japan. Then, based on these bilateral EPAs, Japan will quickly proceed to 
connect these EPAs. Depending on the progress of these EPAs, Japan will expand them 
to include all members of ASEAN as fast as possible. 
 
Because the agreement with Singapore was relatively in-depth, this was a good model to 
apply to the relatively less developed ASEAN members (Makio Miyagawa, former Director 
of Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), personal communication; Munakata 2001). Based on 
JSEPA, Japan then accepted proposals from individual ASEAN members to promote 
“parallel” negotiations. This approach with Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea 
was pursued under the rationale that Japan would be able to promote a balanced reaction to 
each as negotiations progressed. From the ASEAN counterparty’s perspective, this approach 
was perceived as beneficial because it was easier to attain information on the negotiation 
progress of a fellow ASEAN member (Watanabe and MOFA (Japan) Economic Bureau EPA 
Negotiation Team 2007, 87; Terada 2003, 2008).  
The parallel approach, however, exacerbated competition among ASEAN members. 
This, in turn, strengthened Japan’s negotiation leverage to enhance negotiation efficiency 
while minimising liberalisation in its sensitive sectors. To quote former vice minister of 
METI, Osamu Watanabe,  
 
[w]e can give examples of negotiations with other countries [to persuade the 
counterparty) or ask for the counterparty’s understanding regarding the delays in the 
negotiations as we are occupied (promoting many EPAs at the same time] — in this 
respect, promoting two or more EPAs together is beneficial [for Japan]. (Nihon Nogyo 
Shimbun 2003d)  
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Negotiators also considered that simultaneous negotiations are excellent bargaining tools, 
particularly with Thailand. As then-negotiator also pointed out, “we suffer from the lack of 
human resources,56 but we can use the approach to keep Thailand in check — it is better than 
confronting Thailand alone” (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2003d). 
To Japan’s progress, ASEAN countries not involved in Japan’s EPAs in 2002, 
including Vietnam and Myanmar, criticised that a mixture of bilateral and region-based 
negotiations confused and distracted ASEAN integration. Japan’s progress with these EPAs, 
however, caused the ASEAN side to propose further EPAs (Tsuyoshi 2002). The intra-
ASEAN competition provoked Indonesia, Brunei and Vietnam to negotiate EPAs with Japan. 
Brunei and Vietnam, in particular, were to be covered under AJCEP due to their small 
economic influence. However, the two parties did not wish to be excluded from the intra-
regional political competition, welcoming the introduction of bilateral EPAs (METI official, 
personal communication; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2005a, 2005b; MOFA 
(Japan) 2006b).  
 MOFA’s final rationale involved foreign policy objectives, namely, counterbalancing 
China. China joined the WTO in 2001. The next step for China was to establish friendly 
relations with ASEAN, emphasising its peaceful rise. China considered ASEAN as a political 
tool to strengthen its diplomatic connection with Southeast Asia (Shujiro Urata, personal 
communication; Sheng 2003). Encountering Chinese officials, Japanese negotiators came to 
perceive that having a PTA with ASEAN itself, rather than having a high-quality agreement 
like Japan, was China’s ultimate goal (METI official, personal communication). Hence, 
China’s move toward ASEAN threatened Japan’s regional economic leadership (Oike 2007, 
15).  
In response to China’s growing presence in the politics of regional trade, MOFA 
(Japan) officials believed that Japan should establish its own model of EPA. According to the 
former Director for MOFA (Japan) EPA Negotiation Team, Atsuyuki Oike (2002, 34–35), the 
Japanese style of bilateral EPAs were considered a useful tool to set the precedent to counter 
                                   
56 Promoting all of the EPAs, together with AJCEP, at once meant that Japan had to suffer 
from the limited amount of human resources available at the time. For example, during the early 
2000s, there were only about 30 people within METI’s Economic Policy Division; it was gradually 
supplemented upwards of 50 people by July 2004 (METI official, personal communication). 
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CAFTA. As there was only one ASEAN+1 FTA with China before AJCEP, the negotiation 
methods of the ASEAN+1 PTAs had not been established. Furthermore, as CAFTA is an 
agreement between developing nations, it is neither comprehensive enough to include services 
and investment sectors nor is it high quality and advanced enough to remove barriers to trade 
substantially. Japan believed the bilateral EPAs would strengthen its political relations with the 
ASEAN countries, which would reinforce its leadership role in the region by spreading the 
kind of governance where advanced and comprehensive market liberalisation is valued. The 
labels “EPA” was part of Japan’s effort to differentiate its initiative from the conventional FTA 
and emphasise, in addition to the traditional trade issues, the creation of a partnership in 
sciences, technology, education, finance and more (Makio Miyagawa, former Director of 
Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), personal communication).  
As Director Oike (2007) summarises, Japanese EPAs premised: (1) 
comprehensiveness (not just about goods, but includes services and investment), (2) Japan as 
the hub of the supply chain network in ASEAN and (3) Japan’s assistance in raising the 
developing status of ASEAN. Through these, Japan established its EPA style, not only as an 
economic tool, but also as a political tool as a symbol of leadership differentiated from China. 
Japanese officials recalled this approach was, as a matter of fact, an effective way of 
establishing Japan’s EPA as a de facto standard in East Asia and outcompeting the Chinese 
move. Many ASEAN members’ first bilateral EPA partner was Japan, which provided them 
with the learning experience for the ASEAN countries, particularly for Malaysia and the 
Philippines, whose first EPA partner was Japan, which shaped their subsequent EPAs (METI 
official, personal communication).  
Having those concerns in mind, Japan’s bilateral EPAs were conducted through the 
request-and-offer approach of negotiation.57  The request-and-offer approach is commonly 
used by Japan and many other countries in their bilateral negotiations, especially among 
developed countries, where each party exchanges its expectations in the proposed tariff 
                                   
57 Existing studies (e.g. Egashira 2014, 45; Higashi 2008, 17–18) tend to consider Japan’s 
negotiation approach toward ASEAN as different than China’s one, by arguing that Japan used the 
request-and-offer list of negotiation bilaterally with ASEAN nations while China used the modality 
approach. They compare CAFTA and Japan’s bilateral EPAs without examining the negotiation 
approach used in AJCEP. However, the use of request-and-offer is common in bilateral negotiations, 
including Korea’s bilateral FTAs. Like China and Korea, the modality approach of negotiation was 
used in the case of AJCEP. 
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reduction scheme which includes the products that each party would like to see liberalisation 
in. Unlike the modality approach of negotiations that is designed to give more flexibility to the 
developing countries, the agreement would only be signed after all agendas for tariff reduction 
are discussed. 
 
(c) METI’s rationale for the region-based AJCEP and the negotiation hurdles. METI 
initially emphasised preference for the region-based approach of negotiation. This was in 
consideration of the interests of Japanese businesses operating in Southeast Asian countries, as 
METI worked closely with the industrial sectors (Yoshimatsu 2007, 85–86). METI was 
concerned that bilateral EPAs might divide the region, “which may create an unstable business 
environment for the Japanese companies” (Tsuyoshi 2002). Because Japan had already 
established a significant amount of economic presence in the region, its strategic priority was 
given to sustaining a long and enduring relationship with ASEAN counterparties (METI 
official, personal communication; MOFA (Japan) 2002a); METI’s preference for AJCEP 
reflected practical and economic considerations, as compared to MOFA’s emphasis on political 
and strategic motivations. 
The use of cumulative RoO was expected to generate positive regional economic 
development in two ways. First, the application of the accumulation rule would benefit sectors 
that have developed an intensive production network in a region. This was especially important 
for Japan, as it had already developed a significant amount of supply network by the 2000s. 
The increase of bilateral EPAs would increase the burden for businesses, due to the spaghetti 
bowl effect—i.e. the cost attached to the use of complicated RoO. AJCEP was expected to 
merge some of these complications of Japan’s bilateral EPAs by allowing an accumulation of 
values of parts and components produced in AJCEP member countries.  
Second, the cumulative RoO would allow Japanese companies to strategically 
reallocate their resources and further intensify their development of supply chains in ASEAN. 
METI officials were concerned that bilateral EPAs would cause trade diversion of parts 
processed in the Japan–ASEAN region. Through AJCEP, all 10 ASEAN countries would be 
bound under one agreement, even for the countries that are difficult to reach bilaterally but are 
significant producers of parts and components. Hence, the AJCEP negotiations emphasised 
harmonising RoO in parts and components with the existing EPAs (METI official, personal 
communication) For example, Japan’s industries, such as textiles and apparel, moved to 
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ASEAN after the realisation of AJCEP, as they would be subject to zero tariff compared to the 
MFN rate applied in the third economies. More importantly, industries that established supply 
chains in the region, such as producers of flat panel display TV, benefited by moving their 
supply chains to ASEAN (Yamazaki 2008). 
Despite the importance of AJCEP, Japan and ASEAN’s negotiations were prolonged 
over their choice of negotiation method. The delay was primarily attributable to Japan’s relative 
lack of leverage with ASEAN as a region compared to the bilateral EPAs. For example, Japan 
did not wish to opt for the modality approach of negotiations,58 which is a type of negotiation 
framework used in AFTA, CAFTA and KAFTA. Japan did not wish to settle with a framework, 
because its aim was to bring together all individual EPAs it had negotiated or had been 
negotiating under the AJCEP framework. ASEAN strongly opposed Japan’s approach, arguing 
that a deal reached by one member could not be equally extended to another as their economies 
vary (Chin 2011, 229).  
ASEAN’s insistence on the modality approach of negotiations was also associated with 
the intra-ASEAN rivalry and the variance in their development statuses. More developed 
ASEAN members did not wish others to free-ride on their hard-earned concession from Japan 
(Corning 2009, 652). In contrast, less developed members argued that they were not ready to 
accept the liberalisation scope and depth agreed in Japan’s bilateral EPAs. Moreover, the 
bilateral EPAs would further divide the development gap between the more developed ASEAN 
countries and the less developed ASEAN countries (Yomiuri Shimbun 2002b). The common 
understanding among the ASEAN members was a drive in raising ASEAN’s collective voice, 
making AJCEP difficult to be agreed at the level that Japan had initially demanded. The longer 
the negotiation progress was delayed, the stronger Japan was pressured by the progress of 
KAFTA and CAFTA.  
Therefore, Japan came to concede some of the aims it had initially pursued for AJCEP. 
A common understanding was reached that a modality framework should be used, and AJCEP 
was signed in April 2008. However, Japan requested that it not be formally included the 
                                   
58 Under the modality framework, tariff lines would be divided into the Normal Track and the 
Sensitive Track. Usually, in bilateral PTAs, involved parties agree to the terms of conditions before 
signing an agreement. In contrast, the modality approach is an “Agreement First, Negotiation Later” 
approach, meaning the parties first sign the PTA by agreeing on the basic terms on what percentage of 
goods are included in the Normal Track and the Sensitive Track; specific tariff schedules are not 
decided at this stage. Then, individual countries reconvene at the working-level negotiations to decide 
on the number of tariff lines and the degree of tariff reduction. 
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Framework Agreement, so that room for adjustment could be assured in the progress of 
harmonising its bilateral EPAs. The ASEAN side also accepted Japan’s request, because it 
expected Japan would be flexible in giving concession to ASEAN (Chin 2011, 230). 
 
4.3.2 Korea’s Interest in the ASEAN Market 
 
4.3.2.1 Korea’s Commercial Interest 
 
(a) The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI).59 Because Korea holds a comparative 
advantage in the manufacturing sector over most of its trade partners, FKI had been a strong 
proponent of PTAs. 60  In particular, KAFTA was one of the PTAs 61  in which Korean 
businesses perceived that they would enjoy greater market access through comparative 
advantage in developing countries (Choi 2006, 7–8). The proactive approach of FKI has been 
noted since the early stages of the FTAs. For example, after the conclusion of KSFTA in 2004, 
the FKI contended that since the economic impact of KSFTA was negligible, the Korean 
government should put in the effort to quickly initiate the KAFTA negotiations (FKI 2004).  
FKI has recognised Japan as its biggest competitor for a number of reasons. The Korea–
Japan FTA was being negotiated at the time, and because the two countries’ economic interest 
overlap, FKI was concerned that the Korean government did not have enough negotiation 
capacity compared to Japan to derive a win–win game for both parties. Having that concern in 
mind, KAFTA also came to be compared with the content of negotiations with Japan. Hence, 
FKI’s position was that the region-based KAFTA be pursued, but the government should make 
sure that the content does not fall behind those of Japan’s bilateral EPAs.  
During the negotiation process, FKI (2005) presented a survey outcome to demand 
deeper liberalisation through KAFTA. The industries varied in their preference of tariff 
reduction timeline and applying the RoO. In terms of tariff reduction timeline, the companies 
                                   
59 The FKI was established in 1963 to represent the interests of the Korean industrial sector. 
Among its 619 members, 96 are industrial associations and 519 are individual companies (FKI, 2016). 
60 An exception was the Korea–Japan FTA negotiations. FKI opposed this FTA because it 
expected to face fierce competition from the imports of the counterparty. 
61 Others examples included China and India. 
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that belong to light industries, such as wood pulp and textile, preferred the longer timeline. 
When it came to the RoO, most industries accepted the sole standard of RoO used in AFTA, 
or the 40% cumulative RoO, with exception for the steel and chemical industries. The steel and 
chemical industries thus demanded for additional standards of RoO, so that their goods would 
not be disadvantaged even if their goods change forms in the process of production 
Conglomerates also showed less acceptance of this one standard of RoO (57%), as compared 
to medium-sized companies (88.9%) and SMEs (68.6%). One reason is that the conglomerates 
have different production lines across different industries, and they have the resources to 
manage complex RoO; therefore, the economic gains from applying more suitable RoO to a 
certain product would outweigh the costs for understanding and applying the RoO. 
Despite such variations in preferences, 71.1% of industries agreed to accept the 
negotiation scheme that the government suggested, as compared to only 38.7% agreeing to 
accept the Korea–Japan FTA.62 The auto and steel industries were particularly concerned that 
their products would be categorised as sensitive items by the ASEAN side, so that the 
competitiveness of their prices would drop in comparison to China and Japan. They submitted 
an additional proposal to the government requesting that their industries see early reduction in 
tariffs and that the tariff reduction be at a higher rate than Japan’s individual EPAs with 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (FKI, Korea Iron and Steel Association and Korea 
                                   
62 According to former FKI officer (personal communication), FKI’s major role is to 
intermediate the differences between large businesses and SMEs, and to make sure the opinions of 
under-represented are heard to the government. Consistently, FKI (n.d.) suggests that: 
“FKI, as mentioned in the objective of the organization, is dedicated to improving the welfare 
of the Korean economy. Because the membership body is composed of representatives from 
the major corporations, it would seem that FKI works on behalf of the enterprises the 
members come from, to a certain extent. However, that is only under the premises of unity 
with the national economy and does not necessarily work for the interest of the corporations. 
FKI has led the development of various social welfare activities in industrial complexes in the 
cities of Ulsan, Kuro, Masan, Changwon and Yochon. It established the Korea Long-term 
Credit Bank, the Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, the Korea Invention & 
Patent Association, the Korea Energy Management Corp., and the Federation of Korean 
Information Industry. It has also taken a leading role in the growth of the Korean economy. 
Moreover, FKI has been cooperating closely with 30 international organizations and foreign 
economic organizations to strengthen foreign economic ties and national competitiveness, and 
to increase Koreas exports. Thus, we have contributed to the stabilization of the Korean 
economy. FKI will strive to provide policy recommendations in the future to bring forth 
further development of the Korean economy.” 
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Automobile Manufacturers Association 2006). FKI’s position was that KAFTA would clearly 
give the Korean firms access to the new market and that early conclusion of the negotiations 
was necessary to avoid the disadvantage expected from CAFTA and AJCEP. CAFTA and 
Japan’s EPAs’ degree of liberalisation was used to push the Korean government to conclude 
more comprehensive FTAs.  
Moreover, FKI argued that KAFTA would be a cornerstone for FDI in the ASEAN 
countries, as (a) KAFTA would be a gateway to access the Chinese market with lower barriers 
in the absence of Korea–China FTA, and (b) some ASEAN markets, such as Vietnam, provide 
cheaper labour than China (FKI, 2005). 
 
(b) Korea Advanced Farmers Federation (KAFF) and Korea Peasants League (KPL). 
Going through rapid industrialisation, accompanied by urbanisation and globalisation, the 
agricultural sector had long been cast aside from policy priority. Its competitiveness only 
continued to decline as more people migrated to cities and the cost of labour continued to rise. 
Agricultural interest groups began to emerge in the late 1980s, but mostly in the 1990s. They 
included groups such as Korean Women Peasants Association, KAFF, Korea Dairy and Beef 
Farmers Association, Korean Women Advanced Farmers Federation, Korea Catholic Farmers 
Movement and KPL. In particular, KAFF and KPL had been in the forefront of aggregating 
farmers’ voices to protect the agricultural sector from trade liberalisation through PTAs and 
the WTO.  
When it comes to the specific policy goals regarding the protection of agricultural sector, 
however, KAFF and KPL have had contrasting perspectives. KPL fundamentally opposed any 
trade liberalisation in principle, whether through multilateral or bilateral negotiations. KPL 
contended that the government used these agreements as a tool to lock itself from accepting 
the demands of the agricultural sector. The government has often used GATT Article XXIV 
(WTO n.d.), which stipulates that  
 
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories 
in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in 
such territories,  
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to convince farmers there was no precedent in excluding agricultural sector. To quote KPL’s 
Policy Director Hyung-dae Park (personal communication),  
 
FTAs exist under the WTO system. Thus, when the agricultural sector suffers loss 
(from FTAs), government actions are constrained (to help the farmers) by the rules of 
the WTO. It means that the more we negotiate these agreements, the more Korea’s 
policy boundaries become smaller. This is why we argue that FTAs and the WTO are 
the cause of misery for Korean farmers. 
 
KPL further contended that international trade politics demonstrated protectionist 
measures still being pursued in many FTAs promoted by other countries. Some examples 
included NAFTA’s exclusion of the culture industry, JSEPA’s exclusion of the agricultural 
industry, as well as Japan’s effort to exclude the agriculture sector in the on-going negotiation 
with Thailand. The self-sufficiency rate of agricultural product was another rationale for 
maintaining the protectionist approach. KPL argued that in comparison with the US (133.5%), 
the UK (99.6%) and France (194.5%), Korea’s self-sufficiency rate was 29.4% in 1999. This 
would mean that in the case of regional or global crisis, the shortage of domestic food supply 
would be critical to Korea’s security (KPL 2003). 
KAFF’s basic position was that Korea’s trade liberalisation through the WTO and FTAs 
was inevitable, considering the country’s high dependence on trade. KAFF argued that even if 
the FTAs are necessary to survive in the global economy, exceptions should and could be made 
with regard to the agricultural sector. KAFF demanded that the agricultural sector be protected 
as much as possible; in the case of trade liberalisation, proper compensation should be made 
(Minsu Han, General Manager of KAFF, personal communication). In the early 2000s, KAFF’s 
position also did not fundamentally differ from KPL. Even though KAFF had accepted the 
need for FTAs, it fiercely opposed the liberalisation of the agricultural sector through the WTO 
and FTAs.  
The opposition especially heightened when the president of KAFF, Kyeong-hae Lee, 
took his life in Cancun, Mexico, during the WTO conference in September 2003. Lee, in his 
final testament to the WTO Secretariat, appealed that: 
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Our fears became reality in the marketplace. We soon realized that all our efforts could 
never meet the low prices of imported food. Similarly, we became aware that our farm 
size (1.3 ha on average) is a mere one-hundredth of the average size in the large 
exporting countries. Imported products were flooding the market everywhere, and we 
had to run from crop to crop in search of new niche markets. But almost always, we 
met the same friends who were producing the same crops. (K. Lee, 2003) 
 
The incident generated anger among KAFF and other agricultural groups, which led to a series 
of rallies in late 2003 and into 2004. They fiercely protested the US’s pressure for liberalisation 
in rice under the WTO system and the ratification of Korea–Chile FTA.  
Thus, when the Korean government announced an FTA with Singapore in 2002, and 
again, announced KAFTA in 2004, it worried there would be strong opposition from the 
agricultural groups. Contrary to this expectation, KAFTA was not a concern of KPL and KAFF. 
First, KPL and KAFF’s attention was diverted to Korea’s FTA with Chile and soon after with 
the initiation of Korea–US FTA. They considered it necessary to draw as much attention from 
the farmers and the public to assert greater influence on the government. Because of the lack 
of an official channel between interest groups and government, the agricultural groups tended 
to pursue violent methods of resistance (Choi 2006, 10). KPL and KAFF utilised press 
conferences, held educational seminars to public, or convinced politicians in the National 
Assembly; however, demonstrations continued to be the farmers’ primary method to exercise 
influence. Because the methods by which agricultural groups influenced government was 
limited, KPL and KAFF devoted most of its energy to drawing public attention to Korea’s most 
politically contentious FTAs.  
Second, the ASEAN agreement was perceived to be much shallower in its content, as 
it is an FTA with a group of nations in which many are still developing. KAFF and KPL 
considered that the degree of liberalisation should not be deep enough to cause significant 
damage to Korea’s agricultural sector. Third, even in the cases where Thailand’s rice could 
have been a problem, Korean farmers were not sensitive to this issue. The main rice Thailand 
produced differed from Korea’s staple rice (Minsu Han, General Manager of KAFF, personal 
communication; Hyung-dae Park, Policy Director of KPL, personal communication). 
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Instead of opposing KAFTA, agricultural groups demanded that the existing tariff rates 
in sensitive sectors be preserved as much as possible. The demand from the agricultural groups 
became particularly active as the KAFTA negotiations progressed throughout 2005. In 
particular, the sixth round of negotiations between Korea and ASEAN’s economic ministers, 
help on 29 September 2005 in Laos, called the farmers to direct their attention to the terms 
negotiated in KAFTA.  
The agricultural groups’ concerns were twofold. First, the Korean government aimed 
to conclude KAFTA with a greater degree of liberalisation compared to CAFTA or AJCEP, 
aiming to leave only 5–7% of all goods under tariff protection. They argued that beef, pork, 
chicken and tropical fruits posed particular threats to the Korean agricultural industry (KPL 
2005a; KAFF 2005a). Second, they criticised the way the government led the KAFTA 
negotiations, claiming they were not democratic; no information was disclosed to the public 
and farmers had no paths to deliver their opinions. They insisted that the government open an 
official channel for the sensitive sectors of the economy to participate in its decision-making 
process (KPL 2005a; KPL 2005b; KAFF 2005a). 
After the sixth round of negotiation, the agricultural group’s demands became more 
specific. As KAFF (2005b) stated: 
 
The negotiation was preliminarily agreed with much deeper level of liberalization than 
it had been in the original offer list. By 2010, tariff of 90% of all goods will be 
eliminated […] What is even more serious, is that 233 products in the Highly Sensitive 
List were reduced by 36% to 150 products (based on HS-6-digists), and 84 products in 
the Exclusion List was reduced down by 52%, to 40 products. […] Currently, 77 
products included in the Highly Sensitive List have high tariff rates that exceed 100%. 
These high tariff products must be excluded from the list. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food, and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) in the beginning of the negotiations said to make 62 
products as exceptions. But in the 6th negotiation, this list has been narrowed down to 
40 products; thus, it has become more difficult to include agricultural goods. Also, fruits 
(e.g. apple and pear), meat (e.g. pork, chicken, and beef), and rice have been excluded, 
but other grains have been included in the highly sensitive list — their tariffs will be 
reduced by 20%–50% by 2015, which is a serious problem. 
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KPL and KAFF did not want any FTAs. The agricultural sector had an indirect way of 
influencing Korea’s negotiation approach, making the government carefully consider the costs 
and benefits of the bilateral approach versus the group-based approach toward ASEAN. 
However, the agricultural sector did not have a specific preference with regard to bilateral or 
regional trade negotiations with ASEAN, so long as the agricultural sector was protected. 
 
4.3.2.3 Government’s interests 
 
(a) Before the formal negotiations, 2001–2004. ASEAN had proposed an FTA to Korea 
in November 2001, but the latter was reluctant to initiate (Park and Lee 2006, 86). It was not 
until China and Japan consecutively approached ASEAN that the Korean government officially 
began to consider KAFTA. Upon receiving a positive analysis result from the Korea Institute 
for International Economic Policy (KIEP) of the economic impact of KAFTA, there was 
discussion within MOFAT on the negotiation approach it should take with ASEAN. MOFAT 
had recognised that China and Japan took two different approaches but without clear 
information as to why (J. Kim 2002). At this point, the Korean government had strategically 
weighed the costs and benefits of signing bilateral negotiations versus multilateral negotiations 
with ASEAN. 
In the beginning, the internal discussions converged toward the bilateral approach for 
its efficiency and feasibility. In his special interview to Financial News (J. Kim 2002), then 
Trade Minister Doo-yeon Hwang stated that a multilateral FTA with ASEAN would be more 
difficult to reach because of the complexities attached to the involvement of multiple 
negotiation partners—thus, following Japan’s footsteps, it would be more realistic to pursue 
FTAs with accessible partners first. MOFAT considered that Korea was inexperienced 
compared to China and Japan, which had built deep historical bonds with the ASEAN. For 
example, China had a thorough knowledge of the market through ethnic Chinese businessmen 
in Southeast Asia. Japan had made massive investments in the region since the end of World 
War II. By contrast, Korea’s investment was limited to light industries, such as sewing and 
shoemaking. 
Because the agricultural sector’s structural reform at the time was the most sensitive 
issue in Korea due to the Korea–Chile FTA, the Korean government was extremely cautious 
even about mentioning the possibility of an FTA with ASEAN. Prime Minister Seok-Su Kim 
137 
 
was interviewed at the summit and said, “We expect that we will face strong domestic 
opposition if the FTA talks began, because import of agricultural products from the ASEAN 
will increase dramatically with the FTA” (Yonhap News Agency 2002a). He further emphasised 
that  
 
Korea is not ready for an FTA with ASEAN, and a thorough discussion and consent 
from the agricultural and fishery sector is needed because they make up very important 
parts of the Korean economy. The KAFTA needs further study by setting long-term 
goals. (Hong 2002). 
 
For these reasons, Korea chose Singapore as its second FTA partner, following its first 
FTA with Chile, at the economic ministers’ meeting held in November 2002. The FTA with 
Singapore seemed easier than an FTA with ASEAN, as it would little impact the domestic 
agricultural market and would take a shorter time to conclude. To Korea’s second decline of 
ASEAN’s proposal, Singapore and Thailand criticised that Korea was not as enthusiastic about 
ASEAN as compared to its active approach with Chile (Bae 2002; Hong 2002). However, 
Korea continued to insist on further analysis of how it and the ASEAN economies could 
mutually complement one another before beginning the region-based negotiations. As then-
Trade Minister Hwang said after the ministers’ meeting 
 
We already have informal agreement from Singapore to further proceed with our FTA 
negotiations. We do not expect this negotiation will require complicated procedure, 
since Singapore has an economic structure where the agricultural sector is minor. The 
FTA with the entire ASEAN, however, still needs further examination and study. 
(Yonhap News Agency 2002b) 
 
Because of Korea’s lukewarm response, the ministers of foreign affairs from the ASEAN side 
continued to make direct requests for KAFTA to then Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Young-kwan Yoon (H. Kim 2006, 22).  
The next year at the APT Summit held in October 2003 in Bali, Korea’s negotiation 
approach shifted to the region-based approach, which only a year before claimed to need long-
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term consideration of KAFTA. Giving an account as to why the Korean government had been 
indefinite about KAFTA, President Roh explained, 
 
opening up the agricultural market is no threat to China. The Japanese agricultural 
sector’s structural reforms are almost at the end stage. In contrast, our FTA progress 
with ASEAN had been slow because our structural reform in the agricultural sector is 
incomplete. (Cho and Ko 2003) 
 
President Roh considered that Korea had its absolute advantage in industrial 
competitiveness, which outweighed any potential loss in the agricultural market. The opinions 
that the region-based approach of negotiation was more beneficial for both Korea and ASEAN 
were continuously emphasised and confirmed by the five rounds of joint studies conducted 
throughout March to August in 2004 (Seo 2004; MOFAT and KIEP 2007, 10).  
Securing the first mover advantages in the Southeast Asian market and gaining enlarged 
market access was expected to improve the overall national economy. In 2002, 51.7% of 
Korea’s GDP63 depended on trade, where the share of the export and import was 26.7% and 
25%, respectively (KITA n.d.). Among just over half of the GDP, ASEAN took up 11% of the 
total trade, which amounted to US$35,156 million out of US$3,145,960 million. ASEAN was 
Korea’s fifth largest trading partner, after the US, China, Japan and the EU. So far as ASEAN, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia were Korea’s most important partners, followed by the 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Brunei. Next were Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos (see 
Figure 4.5).  
Compared with Japan and China, however, Korea’s market share in ASEAN was still 
far behind (see Figure 4.6, ASEAN Secretariat 2013; Seo 2004). That is, Japan continued to 
take up a significant market share of over 15%, while the Chinese market share sharply 
increased from 4.3% in 2000 to 9.1% in 2002 (ASEAN Secretariat 2013). Moreover, China’s 
market share in ASEAN was expected to increase further after CAFTA went into effect in July 
2005.  
                                   
63 Trade dependency rate was calculated using nominal GDP, where it was US$608,900 
million, export was US$162,471 million, and import US$152,126 million. 
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With the rapid economic growth of ASEAN, the market was increasingly highlighted 
by its consumption capacity. ASEAN’s growth rate recorded an average of 8% since the early 
2000s (KITA n.d.), indicating that it would be a potential export destination for a new 
consumption market. In addition, ASEAN was being recognised as an alternative relocation 
spot for the companies seeking a cheaper labour force in the face of rising labour costs in China. 
To quote the Director at East Asia Negotiation Division, Young-mu Kim, interviewed by YTN 
Radio in 2014,  
 
if an emerging market as is compared to a pie, the negotiators considered that the first-
mover advantages are important in terms of taking the larger piece of pie faster than its 
competitors.  
 
This meant that expanding Korea’s presence in the region became an urgent task for the Korean 
government. 
Furthermore, the Korean negotiators began to consider that, unlike Japan, Korea had 
less incentive to negotiate bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN members. Even though the 
bilateral approach of negotiations would be more efficient, as in the case of KSFTA, further 
negotiations with other bilateral FTAs were beginning to be perceived more difficult. ASEAN 
members were not interested in engaging in bilateral FTAs with Korea. According to the chief 
delegate of KAFTA, Hansu Kim (personal communication), Malaysia was the only country in 
ASEAN at the time that showed an interest in negotiating a bilateral FTA with Korea. A 
counterpart’s willingness reflected how politically and economically attractive a country is to 
its partner. In this respect, Korea did not hold political and economic leverage against 
individual ASEAN countries in the early 2000s.  
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Figure 4.5 Composition of ASEAN’s trade share in Korea, by country, 2002 
Source: Author’s compilation of data from KITA (2015). 
 
Figure 4.6 Share of ASEAN trade with dialogue partners 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2013).  
 
 
 
Trade Partners 
Share of ASEAN Trade (%) 
1993 2000 2011 
Intra ASEAN 19.2 22.0 25.0 
China 2.1 4.3 11.7 
Japan 20.2 15.3 11.4 
Korea 3.1 3.9 5.2 
EU–27 14.7 13.5 9.8 
USA 17.6 19.8 21.4 
Others 23.1 21.2 15.5 
Total 100 100 100 
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(b) Negotiations at work: The modality approach, 2005. In recognition of Korea’s 
relatively disadvantaged position in the ASEAN market and the country’s higher 
development status, Korea suggested a deal that may seem imbalanced to its side.  
At the working-level negotiations, the different domestic circumstances of individual 
countries would be considered through bilateral negotiations, where the specifics of a tariff 
concession plan and the specifics of the sensitive goods would be listed and established. 
When these tasks were finished, Korea and ASEAN would come together at the negotiation 
table once again and tune up the final deals both bilaterally and multilaterally (Hyun 2005). 
Hence, the modality framework was signed without a tariff schedule and Annex on RoO on 9 
December 2005 (MOFAT, 2005) in Kuala Lumpur.  
The modality approach was opted for its flexibility in tariff liberalisation between 
multiple parties that varied in developing status. In the Normal Track, over 90% of all goods, 
which amounted to 5,224 items (by HS 6 digit), targeted at complete elimination of tariff 
from the minimum deadline of 1 January 2010 to the maximum 1 January 2020. The Normal 
Track schedule of tariff reduction was divided into three categories: (a) Korea and 
ASEAN+6, (b) Vietnam and (c) the CLM countries (see Table 4.1). Unlike in the precedent 
set in the CAFTA where there were only two categories—(a) China and ASEAN+6, and (b) 
CLMV countries—the KAFTA agreement was differentiated in two ways.  
Table 4.1 Schedule of Tariff Reduction, Korea and ASEAN 
 
 
Category (a) Korea ASEAN+6 (b) Vietnam (c) CLM 
Normal Track 
(over 90%) 
Immediately 
2008 
2010 
70% 
95% 
100% 
2007 
2009 
2010 
2012 
50% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
2013 
2015 
2016 
2018 
50% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
2015 
2017 
2018 
2020 
50% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
Sensitive 
Track 
(10% or 
less) 
Sensitive 
List 
Tariff line: 6~7% 
Import value: 7% 
Tariff line: 10% 
Import value: 
25% 
Tariff line: 
6~7% 
Highly 
Sensitive 
List 
Tariff line: Up to 200 items (HS6) 
or 3% of Tariff line and import value 
Tariff line: Up to 200 items (HS6) 
or 3% of Tariff line 
  
Source: Korea Customs and Trade Development Institute 2016; Korea-ASEAN FTA 
Agreement in Trade in Goods, Annex 1 & 2 (http://fta.go.kr). 
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First, the concession Korea offered was seen as much more generous than what China 
offered to ASEAN. Then-chief delegate of the ASEAN side, Chin (2011), recalled that in the 
process of such modality-based negotiations, Korea was the first case in which the ASEAN 
side began to consider that its more developed dialogue partner should concede more by 
taking the development gap into account, even to the relatively more developed ASEAN+6. 
For example, even though Korea and ASEAN+6 were grouped together in the modality, 
different target dates were set for tariff reduction. Upon KAFTA’s entry into force on 1 June 
2007, Korea agreed to eliminate at least 70% of its tariff lines to zero. By 1 January 2010, 
tariffs of all items in the Normal Track would be eliminated. In contrast, ASEAN+6 agreed to 
eliminate at least 50% of the tariff lines by 2007 to the tariff rates at 0–5%. After two further 
stages of liberalisation in 2009 and 2010, all tariff elimination would be completed no later 
than 1 January 2012 (Chin 2011, 225–228; Korea Customs and Trade Development Institute 
2016). For the Korean side, the early target date, despite its steep reduction of tariffs, was 
seen as necessary to catch up with CAFTA’s tariff elimination deadline, which was set as 1 
January 2010.  
Second, among the CLMV countries, Vietnam was treated as an exception. Because 
Vietnam had much a higher trade share with Korea and was more developed than Laos 
Malaysia and Cambodia, Korea contended that higher standards should be met (MOFAT and 
KIEP 2007). Having agreed on such modalities throughout the negotiations held in 2005, the 
Framework Agreement and an Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism were signed on 
13 December that year at the 9th Korea–ASEAN Summit. 
Throughout 2006, the working-level negotiation continued. Korea divided tariff lines 
using HS 10 digits, based on the modality agreed. Out of 11,261 goods, 10,403 goods 
(93.2%) were categorised in the Normal Track, where the tariff of 7,312 products (65.5%) 
were eliminated with KAFTA’s entry into force. Of the remaining goods, 481 goods (4.3%) 
were categorised in the Sensitive List, 279 goods (2.5%) were categorised in the Highly 
Sensitive List (see Table 4.2) and 98 goods (0.9%) were excluded from liberalisation. The 
exclusion list comprised agricultural products, including rice, beef, pork, chicken and pepper, 
with exception for Thailand (Korea Customs and Trade Development Institute, 2016). In 
contrast, for Korea the main triggers that sped up the negotiations were its concern about the 
export competitive industries, such as those in fibre, machinery and electronics, and its fear 
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of ASEAN market domination by China and Japan if CAFTA and AJCEP went into effect 
faster than KAFTA (Jeong 2002).  
 
Table 4.2 Schedule of Tariff Reduction for Sensitive Track, Korea and ASEAN 
 
 
Category 
Korea & 
ASEAN+6 
Vietnam CLM 
Sensitive List 
2012: reduced to 20%  
2016: reduced to 0–
5% 
2017: reduced to 20% 
2021: reduced to 0–
5% 
2020: reduced to 20% 
2024: reduced to 0–
5% 
Highly 
Sensitive 
List 
Group A 2016: 50% tariff cap 2021: 50% tariff cap 2024: 50% tariff cap 
Group B 
2016: reduction by 
20%  
2021: reduction by 
20% 
2024: reduction by 
20% 
Group C 
2016: reduction by 
50% 
2021: reduction by 
50%  
2024: reduction by 
50% 
Group D Subject to tariff quotas 
Subject to tariff 
quotas 
Subject to tariff 
quotas 
Group E Exempt Exempt Exempt 
Source: Korea Customs and Trade Development Institute 2016; Korea-ASEAN FTA 
Agreement in Trade in Goods, Annex 1 & 2 (http://fta.go.kr). 
 
 
(c) Negotiation at a turning point? Changes in Korea’s leverage. Even after the region-
based approach of negotiation was selected, the difficulty with negotiation persisted due to 
Korea’s weak negotiation leverage in bilateral negotiations specifying the tariff lines to be 
liberalised at the working-level. In an interview with KBSi Radio in 2012, chief delegate of 
KAFTA, Hansu Kim, claimed that because ASEAN did not have an executive body, such as 
the European Commission, that would act in one during the negotiations, the process of 10 
ASEAN members arriving at consensus took much longer than compared to Korea’s 
negotiations with the EU. In this respect, KAFTA was a collection of bilateral agreements, 
rather than a single unified arrangement, as was the case with the Korea–EU FTA. 
The delay at the working-level negotiation with Thailand demonstrated Korea’s relative 
lack of leverage compared to Thailand’s favourable approach to the JTEPA. Even after the 
Framework Agreement was signed and the rest of ASEAN reached an Agreement on Trade in 
Goods with Korea, Thailand opted out of this pact in opposition to Korea excluding agricultural 
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products, including rice, chicken and tropical fruits, from the tariff liberalisation. For this 
reason, KAFTA entered into force on 1 June 2007 without Thailand.  
However, the internal pressure within Bangkok that being excluded from the pact would 
eventually disadvantage its position with its regional trades brought it to the negotiation table 
again. The two parties struggled to find a common ground through the four additional bilateral 
negotiations on trade in goods held from April to October 2007 and also the two Trade 
Ministers’ meetings held in September and November that year. It was only in the fifth round 
of Korea–Thailand Trade in goods negotiations, held on 18 December 2007, that the two parties 
finally reached an agreement (MOFAT FTA Negotiation Team 2007). In comparison with 
JTEPA or KAFTA, which excluded rice from tariff reduction, Thailand’s rice had been 
grouped under the highly sensitive list, category D. As the Korea–Thailand tariff reduction 
schedule specifies, tariff is zero within the allocated quota,64 but 52% tariff is imposed to any 
exceeding amount (MOFA (Korea) n.d.). 
So when and how did Korea’s region-based negotiation approach begin to shift back to 
the bilateral approach? It was only later in 2012 that Korea started to negotiate further bilateral 
FTAs with ASEAN countries. According to then-Trade Minister Taeho Bark (personal 
communication), it was Vietnam and Indonesia that first proactively suggested additional 
bilateral FTAs with Korea, while countries such as the Philippines and Thailand were still 
reluctant. In explaining Korea’s negotiation strategy with ASEAN, Trade Minister Bark 
(personal communication) stated,  
 
It is easy to conceive that Korea is pursuing bilateral FTAs with the individual ASEAN 
members to complement the limitations of the region-based KAFTA. However, 
Korea’s strategy is to further strengthen KAFTA as a group, not through bilateral 
agreements.  
 
Korea has been focusing on strengthening KAFTA by revising the Agreement on Trade in 
Goods, particularly to enhance its utilisation and implementation. In this process, Annex 3 on 
RoO was revised in 2014 and 2015.  
                                   
64 Each year’s quota can be found at http://www.dft.go.th.  
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In the backdrop of further negotiation between the two Southeast Asian partners was 
the increased economic exchange after KAFTA. Indonesia and Vietnam’s economic 
significance to Korea among ASEAN countries ranked second and third place, respectively, 
just after Singapore. By 2012, their total trades recorded US$29.6 billion and US$21.7 billion, 
up from US$13.7 billion and US$4.9 billion, respectively, in 2006 (see Figure 4.7). In 
particular, Korea’s trades with Vietnam increased by more than eightfold since 2002, during 
which its trade share among ASEAN countries increased from 8% to 16% (see Figures 4.5 and 
4.8). Korea’s trade share ranked fourth after China, Japan and the US in 2012 (Vietnam 
Customs, 2012: 58), and its FDI share was the largest with a strong presence of Samsung and 
LG Electronics. However, Korea’s establishment of a supply chain was still limited to Vietnam 
and Indonesia (MOFA (Korea) official, personal communication).  
Other than these direct economic factors, Vietnam and Indonesia also highly evaluated 
Korea’s economic miracle as a development model. Moreover, over 10% of Korea’s foreign 
residents were Vietnamese in 2010 (Statistics Korea 2010), meaning that further economic 
commitment in bilateral FTA was expected to promote closer diplomatic ties between Korea 
and Vietnam. Combined with these, the Korean Wave’s popularity in these countries formed a 
favourable perspective toward Korea and the Korean negotiators in general (Taeho Bark, 
former Minister for Trade, personal communication; South China Morning Post 2012, 2018; 
Vietnam Net 2017).  
Even though KIFTA negotiations had stalled since 2014,65 KVFTA was officially 
signed on 5 May 2015 and went into effect on 20 December that year. Korea and Vietnam 
aimed toward two different goals through this FTA. Vietnam’s primary goal was to expand its 
agricultural export to Korea, especially with tropical fruits that do not overlap with Korea’s 
agricultural interests. Korea was interested in strengthening its supply chain and expanding its 
consumption market. Even so, Korea saw this FTA more as a diplomatic tool. Vietnam was a 
stepping-stone for wider regionalism, such as TPP. Politically, Korea’s establishing a closer 
relation with Vietnam had a significant political implication, “sort of like marking its territory 
                                   
65 The Korean side requested strengthened protection for Korean businesses in Indonesia, and 
the Indonesian side requested that Korea increase FDI to Indonesia, but the two parties failed to reach 
a consensus (MOTIE 2014). In general, however, the new administration since 2013 had been quite 
conservative in trade policy; thus, the negotiation with Indonesia was not expected to progress in the 
near future (MOFA (Korea) official, personal communication). 
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within the ASEAN countries”, in competing with China and Japan (MOFA official, personal 
communication). Because it was an FTA that the Vietnamese strongly demanded and Korea 
had little to lose from it, the Korean negotiators could be more generous in giving concessions 
to Vietnam. Despite the concession made in the agricultural sector, the Korean negotiators 
remembered the KVFTA as a relative easy negotiation, having established the first mover 
advantages in Vietnam through the KAFTA (Taeho Bark, personal communication; MOFA 
official, personal communication). 
Furthermore, the KTFTA study group was reproposed in 2013 to complement the 
limitations of KAFTA. According to Trade Minister Boonsong Teriyapirom (Cho 2013) 
“ASEAN agreed an FTA with Korea, but Thailand has enjoyed relatively little benefit from 
this agreement compared to other ASEAN neighbours. Thailand wanted a direct FTA with 
Korea from the first place”. The main issues of this agreement would involve the agricultural 
imports from Thailand and exports of the manufacturing sector, like automobiles and electronic 
goods. However, this agreement has not come to fruition. 
 
Figure 4.7 Korea–ASEAN Trades, 2000–2014. 
Source: Author's compilation of data available at KITA (n.d.). 
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Figure 4.8 Composition of ASEAN’s Trade Share in Korea, by country, 2012. 
Source: Author’s compilation of data available at KITA (n.d.). 
 
4.4 Testing the Hypotheses 
 
The empirical findings of this chapter partially confirm the hypotheses established in 
Chapter 3. That is, Korea and Japan both pursued bilateral PTAs in the beginning, because of 
their negotiation efficiency and to minimise the opposition of their agricultural sectors. When 
it comes down to the details, however, the two countries demonstrated minor variations in 
shaping their motivations. The findings confirm the hypothesis that the Japanese government 
was further motivated to promote a bilateral approach, because of its foreign policy objectives 
and diplomatic leverages against ASEAN. It was unexpected, however, that neither the Korean 
nor the Japanese government was able to calculate its respective diplomatic leverage against 
ASEAN. As a result, neither country could utilise this factor as a strategic bargaining tool to 
derive a more favourable negotiation outcome. 
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The private sectors in Japan and Korea were mainly concerned about economic gains 
and losses through the different approaches of negotiations. As Figures 4.9 and 4.10 summarise, 
Japan and Korea’s export competitive industries both preferred the region-based approach of 
negotiations with ASEAN. In the face of the trilateral competition among Korea, China and 
Japan, to gain a better market access to ASEAN than each other, industrial groups in both 
countries strongly demanded that KAFTA and AJCEP be pursued as fast as possible. However, 
FKI and Keidanren differed in their preference toward the bilateral deals. FKI demanded that 
the content of KAFTA be comprehensive and in-depth so that it countered both CAFTA and 
Japan’s bilateral EPAs. In contrast, Keidanren argued that even though the region-based PTAs 
were more beneficial, bilateral EPAs could complement the region-based approach and thus 
both should be pursued. Keidanren was more cautious about maintaining and strengthening 
existing relationships the Japanese businesses had accomplished in individual ASEAN 
countries. 
Korea’s and Japan’s agricultural sectors also had overlapping interests with ASEAN. 
As expected by hypotheses, the agricultural sector did not want any trade liberalisation to take 
place in the first place. However, they also recognised the need for FTAs as long as their 
governments protected their agricultural interests. The two countries’ agricultural groups 
demonstrated differences in their preferences when it came to the details. In the case of Korea, 
KPL’s and KAFF’s interests were diverted to FTAs that had greater impact on Korea’s 
agricultural sector than the FTA with ASEAN. They considered that the liberalisation through 
the FTA would be limited, considering the high development gap among the ASEAN countries. 
In Japan, JA-Zenchu showed preference for bilateral EPAs over AJCEP. The bilateral 
approaches were preferred, because JA-Zenchu considered that Japan would have greater 
leverage in deriving concessions from individual ASEAN counterparties by providing other 
forms of assistance to ASEAN. 
  The governments of Japan and Korea additionally considered the aggregate interests 
of society overall. Japan’s government’s interests were represented by the contrasting priorities 
of METI and MOFA (Japan). As the two ministries agreed that both bilateral and regional 
negotiation approaches could complement each other, Japan decided to pursue two-track 
strategy.  
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Figure 4.9 Japan’s domestic interests and their preferred negotiation approaches 
 
  
Domestic 
Interests 
Negotiation Approaches 
Region-based Negotiation Bilateral Negotiation 
Private 
Interests 
• Keidanren: preference to AJCEP, but 
also supported bilateral EPAs. 
AJCEP was expected to give greater 
market access and secure existing 
supply chain network in Southeast 
Asia. 
• JA-Zenchu: Little opposition to JSEPA. 
Preferred bilateral EPAs over AJCEP. 
Government’s 
Interests 
METI: 
• Japan’s overall economy could gain 
from securing its existing supply 
chain and strengthening its 
competitiveness within Southeast 
Asia region through further 
investment. 
• AJCEP negotiation was delayed due 
to the relative weakness of Japan’s 
leverage against ASEAN as a group 
compared to that of its individual 
EPAs 
MOFA:  
• Bilateral negotiations, such as JSEPA, 
would be more efficient than the region-
based AJCEP; bilateral EPAs would be of 
higher quality, but would take less effort 
and time to conclude. 
• Japan’s existing relationship with individual 
ASEAN members was expected to give 
Japan greater negotiation leverage. 
• Promotion of parallel EPAs, using JSEPA, 
was expected to increase Japan’s leverage 
by facilitating competition among the 
ASEAN counterparties. 
• Japan could achieve foreign policy 
objective of countering the Chinese 
influence through the establishment of its 
EPA models. 
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Figure 4. 10 Korea’s domestic interests and their preferred negotiation approaches 
 
Japan chose the bilateral EPAs for their efficiency, as it aimed to achieve high quality 
agreements in a short period. MOFA (Japan) considered that the country’s political and 
economic leverage against individual ASEAN members could be helpful for deriving a 
favourable negotiation outcome for Japan, as it had been ASEAN’s most important contributor 
of FDI and ODA. Moreover, Japan enhanced its strategic position through the simultaneous 
promotion of bilateral EPAs by triggering competition among the ASEAN members. In this 
process, JSEPA was used as precedent to negotiate comprehensive EPAs with conservative 
liberalisation in its agricultural and fishery market. Diplomatically, MOFA considered that 
Japan’s own style of EPA would strengthen Japan’s regional power, shaping regional economic 
governance.  
Thus, the region-based approach was promoted primarily for economic-driven reasons. 
As Japan already had been deeply engaging in trade and investment with ASEAN, it aimed to 
secure its existing supply chain through cumulative RoO via AJCEP. In that process, however, 
Domestic 
Interests 
Negotiation Approaches 
Region-based Negotiation Bilateral Negotiation 
Private 
interests 
• KFI: Gained first mover advantages in the 
ASEAN market over Chinese and Japanese 
competitors. 
• KPL & KAFF: Opposed KAFTA, but only with 
mild resistance, distracted by Korea–Chile FTA 
and Korea–US FTA. 
 
 
 
• KPL & KAFF: Opposed FTAs, 
but relatively indifferent to 
KSFTA 
Government’s 
Interests 
• Trade gains through enlarged market access. 
• Early stages of negotiation: Lack of leverage to 
attract individual ASEAN members to 
participate in bilateral FTAs. 
• After KAFTA: Increased Korean economic and 
political leverage, leading to additional bilateral 
FTAs. 
• Negotiation efficiency (less 
complicated and takes shorter 
time and resources to conclude 
with an in-depth agreement) 
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the AJCEP negotiations were delayed due to the relative weakness of Japan’s leverage against 
ASEAN as a group. 
The Korean government also preferred the bilateral approach of negotiations initially. 
The bilateral approach was considered more efficient than the regional KAFTA, not only 
because of its efficiency, but also because Korea faced strong opposition from the agricultural 
sector due to the Korea–Chile FTA. In 2003, however, the Korean government turned to 
KAFTA. It considered that the benefits of the enlarged market access through first mover 
advantages outweighed the costs from the agricultural sector and the complexity caused by 
negotiating with multiple partners. The change in Korea’s negotiation approach also concerned 
realistic constraints, namely, its relative lack of diplomatic leverage to attract individual 
ASEAN countries. Even though economic transaction between Korea and ASEAN rapidly 
increased throughout the 1990s, ASEAN members were reluctant to engage in FTAs bilaterally 
with Korea. It was only since 2010s that Korea’s economic and political leverage had also 
increased, leading Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand to propose additional bilateral FTAs with 
Korea. 
The examination of Japan’s and Korea’s domestic interests demonstrates that a direct 
and visible cause of the divergence in negotiation approaches came from their respective 
government’s interests. Japan and Korea held varying degrees of diplomatic leverage against 
the ASEAN countries, both individually and as a group. Japan also had a stronger motivation 
than Korea with its foreign policy objectives of countering China. For Japan, it was important 
to sustain its leadership role in East Asia. To do so, Japan aimed to establish a regional trade 
regime based on its standards, and it considered the bilateral EPAs more suitable for those 
purposes. Thus, the findings confirm most of initial predictions. 
However, the findings also suggest that the cost and benefit analysis did not determine 
preference of one approach over another. In particular, Korea and Japan did not strategically 
calculate the strength of their diplomatic leverages. Instead, the utility of leverages was 
demonstrated through the counterparty’s willingness to participate in the negotiations. Japan 
already had a strong influence in Southeast Asia through trade and investment by the early 
2000s. Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines showed interest for the bilateral approach to 
Japan. Fearing to be left out of the bilateral deals that these three ASEAN members had 
achieved with Japan, the rest of ASEAN members were also drawn into the negotiation not to 
be excluded from the EPA-driven benefits. The region-based approach took much longer due 
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to Japan’s effort to incorporate the bilateral EPAs into AJCEP. The AJCEP negotiations were 
delayed and Japan’s demands were not fully met, because its leverages were not strong enough 
to obtain the deals it had desired. Despite the delay, the Japanese negotiators considered that 
Japan’s unique style of EPA had been effective in countering China’s influence in Southeast 
Asia, as most Southeast Asian countries learned to negotiate their first PTAs through Japan. 
In comparison, Korea did not have the leverage that Japan held in the early stages of 
the negotiations. Because only very few ASEAN countries were interested in bilateral FTAs 
with Korea, reaching ASEAN as a group was a more realistic goal. The existence of leverage 
was clearly demonstrated by the difficulty Korea faced at the working-level bilateral 
negotiations with Thailand for the signing of KAFTA, in contrast with the JTEPA in which the 
conflicting issues over rice was resolved relatively easily. By the time KAFTA went into effect, 
however, Korea’s economic influence in these countries had grown substantially, leading to 
countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia, to request further bilateral FTAs with Korea. Despite 
its increased leverage, however, Korea’s strategy toward ASEAN remained consistent with the 
region-based approach unless otherwise proposed by individual ASEAN members, and its goal 
is to improve the utilisation of KAFTA rather than negotiating further bilateral FTAs. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
When KAFTA and AJCEP began, both Korea and Japan were novices with FTAs. Thus, 
neither party’s strategies were thoroughly planned. Rather, they opted for strategies that 
seemed most strategic at the time. Although Japan had the greater interest to counter China’s 
rise, Korea’s and Japan’s similarities in their interests initially led both countries to place 
greater emphasis on the bilateral approach of negotiation. At this stage, the two countries’ 
expected benefits of using diplomatic leverages against ASEAN members were still vague. 
Due to the lack of experience and information in FTAs, the two countries had not been able to 
fully calculate the costs and benefits of the different negotiation approaches before entering 
into negotiations with ASEAN.  
Thus, the logic of cost and benefit analysis is insufficient to account for Korea’s sudden 
shift of preference from bilateral to the region-based approach of negotiations, even regarding 
its relative lack of leverage. This also brings into question what the counter-intuitive 
implications of Japan’s continued promotion of a two-track strategy are. Moreover, the interest-
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based explanation in this chapter does not account for the mechanism in which the 
government’s interests and private interests interact to produce a certain outcome. In particular, 
the private interest groups’ preferences in Korea and Japan were almost identical; thus, how 
much they influenced each government needs further scrutiny. To account for the remaining 
puzzles, the following chapters will examine the influence of ideas and institutions on Korea’s 
and Japan’s preference of negotiation approaches.  
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Chapter 5 When Do Ideas Matter? The Negotiation Divergence of Korea and Japan  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Until the late 1990s, Korea and Japan claimed to be firm adherents of GATT and the 
WTO-based multilateral system. A series of external events—the slow progress of the 
multilateral talks, the emergence of NAFTA and the EU, and the Asian financial crisis— led 
the two countries to shift in their trade policies. In addition, the Doha Round launched in 2001 
was not expected to advance any faster with the WTO’s 142 members with diverse 
development statuses, which included the newly admitted China and Taiwan. They further 
facilitated Korea’s and Japan’s transition from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism, 
which notably progressed at a fast pace since the early 2000s. The two countries’ degrees of 
emphasis on bilateralism and regionalism, however, began to vary in the formation of their 
PTA preferences. Korea and Japan both initially preferred bilateral approaches of negotiations 
in their PTAs with ASEAN as a response to the progress of CAFTA. In 2003, however, Korea’s 
preference suddenly shifted to the region-based KAFTA. In contrast, Japan continued to 
simultaneously promote bilateral EPAs and AJCEP.  
This chapter demonstrates that ideas are central to explaining Korea’s and Japan’s 
divergence in their preferences for bilateralism and regionalism. As Chapter 3 lays out, Korea’s 
and Japan’s cases with ASEAN provide counterfactuals to assess the influence of ideas, as no 
substantive structural changes occurred to bring obvious changes to the two countries’ 
domestic interests. The contrasting perspectives developed in Korea and Japan are more 
obvious when examining cross-regionalism trends in East Asia. East Asian countries started 
promoting cross-regional PTAs almost as soon as they began PTAs in the late 1990s. In 
comparison with European or North American countries that consolidated intra-regional 
partnerships before seeking expansion of PTAs with extra-regional partners, East Asian 
countries have taken bolder steps toward PTAs (Solís and Katada 2007a). Korea and Japan 
have also promoted cross-regional PTAs from the outset: Korea’s first FTA partner was Chile, 
and Japan’s second EPA partner was Mexico. However, the steps towards the two countries’ 
subsequent agreements varied, creating a significant gap in the two countries’ overall PTA 
progresses. As Yoshimatsu (2012) observes, of the 12 PTAs Japan concluded by 2010, only 
four—Mexico, Chile, Switzerland and India—were made with non-ASEAN countries. Japan’s 
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trade policies did not include its major trading partners, such as the US, the EU or China. In 
contrast, Korea negotiated FTAs with Chile, EFTA, India, the US, the EU and Peru, in addition 
to the FTAs with ASEAN and Singapore.  
To trace the origin of the ideational background on Korea’s and Japan’s divergence on 
their different PTA negotiation approaches, this chapter examines the development paths of the 
policymakers in the two countries’ ideas.  It demonstrates how a combination of antecedent 
conditions and the reinforcements amalgamated in to the policymakers’ ideas, determining a 
range of viable policy options. Following the introduction, the next part examines the Korean 
policymaker’s ideas on bilateralism and regionalism. The third part then examines the case of 
Japan. After examining each country’s evolution of ideas, this chapter tests the hypotheses 
established in Chapter 3. It concludes by assessing the findings from this chapter.  
 
5.2 Korea 
 
5.2.1 The Antecedent Conditions: Korea’s Departure from Multilateralism and the 
Rise of Bilateralism and Regionalism. The Korean policymakers did not consider the 
possibility of bilateral trade agreements until the late 1990s. Even as the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), as early as in the mid-1980s, considered Korea one of the most apt 
partners to initiate an FTA in East Asia, policymakers refrained from adopting PTAs due to the 
high sensitivity in its agricultural sector (KITA 2002). Together with countries like Japan, New 
Zealand, India and Pakistan, it criticised the new rise of regionalism and bilateralism in the 
Western hemisphere and argued that economic co-operation should be strengthened at the 
multilateral level (former MOFAT official, personal communication). As one of the biggest 
beneficiaries of multilateralism, Korea’s official position was that it supported trade through 
the WTO-based multilateral co-operation (former MOFAT official, personal communication; 
Moon 2007, 176-177). 
Despite its maintenance of a firm position throughout the 1990s, the pressures for the 
FTAs continue to grow with the slow progress of multilateral talks, emergence of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements in the Americas and Europe, and the outbreak of the Asian financial 
crisis. Accommodating these external changes, however, did not cause political turbulence 
within Korea. During the process of redirecting its external economic policy from 
multilateralism to bilateralism, the Korean president and the MOFAT bureaucrats could build 
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consensus on the need of the FTAs in several aspects (former MOFAT official, personal 
communication; Moon 2007; S. Kim 2004, 18-20).  
First, the new president and the MOFAT bureaucrats shared the view that reforms in 
trade are necessary. They believed that external trade relations are essential for a heavily trade-
dependent economy like Korea. Therefore, President Dae Jung Kim, who came into office in 
February 1998, moved the jurisdiction over trade to MOFA (Korea), changing the name of the 
ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). In addition, the FTA 
Promotion Guidelines were published in November 1998. The Guidelines were created 
voluntarily within MOFAT, independent from those imposed by the IMF system. The MOFAT 
officials, who shared the idea that the emphasis on multilateralism is ideal but not realistic 
(former MOFA official, personal communication), strongly supported them. 
Moreover, Mexico’s participation in NAFTA gave confidence to Korean policymakers 
and policy advisors from diverse trade backgrounds, so that Korea could also successfully 
employ FTAs (Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication; S. Kim 2004; 
H. Kim 2006). The fact that Mexico is situated in the southern part of North America directed 
the decision makers’ attention to Chile in selecting Korea’s first FTA partner (Taeho Bark, 
former Minister for Trade, personal communication). Mexico’s case was perceived as a model 
to be learnt, rather than a threat of trade diversion or a gateway for the market access in North 
America. In fact, when Mexico proposed an FTA with Korea in November 1998, the Korean 
government did not agree to the proposal, as it feared that pursuing another FTA with similar 
economic characteristics of Chile would cause domestic backlash (H. Kim 2006, 21).  
Thirdly, the decision makers shared the view that their influence at the multilateral level 
was meagre due to Korea’s low international status in the late 1990s. Then-negotiators 
perceived that Korea’s influence or reputation in the multilateral negotiations was rarely heard. 
Korea also was perceived as a country with no experience in the FTAs and thus incapable of 
negotiating advanced bilateral agreements (H. Kim 2006, 31–35). Therefore, advancing FTAs 
became considered as a diplomatic tool to enhance Korea’s international status (Cheong 2009, 
5). 
Relatively frictionless policy-making process did not last long. In moving away from 
multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism, domestic friction began to emerge. During the 
Kim administration, Chile was chosen as Korea’s first FTA partner, an idea prompted by 
Mexico’s progress with NAFTA (Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal 
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communication; S. Kim 2004). However, the domestic political atmosphere was more 
favourable toward negotiating FTAs with the East Asian neighbours. The FTA with Japan was 
expected to launch soon, as President Kim had maintained a close diplomatic relationship with 
Japan and had promised to initiate the Korea–Japan FTA in the near future.  
The next administration, succeeded by President Moo Hyun Roh in 2003, followed the 
core elements of his predecessor’s external trade policies. Thus, the first task of trade with the 
new administration was to initiate the FTA with Japan. The mainstream opinion in the 
government and the media during this time was still inclined toward the goal of East Asian 
economic integration, and therefore, it was seen natural that Korea began FTAs with its closest 
neighbours: China and Japan (H. Kim 2006, 29). In this respect, President Roh, in his inaugural 
speech, emphasised the “Era of Northeast Asia”, which would model the EU in its economic 
integration of East Asia and basis for security co-operation (Jeon-Hong 2003). Roh sought for 
Korea to be a co-ordinator and a casting voter in regional affairs through the Northeast Asian 
frame of co-operation (Jeong 2006). 
 
5.2.2 The Reinforcement: Development of Negative Experience from Korea–Chile 
FTA. Korea’s first FTA with Chile gave it a negative impression of bilateralism in two respects. 
The first considered its relationship with the counterpart. Negotiators often refer to an FTA as 
a “marriage” between two economies (Choi 2016, 8); Korea’s first marriage was rather 
turbulent. Chile was chosen as Korea’s very first FTA partner in 1998 at the Inter-Ministerial 
Trade Policy Coordination Committee Meeting. Korea considered that an FTA with Chile 
would be a good experiment to shift its policy toward bilateralism and act as a gateway to the 
Latin American market. Moreover, policymakers considered that Korea’s trade volume with 
Chile would be relatively small, thus, an FTA would not have a very significant impact on the 
domestic market. Chile’s far distance from Korea, located in the opposite side of the 
hemisphere, was expected to minimise the potential loss for domestic farmers (MOFAT and 
KIEP 2003, 54). Then-negotiators at the Ministry of Agriculture considered that the most likely 
imported agricultural goods—apple, pear and grape—were uncompetitive in the Korean 
market, due to their high transportation costs to maintain freshness and different product 
varieties far from the general Korean consumer’s taste (Bae et al. 2005, 146–148). 
Korea’s approach to negotiations was also quite reserved, as it could not anticipate how 
domestic constituencies and the agricultural sector would respond to the FTA. Therefore, 
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Korea’s offer of concession clashed with the expectations of Chile, then the world’s second 
most proactive FTA negotiator after Mexico. Disagreement between the two parties was not 
unforeseen considering the gap in their FTA experiences and the sensitivity of the Korean 
agricultural sector after the Uruguay Round. Throughout the six rounds of negotiations on tariff 
schedules, from 1999 to 2002, the Korean side continued to maintain a strong protectionist 
position for its agricultural goods; whereas the Chilean side contended that substantially all 
tariffs be removed, including the agricultural sector, for the next 10 years. Official negotiations 
stalled after the fourth negotiation round held in Seoul in December 2000, due to strong 
domestic oppositions.  
The negotiations reached the point where they were no different than being suspended; 
it was only on-going on the surface at the request of the Korean government (S.C. Kim 2001). 
Korean policymakers felt pressured because other agricultural exporters, including the US, 
were keeping an eye on the progress of this negotiation, and the FTA with Chile would be an 
opportunity to show its determination for trade liberalisation (S.U. Kim 2002). The fifth 
negotiation was expected to be held in Santiago in March 2001 but was postponed until the 
next year August due to domestic oppositions. An agreement was finally reached in the sixth 
negotiation in October 2002. 
Even though the Korean tariff schedule was much more protective than originally 
suggested, Chile moved a step backward and accepted these terms in the recognition of the 
strong backlash reported by the Korean media. Korean negotiators recalled that due to the series 
of stalled negotiations and revision of tariff schedule by the Korean side, the Chilean 
government was deeply disappointed and its credibility toward Korea plunged (Taeho Bark, 
former Minister for Trade, personal communication; Bae et al. 2005, 156–157). These 
difficulties suggested that further FTAs with another Latin American country, like Mexico, 
could overload its negotiation capacities for the time being.66 
                                   
66 Mexico had already once proposed an FTA to Korea, just after Korea and Chile agreed for 
an FTA in November 1998. Korea showed hesitancy about negotiating another FTA with similar 
economic characteristics. Due to Korea’s reluctance, Mexican President Zedillo instead proposed an 
FTA with Japan in the same month. This was only the beginning of the mixed fate between Korea and 
Mexico, leaving their diplomatic relationship in an uncomfortable position throughout 2000s (H. Kim 
2006, 21; Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication). Even though the first 
negotiation for the Korea–Chile Strategic Economic Complementation Agreement (SECA) began in 
2006, it was again stalled in 2008. As of 2017, Korea–Chile SECA negotiations are yet to reinitiate. 
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More fundamentally, however, the second source of the negative experience came from 
the conflict between the Korean government and its domestic constituencies. During the 
Korea–Chile FTA negotiations, structural systems had not been established to reflect various 
interests of the domestic interest groups.67  Due to the lack of the channels in which the 
domestic interest groups could lobby or deliver their opinion, the agricultural groups penetrated 
their oppositions through unorganised, and sometimes violent, demonstrations. Going through 
such negotiation experiences, negotiators began to consider that they needed a strategic 
guideline to pursue further FTAs. Many negotiators regretted that the negotiation with Chile 
did not extend into a friendly relationship between the two countries, but rather, ended as a 
single event (Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication). 
 
5.2.3 Emergence of New Ideas and the Policy Change. Even though the Roh 
administration emphasised economic regional co-operation based in East Asia, its goals soon 
changed together with the rearrangement of personnel within the trade ministry. In other words, 
both the security and economic goals under the Kim administration68 was narrowed down to 
the security dimension under the Roh administration (Cho and Park 2014, 590). Instead of 
region-based economic co-operation, the FTA Roadmap announced in August 2003 became 
the milestone for Korea’s subsequent FTA strategies. Korea sought a niche strategy to become 
the global hub of FTAs, situated between China and Japan (H. Kim 2006, 29).  
The ideas of the newly appointed Minister for Trade, Hyun-Chong Kim,69 were a 
determining factor that shaped Korea’s FTA policy orientations. Trade Minister Kim 
emphasised the importance of connecting to big economies like the US and the EU, rather than 
East Asia-based FTAs. As a practical decision maker under the strong support of President Roh, 
he argued that Korea–Japan FTA strategically was not a good start for Korea’s subsequent 
FTAs. He argued that Japan’s growth model was outdated considering Japan’s prolonged 
economic downturn, and that Korea could learn from the FTAs with the bigger economies (H. 
                                   
67 See Chapter 7 for detail on the development of institutional arrangements. 
68 Korea had been considering the creation of a regional trade block that included both 
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia since President Dae Jung Kim proposed EFTA at the APT Summit 
in Brunei, 2001. 
69 Kim was reappointed as Korea’s Minister for Trade in 2017 under the Jae-in Moon 
administration. 
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Kim, 2006). His ideas were borne out of his experience in his personal environment (H. Kim 
2006); being the son of a diplomat, he was spent most of his childhood abroad. His educational 
background in the US70 and his working experience at the WTO71 were known to have 
influenced his neo-liberal philosophy (former MOFAT official, personal communication; H. 
Kim 2006). 
The dramatic change in the Roh administration’s policy direction by no means occurred 
in a vacuum. The change was about a constant process of persuasion of Trade Minister Kim to 
change President Roh’s mercantilist beliefs and encourage his pragmatist and reformist desires 
towards the neo-liberalist direction. As Trade Minister Kim (2006) states, in his conversation 
with MOFAT officials,  
President Roh is pragmatic. He is not the kind of leader who is held back by his ideology. 
He supports logical ideas that break paradigm and has the desire to triumph. He will 
[have greater] concern for our [Korea’s] isolation from [the global rise of] FTAs [than 
maintaining his mercantilist ideology]. (41) 
In spite of the domestic opposition Korea faced with the Korea–Chile FTA, Trade 
Minister Kim (2006, 41–42) believed that the proactive FTA strategies could progress under 
the Roh administration due to the latter’s progressive and leftist tendencies. However, he also 
considered that President Roh needed to be fully convinced of the need for a multitrack FTA 
strategy, as reforms would necessarily accompany opposition from vested interests.  
Trade Minister Kim’s logic on the need for FTAs was seen as radical at the time. 
However, as one of President Roh’s advisors (cited in J. Lee 2007) states, “Kim’s strategic 
mind that sees few moves ahead of others convinced the President”. He was considered a man 
of path-breaking ideas with an analytical and strategic mind, winning President Roh’s favour 
despite his near absence of network in Korean politics (J. Lee 2007). He was also taken as a 
man of political dexterity for his ability to convince the president and win his political support 
and budget for FTAs (MOTIE official; former MOFAT official, personal communication). 
Trade Minister Kim’s view was at odds with the Roh Administration’s trade guidelines but his 
                                   
70 Minister for Trade Kim received a B.A. (1981) and M.A. (1982) in Political Science from 
Columbia University and a J.D. (1985) from Columbia Law School in New York (Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) 2017). 
71 Minister Kim served as a senior lawyer with the WTO’s Appellate Body Secretariat and 
Legal Affairs Division from 1999–2003 (CSIS 2017). 
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core logic was consistent with the president’s philosophy on reforms, which sufficiently 
convinced the latter in spite of domestic criticisms (H. Kim 2006; former MOFAT official, 
personal communication). To quote President Roh, “there is no guarantee that reforms will 
succeed, but if we don’t liberalize, we can’t become an advanced country” (H. Kim 2006, 42). 
Within MOFAT, the administration’s change was received with surprise for its 
contradictory orientations to Roh’s political background. There was a discomfort about Kim’s 
unprecedented style of leadership, which was inconsistent with MOFAT’s traditional 
bureaucratic culture (MOTIE official, personal communication; H. Kim 2006). Trade Minister 
Kim had neither a political nor a bureaucratic background in Korea. Because he lacked a 
connection with Korean society, Minister Kim’s decisions were less politically oriented and 
more geared towards his convictions in the benefits of free trade. As Minister Kim (2006, 55) 
reminisces, “[w]hy would bureaucrats risk their life-long career, by dealing with domestically 
sensitive issues through FTAs, which are voluntary agreements unlike the multilateral trade 
negotiations? [By contrast,] I had no reason to spare myself.”  
The progressiveness of the new policy faced criticisms not only within MOFAT, but 
also within the broader domestic politics. Those who argued that Korea should begin with East 
Asian FTAs opposed Korea’s FTA Roadmap, as they considered that it made more political 
and economic sense to start FTAs gradually at the regional level. For example, Tae-in Jeong 
(2006), then-Executive Director for Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Economic 
Cooperation Initiative, contended that the sudden surge of FTAs with big economies would 
shock the Korean economy. Moreover, the strategies outlined in the FTA Roadmap would 
create a political divide between Korea–US–Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK)–Soviet Union–China alliance, which would cause a loss of Korea’s diplomatic 
chip as a co-ordinator between the US and China. Due to Minister Kim’s strong insistence on 
the FTA Roadmap72 and the Korea–US FTA, some even accused him of a conspiracy with the 
US due to his educational background (Jeong 2006; former MOFAT official, personal 
communication). 
Minister Kim, indeed, placed relatively little emphasis on East Asian regional economic 
integration. The core of Kim’s strategy and the FTA Roadmap was to convince smaller 
economies in each region around the world and then to expand them (KIEP researcher, personal 
                                   
72 For further information on the FTA Roadmap, see Chapter 6 on the institutions. 
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communication; H. Kim 2006). Kim (2006, 54) considered the KSFTA as a bridge to reach the 
south of Korea, including gaining market access to ASEAN, which was looked upon as a 
stepping-stone to reach the greater economies. To the East, Kim considered an FTA with 
Canada would trigger competition from the US, which would take Korea a step closer to 
negotiating a Korea–US FTA. To the West, negotiating a high quality agreement with EFTA 
was expected to provide a strategic gateway to the EU (KIEP researcher, personal 
communication; Tae-ho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication).  
His new policy ideas were also bolstered by Korea’s FTA negotiation experience with 
Chile. Going through a series of oppositions from the agricultural sector, conflict in agricultural 
issues was seen as best to avoid, rather than to persuade or reconcile. The government’s view 
of the bilateral approach of negotiations, initially considered more efficient while remaining 
cautious of the agricultural sector, had changed completely through the Korea–Mexico FTA. 
In other words, the region-based KAFTA began to be considered more efficient and realistic, 
taking into account the domestic backlash the government had experienced. Although it opted 
for the bilateral approach in the beginning, it soon realised that it will be much inefficient given 
its policy goals. According to Kim Han Su (personal communication), the former Chief 
Delegate of the KAFTA negotiations: 
“[a]ll of the ASEAN member countries, other than Singapore, would influence Korea’s 
agriculture and fishery sector, meaning that if negotiation was pursued bilaterally, the 
negotiators would have to persuade the involved interest groups every time, establish 
alternative supporting measures, which would have to repeat in every negotiation.” 
By the end of 2005, President Roh’s redirected his focus on the EU community as the 
model for the Northeast Asia toward establishing an FTA with the US (Jeong 2006). Due to 
the aims based on the values shaped by the FTA Roadmap, KAFTA was considered leverage 
for further FTAs with the wider world, rather than a building block for regional economic 
integration.  
 
5.3 Japan 
 
5.3.1 The Antecedent Conditions: Japan’s Emphasis on Multilateralism. Unlike 
Korea, Japan did not initially have a clear strategy for the PTA. Japan’s trade policies were a 
product of factors after the end of World War II. Japan, along with other East Asian countries 
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that had experienced rapid economic growth during the last half of the 20th century, was 
actively involved in intra-regional trade without formal institutions. Moreover, Japan had 
refrained from taking proactive initiatives in international politics following the Yoshida 
Doctrine73 (Munakata 2001, 2–4).  
Most critically, however, the trade friction with the US throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
drove Japan to commit to the WTO-based multilateral trade system as a means of defence 
against American bilateral pressure. The trade disputes during this period were very different 
in nature to Japan’s previous trade conflicts, as the source of the conflict arose from Japan’s 
high current account surplus and trade surplus in specific industries due to its rapid 
development of technology (Noguchi 2015, 185). These frictions continued to dominate Japan 
and the US’s trade relationship until the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Therefore, when 
it came to bilateral relations, Japan’s external trade policies tended to be conservative and 
improvised by its counterpart rather than strategically planned (Shujiro Urata, personal 
communication; METI official, personal communication). Moreover, the process of moving 
from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism was a constant source of domestic debate 
(METI official, personal communication; Munakata 2001; Yoshimatsu 2007).  
These memories prevailed Japanese economic policies until the early 2000s. As 
Taniguchi (2005), deputy secretary general of the OECD during the 1990s, recalls, Japanese 
society had not been very responsive to the idea of regionalism initially. According to a METI 
official (personal communication), trade negotiators were “almost haunted by the memories of 
the trade dispute with the US so that regionalism and bilateralism were considered like a taboo”. 
It was in line with this memory that they argued the FTAs74 discriminated against those outside 
the agreement, hence, they were not really FTAs.  
Like many other Asian countries, Japan at the time faced external pressures, such as the 
Asian financial crisis, the setback of multilateral dialogues at the WTO and APEC meetings, 
and the rise of bilateralism and regionalism in other parts of the world. To international 
changes, some officials in MOFA (Japan) and MITI were slowly leaning toward the new global 
                                   
73 See Chapter 4 for the Yoshida Doctrine and Japan’s early foreign economic policies, 
which emphasised economic development while relying on the US for security. 
74 This section uses FTA and EPA interchangeably, instead of PTA, as FTA was a commonly 
used term among Japanese officials before the use of EPA. 
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trend and argued that JSEPA could be an experiment for Japan’s further bilateralism (Munakata 
2001). However, MAFF strongly opposed the EPAs. The WTO also criticised Japan’s move 
toward the EPAs. The February 2001 visit to Tokyo of then-WTO Director-General, Mike 
Moore, was in line with the concern that Japan would undermine the rules of the multilateral 
system. As Japan expected to initiate formal EPA negotiations with Singapore at the end of the 
month, Moore criticised that the rise of bilateralism in East Asia would likely cause trade 
diversion, and thus a new round of WTO negotiations would be necessary to deter the trend 
(Asahi Shimbun 2001).  
Despite the external changes, Japan continued to be dominated by the ideas based on 
the WTO’s multilateral rules. Within MOFA (Japan) and MITI, domestic debate surrounding 
multilateralism and bilateralism was fierce. MOFA’s (Japan) main concern was validating 
bilateralism within the multilateral rules and maintaining the Japan–US relationship, so that 
Japan’s changes do not deliver the wrong message to the world. MOFA (Japan) still did not 
have a bureau responsible for FTAs until such a team of three officials was created in 1999 
under the supervision of Makio Miyagawa, then-Director of APEC and Developing Economies, 
Division at the Economic Affairs Bureau (J. Kim 2008, 699). Director Miyagawa played a 
leading role in convincing MOFA (Japan) officials to reach an agreement within the ministry 
so that Japan could begin a step-by-step bilateralism approach. Its first step would be JSEPA. 
As Director Miyagawa (personal communication) recounts: 
Singapore proposed an FTA to Japan. To our luck, late Prime Minister Obuchi decided 
to have an FTA with Singapore. It was sometime in mid-December in 1999, I can still 
remember the discussion. Prime Minister Obuchi and Prime Minister Go Chok Tong 
agreed to create a joint study group. MOFA disagreed with the creation of JSEPA, but 
agreed to the joint study group, which was held for one year. In 1999, the prime minister 
of Singapore proposed for a bilateral trade agreement with Japan, very sincerely, to 
Japan. I was the director in charge at the time. There were differences between MOFA 
and MITI. MOFA had the most rigid and negative views about FTA negotiations. MITI 
was quite flexible. So, I thought that I should change the views within MOFA. Our 
discussions centred on the merits and demerits of the FTAs. From the discussions, we 
agreed that, first, we should seek the lower parts (areas that had already been 
liberalised) between Singapore and Japan. Then, involving other nations to participate 
in EPAs could expand these lower parts. 
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MITI was also cautious about the negative influence of bilateralism and regionalism, 
though less so than MOFA or MAFF. The conflict between the new opinion leaders and the 
conventional supporters of the WTO became so famous that they were known as the “conflict 
between Munakata faction (FTA supporters) and Nakatomi faction (WTO supporters)” (J. Kim 
2008, 698). Within MITI, officials from the International Trade Policy Planning Office also 
played a critical role in convincing the pro-WTO groups within. MITI Deputy Director-General 
Ooshima, for example, organised study groups comprising officials from MOFA (Japan), 
MAFF, Ministry of Finance, MITI, and the young people involved in the agricultural and 
fishery sectors. He convinced them that the oppositions for FTAs had been formed without any 
logical reasoning and that Japan should move forward to catch up with the global trend (J. Kim 
2008, 703–704). The International Trade Policy Planning Office further investigated regional 
integration patterns worldwide to provide policy advice when necessary. However, it had been 
assumed, even within MITI, that Japan negotiated FTAs with geographically close partners—
with whom Japan had already established economic relations (Munakata 2001, 13). 
 
5.3.2 The Reinforcements: Japan’s Learning Experience from JSEPA and Japan–
Mexico EPA. Japan was one of the most careful initiators of the PTAs. For example, the name 
EPA75 initially was adopted instead of FTA when Japan first negotiated an agreement with 
Singapore, so as to minimise the domestic backlash from the sensitive agricultural and fishery 
sector. Because the name “Free Trade Agreement” could deliver a strong message to those hurt 
by the reduction of trade barriers, the Japanese bureaucrats chose the softer sounding name of 
“Economic Partnership Agreement” (Nihon Keisai Shimbun 2003a; METI official, personal 
communication). As its name suggests, Japan’s first EPAs were its attempt to experiment with 
the diverse possibilities of the new bilateral approaches of trade negotiations, while at the same 
time putting in the effort to convince the domestic agricultural group.  
When Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed JSEPA in 1999, the idea 
of bilateralism, as opposed to multilateralism, was considered negative within Japan. In 
addition, JSEPA could trigger more PTAs with the rest of the ASEAN countries, which would 
harm Japan’s agricultural and fishery sectors. Because the JSEPA negotiations were expected 
                                   
75 The label EPA was used to minimise domestic backlash, but also was used to differentiate 
Japan’s goals for a more advanced and comprehensive trade agreement than the FTAs. 
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to go without much opposition from either the public or domestic industry, its precedence was 
not enough to fully convince farmers or MAFF for further EPAs. Singapore’s tariff rates were 
already close to zero, had no significant production of agricultural goods, and already had 
advanced FTAs that included a diversity of trade issues (Watanabe and MOFA Economic 
Bureau EPA Negotiation Team 2007, 49).  
On the other hand, JSEPA could harm the ASEAN unity that Japan had supported for 
many years by approaching only Singapore. Furthermore, Japan was concerned that JSEPA 
could trigger exclusively Asian initiatives, which would cause backlash from other regions 
(Munakata 2001, 20–21). Moreover, MITI officials were concerned that the creation of an 
exclusive East Asian regional bloc could be the beginning of the collapse of the WTO, as it 
would be tantamount to discriminating against other regions. Similar rationalisations were 
prevalent among the MOFA (Japan) officials. They perceived that if Japan joined the tide of 
bilateralism and regionalism, blaming the slow progress of the WTO’s multilateral approach, 
the WTO-based multilateral co-operation could ultimately fall down (J. Kim 2008, 700–701). 
MAFF, on behalf of the sensitive sectors of Japan, was also cautious about reduction of tariff 
through PTAs and argued it should be further examined at the WTO negotiations (Yoshimatsu 
2007, 85). 
Hence, the focus of the five rounds of the Joint Study Group for JSEPA, held from 
March to September 2000, mainly dealt with the compatibility of the WTO and PTAs. 
Specifically, the study group underlined three questions on: 1) whether Japan will give up the 
WTO centred trade liberalisation; 2) how Japan will respond to the compatibility of PTAs with 
the WTO; and 3) how Japan can overcome the negative aspects of PTAs (Watanabe and MOFA 
(Japan) Economic Bureau EPA Negotiation Team 2007, 51). Because the “old thinking” of 
multilateralism dominated, Japan considered JSEPA an experiment; therefore, the negotiations 
involved only technocrats, rather than high-ranking officials (METI official, personal 
communication).  
As the negotiations progressed, however, policymakers began to see the positive side 
of PTAs, which could be reconciled with the WTO. Japanese negotiators perceived as a 
strength the fact that Singapore was pursuing advanced PTAs. They could achieve a significant 
level of tariff elimination beyond the requirement set by the WTO, remove some non-tariff 
barriers like the standards of manufactured goods, liberalise Japan’s and Singapore’s services 
and adopt advanced investment rules, and include the chapters for movement of people and 
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government procurement (Oike 2002, 24–28). During this process, PTAs attained status as 
“one of the tools” of trade liberalisation, while the WTO remained the main tool (METI official, 
personal communication).  
After JSEPA was signed in January 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and 
Mexican President Vicente Fox Quesada jointly announced the official launch of the Japan–
Mexico EPA in October 2002 (MOFA (Japan) 2002b). Even though the negotiation processes 
were not smooth internally and externally, the Japan–Mexico EPA negotiations became the 
turning point that shifted from “old thinking” to “new thinking”. Japan learned new negotiation 
techniques, began to convince the agricultural sector, and gained the general public’s 
acceptance on the PTAs.  
First, it was an opportunity to learn new negotiation techniques and to widen the trade 
scope, as used in NAFTA. Technique-wise, Japan adopted the import quota in agriculture and 
the negative list approach of negotiation in services. This was the first time that Japanese 
officials utilised import quotas as an additional tool to protect the agricultural sector, which 
they considered could be very useful for their subsequent EPAs with other ASEAN members 
(METI official, personal communication). As for the negative list approach in services, MOFA 
(Japan) and MITI officials were uncomfortable with Mexico’s strong insistence in the 
beginning, as it was incongruent with the WTO’s or JSEPA’s positive list negotiation approach. 
Some officials questioned the need for an EPA with Mexico because Japan had set its policy 
goal that Asia would be the starting point for its EPAs. However, the country also saw it as an 
opportunity; because Japan’s EPA policies emphasised region-based co-operation that began 
with Asia, it also saw the negative list approach as another tool that gave it the flexibility to 
shape the “Japan-style EPAs” in East Asia (Solís and Katada 2007b, 294–300). In terms of the 
trade scope, Japan newly added the Business Environment Chapter. 
Second, because JSEPA had no substantial influence over Japanese agriculture and 
fishery, the Japan–Mexico EPA was an opportunity to learn to reconcile the sensitive issues 
raised by the conflict in domestic interests (Watanabe and MOFA Economic Bureau EPA 
Negotiation Team 2007, 80). Even though the sensitivity of Japanese agricultural products was 
a major obstacle in Japan and Mexico’s negotiations, there was an achievement from the 
domestic contestations, particularly with MAFF and the agricultural groups. For example, the 
disagreement was at cross-roads when the second summit in October 2003 failed to be held, 
despite Prime Minister Koizumi and President Fox’s enthusiastic efforts to advance this 
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agreement. This was due to the failure of the earlier meeting at the minister level. The two sides 
could not agree on the terms of liberalisation for agricultural goods, particularly on tariff and 
import quotas on pork and orange juice (Khan 2003).  
This failure delayed the negotiations between Japan and Mexico. It also provided a 
lesson for the Japanese negotiators across the involved ministries that EPAs are not simply 
about economy, but also about domestic politics, which involve the process of reconciliation 
between the different ministries and the domestic industries. Particularly, MOFA and MITI 
officials considered that agricultural interests’ gradual acceptance on the need for the EPAs 
was one of the most significant gain from the Japan–Mexico EPA negotiations (METI official, 
personal communication). After the Japan–Mexico EPA was signed in September 2004, 
MAFF’s changed position was reaffirmed by then-Minister of MAFF, Kamei Yoshiyuki, 
through his statement that “we [MAFF] will strategically respond [to EPAs] by protecting what 
we must, while yielding what is necessary” (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun, 2004f). The change in 
MAFF’s position was once again reflected in the Green Asia EPA Promotion Strategy 
(midorino ajia EPA suisin senryaku), announced in November 2004, which accepted the need 
for the EPAs while allowing the new policy to coexist with the sensitive domestic industries. 
It clearly specified Japan’s future strategy by indicating that in promoting additional EPAs with 
Asian countries, which would begin with Thailand, Japan would balance out the stability and 
liberalisation for its agricultural, forestry and fishery sectors (Higashi 2008). 
The EPA with Mexico was different from MAFF’s previous encounter with its 
constituencies on the negotiation with Singapore or in multilateral agreements because it was 
about convincing them on what Japan could take and must relinquish in return (METI official, 
personal communication). Although not easy, it provided a positive learning experience to the 
Japanese officials and imbued them with confidence about bilateralism, which naturally lead 
to the pursuit of further individual EPAs with the other ASEAN countries. 
 
5.3.3 Continuation of the East Asia-based PTAs. Because Japan had come to clearly 
characterise itself as a good adherent of the WTO, when it turned away from the organisation’s 
multilateral approach, its main task was to justify to itself that EPAs complemented the 
limitations of multilateral negotiations. Specifically, they should have been stepping-stones to 
create a greater economic block that went beyond the rules set by the WTO and qualified as an 
agreement that satisfied the conditions as a developed nation, as specified by GATT Article 
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XXIV (Shujiro Urata, personal communication; Watanabe and MOFA Economic Bureau EPA 
Negotiation Team 2007). To fulfill these principles, it had to be sure that the EPAs were more 
comprehensive and advanced than the standards set by the WTO.  
The basic principles of the EPAs were agreed upon in a meeting involving the prime 
minister and ministers of different sectors meeting on 21 December 2004 (Watanabe and 
MOFA Economic Bureau EPA Negotiation Team 2007, 24). First, the principles of the WTO 
should be placed at the centre of all on-going EPA negotiations. Second, EPAs should promote 
structural reforms in Japan and its counterpart. Third, EPAs should be strategically beneficial 
in forming a politically and a diplomatically favourable international environment for Japan. 
To fulfill these conditions, economists at the study groups convinced the government that it 
was more realistic to pursue EPAs with more developed members of ASEAN first and less 
developed members later (Shujiro Urata, personal communication).  
Having the basic outlines established, Japan further considered the possibility of 
expanding EPAs with ASEAN as a stepping-stone for a more integrative regional economic 
block on its lead (Oike 2007). Japan began to consider ASEAN as one of the three pillars for 
the regional economic integration, together with North America and Europe. Beginning with 
the ASEAN bilateral EPAs and the ASEAN+1 PTA, it considered the possibility of expanding 
into a wider regional economic agreement, such as the ASEAN+3 PTA (METI official, 
personal communication).76 As Terada (2003, 267) explains, Japan’s role in East Asia was 
beginning to be newly defined to lead “stability and prosperity”, while keeping its connection 
with the US through APEC. Japan considered that the ASEAN+3 FTA would have political 
implications not only tying all 13 members, but also in promoting co-operation between the 
three Northeast Asian countries. Because AJCEP only agreed on provisions for Trade in Goods, 
Japan’s regional approach also had greater implication for its support for integration with 
ASEAN, which was based on ASEAN Centrality (former MOFAT official, personal 
communication; Myanmar Times 2017). 
Therefore, Japan’s first EPA with Singapore and the on-going FTA negotiation with 
Korea were considered as the foundations of further EPAs (Makio Miyagawa, former Director 
of Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), personal communication; Oike 2007). According to 
Director Miyagawa (personal communication), “We agreed that we should start from JSEPA 
                                   
76 Argument for ASEAN+6 only came in 2006 (METI Official, personal communication). 
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and expand them to create a level playing field, so that we could expand them to the regional 
FTAs. This was the original idea designed for the region”. While bilateral approach was given 
priority to ultimately build a regional arrangement. AJCEP would then become an extended 
stepping-stone for regional integration.77 To gain an impetus to bring growth to its economy, 
trade negotiators agreed that the ASEAN market should become its strategic starting point 
(Watanabe and MOFA Economic Bureau EPA Negotiation Team 2007, 23).  
In the meantime, the Japanese government had also stated in 2002 that it would refrain 
from negotiating PTAs with the US, Canada or the EU, considering the realistic constraints 
posed by its agricultural sector (Yomiuri Shimbun 2002a; MOFA (Japan) 2002a). In particular, 
it was tentative about potential trade diversion effects of the Japan-US PTA, which would 
severely discriminate against non-members (MOFA (Japan) 2002a). The positive experiences 
the Japanese policymakers had built, through the EPAs with Singapore and Mexico, had further 
strengthened the confidence in their existing focus in East Asia.  
At the economic co-operation inter-bureaucracy meeting in December 2004, Japan’s 
basic principles for EPAs were reconfirmed: it would continue to emphasise East Asia as the 
focus of its PTAs. Thus, aside from Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, which were under 
negotiation, Japan re-emphasised progressing further on Japan-Korea FTA78 and aiming for 
an early conclusion to AJCEP, as its negotiation was to take place in April 2005 (Nihon Nogyo 
Shimbun 2004e). Also, the EPA experience with Mexico would provide Japan a wider range 
of negotiation techniques that can be applied in Japan’s further EPAs within East Asia (Solís 
and Katada 2007b; METI official, personal communication) 
The long-term goal, then, was to further connect North America, as Japan considered 
Mexico as the access point to the NAFTA-based approach. To reach Europe, Japan sought to 
co-operate through Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (METI official, personal communication). 
                                   
77 While the sense of regionalism continued to be emphasised, it was weakened in the face 
of economic interest. That is, Japan wanted to promote the ASEAN+3 FTA, but because China’s 
agricultural sector was too sensitive for the Japanese side, instead it pursued negotiations with Korea 
and ASEAN (METI official, personal communication). 
78 Japan considered that the FTA with Korea could be another momentum to further specify 
the Japanese model of EPAs, as Korea was the only developed country within the region at the time, 
in addition to Singapore. Hence, it came as a big disappointment to MOFA (Japan) when the 
negotiation with Korea stalled in 2004 (Oike 2007, 21). 
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The Koizumi Doctrine, announced in January 2002, highlighted these policy guidelines 
emphasising region-based co-operation: 
The community I am proposing should be by no means an exclusive entity. Indeed, 
practical cooperation in the region would be founded on close partnership with those 
outside the region. In particular, the role to be played by the United States is 
indispensable because of its contribution to regional security and the scale of its 
economic interdependence with the region. Japan will continue to enhance its alliance 
with the United States. Cooperation with Southwest Asia, including India, is also of 
importance, as is cooperation with the Pacific nations through APEC, the Asia–Pacific 
Economic Cooperation group, and with Europe through ASEM, the Asia–Europe 
Meeting. APEC and ASEM are important tools to link our region to other regions. 
Through such efforts, the community I have described can take meaningful actions for 
regional cooperation. I believe that this in turn will benefit global stability and 
prosperity (Koizumi 2002). 
 
5.4 Testing the Hypotheses 
The examination of the interplay between the antecedent conditions and the 
reinforcements in Korea and Japan ideas are in fact valid variables in explaining the two 
countries’ PTA negotiation preferences with ASEAN. In fact, the direct trigger for divergence 
of Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation preferences with ASEAN came from ideas, rather than 
interests. The two countries shared similar international surroundings when they moved away 
from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism. The divergence in Korea’s and Japan’s 
preferences occurred even as there were no further changes in international structures, 
confirming the initial hypothesis that ideas are indeed significant variables in explaining the 
two countries’ different paths.  
The country-specific sub-hypotheses for Korea and Japan are consistent with the 
findings. In Korea, the new ideas substantially influenced changing the direction of the 
country’s negotiation preferences. When Korea shifted its emphasis from WTO-based 
multilateralism to bilateralism, it emphasised East Asian regionalism and FTAs based in East 
Asia. The region-based trade policies, however, soon changed after the Roh administration 
took office in 2003. During this transformation process, Minister Kim’s path-breaking liberal 
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ideas on cross-regionalism were critical in turning around President Roh’s region-focused 
policies. Despite Minister Kim’s lack of political background, his ideas were unprecedentedly 
influential in persuading the key decision makers. The negative experience Korea had in its 
first FTA with Chile bolstered the new idea further, as a breakthrough to restore Korea’s 
international credibility while redefining what it means to achieve negotiation efficiency. The 
turn of Korea’s bilateral negotiation approach with ASEAN to KAFTA occurred in line with 
these changes; the region-based approach would encounter a lesser amount of domestic 
opposition, while it could provide leverage for Korea to negotiate further cross-regional FTAs. 
In Japan, existing ideas on multilateral rules continued to be highly valued across 
domestic policymakers. Compared to Korea, which underwent a relatively smooth transitional 
phase from multilateralism to bilateralism, Japan had a greater inclination to adhere to 
multilateral rules due to the history of trade friction with the US. Even as Japan’s preferences 
were moving toward bilateralism and regionalism, domestic actors placed the highest priority 
on justifying bilateralism and regionalism’s discriminative nature and making sure they are 
compatible with the multilateral rules. Due to the continued dominance of multilateral ideas, 
Japan’s trade policies tended to be reserved and path-dependent; even the strongest proponents 
of PTAs remained focused in East Asia. Japan sought gradual approaches to negotiate PTAs, 
by prioritising neighbouring East Asia countries that had already established economic 
relationships with Japan. Japan’s positive learning experiences in its earliest PTAs—JSEPA 
and Japan–Mexico EPA—strengthened its confidence with its strategy, leading to the 
continued pursuit of existing path.  
The explanatory value of ideas in explaining Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation strategies 
is significant in explaining the divergence in the two countries. If it were not for the frictionless 
antecedent conditions that combined with negative reinforcement, which accommodated 
introduction of new ideas, it is most likely that Korea would have followed the evolutionary 
path Japan had pursued. Korea is likely to have placed East Asian regionalism as its top priority 
in the development path of its FTA Roadmap, instead of pursuing radical and ambitious cross-
regional strategy. These differences in Korea’s and Japan’s in ideas also defined Korea’s and 
Japan’s perception of interest with ASEAN. For Korea, its FTA with ASEAN became a 
stepping-stone for further cross-regional FTAs. For Japan, its PTAs with ASEAN were 
expected to serve as stepping-stones for a more integrative East Asian regionalism. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Even though Korea and Japan’s domestic interests had inclined toward the bilateral 
approaches of negotiation with ASEAN, neither of the two countries was entirely confident 
about their choices. Due to this instability of the equilibrium, the decisions could be reversed 
at any time. Thus, this chapter has examined the role of ideas in shaping Korea’s and Japan’s 
preferences for PTA negotiation approaches with ASEAN. It has demonstrated the long-term 
development of ideas shaped the policymakers’ preferences for the different “-ralisms”—
bilateralism, regionalism, cross-regionalism and multilateralism—in the two countries’ trade 
policies.  
In Japan, the new ideas occurred within the boundaries of the existing ideas. Japan had 
greater pressure about adhering to the multilateral rules established by GATT and the WTO. 
Added by the positive experiences in its very first EPAs with Singapore and Mexico, Japan 
continued to pursue individual EPAs with ASEAN, while trying to harmonise them under the 
region-based AJCEP. Like Japan, Korea also emphasised economic co-operation based in East 
Asia. In Korea, however, the path-creating ideas were enabled, altering the existing equilibrium, 
in the absence of Japan’s corresponding trade conflict with the US and the negative 
reinforcements in its earliest FTAs. The changes in leadership, added by Minister Kim’s neo-
liberal ideas, led to the breakthrough in Korea’s FTA policies. Thus, Korea placed greater 
emphasis on becoming the hub for FTAs. This meant the symbolic aspects of the FTAs were 
more important, which could work as leverage to convince other potential FTA partners, rather 
than pressured by the GATT Article XXIV as Japan was. Moreover, Korea faced strong 
oppositions from the agricultural sector during its very first FTA negotiations with Chile, which 
led the governmental officials to reconsider their initial perception of efficiency in choosing 
the different negotiation approaches. 
The stories this chapter tells are short of resolving the two remaining puzzles. First, the 
key decision makers were apparent in Korea, while Japan’s decision-making processes did not 
demonstrate any outstanding figure who had the power to push through one decision over 
another. In Korea, the key decision makers made quick decisions in a short time, convinced by 
Minister Kim’s path-creating ideas. In Japan, the decision-making process involved numerous 
key players with co-equal voices from the different ministries. Second, it is still ambiguous 
why Korea’s region-based KAFTA and cross-regional strategy has been more efficient and 
liberalising than Japan’s two-track and region-based strategy, in contrast to the two countries’ 
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initial calculations. The next chapter on institutions will address these remaining queries further 
in-depth. 
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Chapter 6 Intra-Democratic Variations in Trade Policies 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This final empirical chapter examines the institutional dimensions of Japan and Korea 
to account for the remaining puzzle from the previous chapters. First, the key decision makers 
were visible in Korea, while non-particular decision makers demonstrated the power to push 
through one decision over another in Japan. In Korea, the key decision makers made quick 
decisions in a short time, convinced by Trade Minister Kim’s path-creating ideas. In Japan, 
the decision-making process involved numerous key players from different ministries with 
coequal voices. Second, in contrary to the preliminary calculations, Korea’s region-based 
KAFTA and cross-regional strategy turned out to be more efficient and liberalising than 
Japan’s two-track and East Asia-based strategy.  
Despite similar interests and starting points, there was a divergence in Korea and 
Japan’s outcomes. This chapter contends this difference arose from variations in institutional 
structures, which distributed varying degrees of power to the decision makers. Specifically, 
this chapter focuses on how intra-democracy variation and bureaucracy discretion influences 
the centralisation of policy-making authority with regard to KAFTA, AJCEP and Japan’s 
EPAs with individual ASEAN countries in the early 2000s. Due to institutional differences, it 
was easier for the Korean government to opt for a more coherent, liberal and international 
strategy, whereas the Japanese government was inconsistent in its strategy, which at times 
inclined toward protectionist and parochial interests. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section examines the negotiation 
outcomes of KAFTA, AJCEP and Japan’s bilateral EPAs with individual ASEAN members. 
It assesses to what extent the existing literature’s view that Korea’s overall progress with its 
PTAs is more liberalising than Japan’s can be generalised to the cases of Korea and Japan’s 
PTAs with ASEAN. The sections three and four applies the analytical framework from 
Chapter 3 based on an atypical principal–agent literature that examines the reciprocal 
mechanisms of decision-making between the executive and legislative branches of 
government and bureaucracy. Specifically, it examines institutional developments in Korea 
and Japan and the development of their PTA institutions throughout the late 1990s to the 
early 2000s. The section then demonstrates how the differences in the executive, legislative 
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and bureaucratic relationships of these two countries resulted in a divergence from the 
institutionalisation of the PTA strategies, which is illustrated by Korea and Japan’s PTA 
strategies with ASEAN. The fifth section tests hypotheses and assess the institutional 
developments of Korea and Japan. The final section summarises the findings and concludes 
by providing the implications of this chapter. 
 
6.2 Korea’s and Japan’s Negotiation Approaches and Outcomes 
 
Existing studies generally acknowledge that Korea’s FTAs are more advanced in 
quality than Japan’s, not only in terms of content, but also the number and the influence of 
FTA partner countries (Choi and Oh 2011; Yoshimatsu 2012; Fujisue 2013). Likewise, the 
negotiation timeline in Chapter 1 shows that even though KAFTA was suggested later than 
AJCEP, KAFTA went into effect faster than most of Japan’s EPAs with individual ASEAN 
members. Before further examining the institutional differences of Korea and Japan in detail, 
this section examines to what extent KAFTA has been more efficient than AJCEP and 
Japan’s bilateral EPAs by assessing the length of negotiations and the degree and scope of 
liberalisations in the respective PTAs.  
One noticeable difference between KAFTA, AJCEP and Japan’s bilateral EPAs is 
how much time the negotiations took, from their official announcements to their entry into 
force. KAFTA was officially announced in October 2003. Official negotiations were 
announced in November 2004 and the agreement on trade in goods came into effect in June 
2007, with the exception of Thailand. In comparison, AJCEP was officially announced in 
January 2002 on Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Singapore. However, official negotiations 
did not launch until April 2005, five months later than that of KAFTA. The agreement on 
trade in goods came into effect in December 2008, approximately one and a half years later 
than KAFTA; this was also two years later than Japan’s original target of negotiating the 
agreement by 2006 (Nihon Nogyo Shimbun 2006).  
Most of Japan’s bilateral EPAs were slower compared to KAFTA, except for 
Singapore and Malaysia. JSEPA had taken effect since November 2002. Japan’s EPAs with 
Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Vietnam progressed together with 
AJCEP. JMEPA, JTEPA and JPEPA were proposed in parallel in early 2004, approximately 
four to five months earlier than KAFTA. Indonesia, Brunei and Vietnam consecutively 
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engaged in EPAs with Japan since 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. JMEPA took effect in 
July 2006, earlier than KAFTA. However, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines took effect 
in 2008, while Vietnam took effect in 2009. As Korea’s FTA took effect faster than most of 
Japan’s EPAs or AJCEP, Korea’s MOFAT (2006) considered that it had achieved its initial 
goal of gaining market access faster than its competitor, Japan. When comparing the tariff 
reduction phase out target years, the gap becomes more significant. Tariff elimination under 
KAFTA was realised in 2016, while AJCEP aims to eliminate tariff by 2018. 
Next, the most notable difference between KAFTA and AJCEP in traditional issues of 
trade is the services and investment provisions (see Table 1). Japan has not yet negotiated the 
provisions for services and investment as of 2017, in spite of its claim for adopting the single 
undertaking approach of negotiation. Thus, the comparison with regard to the level of 
liberalisation between KAFTA and AJCEP is possible only in trade in goods. According to 
Kuno (2012), KAFTA’s average tariff liberalisation rate is 94.5%, in comparison with 
AJCEP’s average of 92.8% (see Table 2). Data for Japan’s bilateral EPAs are unavailable. 
Both KAFTA and AJCEP have achieved the implicit minimum of tariff liberalisation target 
shared among WTO members, which is 90%, although some developed countries, such as 
Australia, insist the tariff should be eliminated by at least 95% of the total trade (Hamanaka 
2014, 59).  
In services, Ishido (2011) provides Hoekman Index79 on KAFTA and Japan’s 
bilateral EPAs. In KAFTA, the average commitment was rated 0.20, in comparison with 
AANZFTA’s 0.23 and CAFTA’s 0.12. Korea’s commitment scored 0.28, in comparison with 
ASEAN’s average of 0.19, indicating that Korea is committed for deeper liberalisation in 
services. Among the included service sectors, “travel agencies and tour operator services” 
had the highest average commitment score of 0.50. In terms of its contents, the KAFTA 
services agreement had similar patterns with AANZFTA and CAFTA, showing a correlation 
of over 0.8. As in the case of other ASEAN+1 PTAs, KAFTA is most committed in 
liberalising consumption abroad, or Mode 2, while most conservative in the movement of 
people, or Mode 4. When examining Japan’s bilateral EPAs with Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (data for Brunei is missing), the average score 
                                   
79 According to the Hoekman Index, the score runs from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates unbound 
(no legally binding commitment) and 1 indicates bound (no limitation) (Ishido 2011). 
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using Hoekman Index is 0.41, which is much higher than KAFTA’s 0.20 (see Table 3). The 
high score is attributable to Japan’s strong commitment in services liberalisation, which 
scored 0.58 on average across Japan’s six EPAs. The average score of ASEAN is 0.24, which 
is still higher than the commitment observed in KAFTA (Ishido 2011). 
When it comes to the inclusion of WTO plus issues, KAFTA is more comprehensive 
compared to AJCEP (see Table 1). Both agreements include intellectual property, 
information and communications, tourism, energy, human resource development, SPS, 
environment, agriculture, trade and investment, and SMEs, but are lightly committed in 
general, which are limited to joint research, co-operation, exchange of information or other 
forms of non-binding assistance. AJCEP also includes light commitments in competition, 
business environment, transportation and logistics, and paperless trading—these 
commitments are the most representative features of Japan’s EPAs. In addition, KAFTA 
includes light commitments in financial services, technology, natural resources, mining, 
construction technology, broadcasting, shipbuilding and maritime transport, and film 
production. When comparing KAFTA to Japan’s bilateral EPAs, however, Korea’s 
commitments are much less engaged in almost all areas of trade. 
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Table 6.1 Liberalisation Scope of Japan’s Seven Bilateral EPAs, AJCEP, KSFTA, 
KVFTA and KAFTA 
 
Source: compiled by the author from official texts of the respective FTAs. 
* Indicates light commitment (for example, limited to joint research, co-operation, exchange 
of information or other forms of non-binding assistance) 
 
 
 
JSEPA KSFTA JMEPA KAFTA JTEPA JIEPA JBEPA JPEPA AJCEP JVEPA KVFTA
2002 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2015
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes x x Yes Yes x Yes x x x
Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes
x Yes x x x x x x x x Yes
x Yes x x x x x x x x x
x Yes x x x x x x x x Yes
Information &
Communications
Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x
Financial Services Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes x Yes x
Business
Environment
x x Yes x Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes x
Technology Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x Yes* Yes* x x Yes*
Tourism Yes x Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x
Energy x Yes* x Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes* x x
Natural Resources x x x Yes* x Yes x x x x x
Human Resource
Development
Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes*
SPS x Yes Yes Yes* x x x x Yes Yes x
Environment x Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x
Agriculture &  etc x x Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x Yes* Yes* x
Trade &
Investment
Yes* Yes* x Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x
Manufacturing
Industries
x x x x x Yes* x x x x x
Transportation &
Logistics
x x x x x x Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x
Paperless Trading Yes Yes* Yes x Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes x
Road
Development
x x x x x x x Yes* x x x
Mining x x x Yes* x x x x x x x
Construction
Technology
x x x Yes* x x x x x x x
Broadcasting Yes* Yes* x Yes* x x x x x x x
Gaming &
Animation
x Yes* x x x x x x x x x
Shipbuilding &
Maritime
Transport
x Yes* x Yes* x x x x x x x
Film Production x Yes* x Yes* x x x x x x x
SMEs Yes x Yes* Yes* Yes* x Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* x
Yes Yes x x Yes Yes x Yes x Yes xLabor standards
Economic
cooperati
on
Services
Investment
Competition
Government
Procurement
Intellectuall Property
Transparancy
Telecommunications
E-Commerce
Entry into force
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Table 6.2 Tariff Liberalisation (%) in KAFTA and AJCEP 
  KAFTA AJCEP 
Brunei 99.2 97.7 
Cambodia 97.1 85.7 
Indonesia 91.2 91.2 
Laos 90 86.9 
Malaysia 95.5 94.1 
Myanmar 92.2 85.2 
Philippines 99 97.4 
Singapore 100 100 
Thailand 95.6 96.8 
Vietnam 89.4 94.4 
Korea 90.5   
Japan   91.9 
Average 94.5 92.8 
Source: Kuno (2012).  
 
Table 6.3 Hoekman Index Under Japan's Bilateral EPAs 
 Japan ASEAN Average 
JIEPA 0.68 0.14 0.41 
JMEPA 0.66 0.12 0.39 
JPEPA 0.65 0.27 0.46 
JSEPA 0.37 0.44 0.40 
JTEPA 0.6 0.15 0.37 
JVEPA 0.55 0.33 0.44 
Average 0.59 0.24 0.41 
 Source: Ishido (2011). Table recompiled by author. 
 
The brief overview of Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN suggests it is difficult 
to generalise on which country’s approach was more efficient in the end, due to the missing 
data on Japan’s bilateral EPAs and Korea’s bilateral FTAs, the lack of discussion on the 
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issues such as non-tariff barriers or RoO, and the absence of analysis on the dynamic trade 
effects of these agreements. The simple one-to-one comparison of AJCEP and KAFTA, 
however, suggests that KAFTA achieved higher liberalisation than AJCEP in a shorter period 
of time, without delay and with an earlier goal to phase out existing tariff barriers. One of the 
highest priorities of Japan and Korea in promoting the PTAs with ASEAN was to gain 
market access faster than its Northeast Asian competitors. In this respect, Korea progressed 
much faster to achieve this goal by reaching KAFTA faster than Japan, while minimising 
trade diversion effects from CAFTA. When it comes to Japan’s bilateral EPAs, however, its 
scope and content are much more in depth than KAFTA, particularly with Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Thailand. Thus, their long-term effects are still 
inconclusive. The mixed findings suggest that more work needs to be done to understand the 
effects of these agreements from a comprehensive view. 
For the purpose of this chapter, then, the better question to ask is why Japan’s PTAs 
with ASEAN went through prolonged negotiation processes without coherence, in both its 
bilateral EPAs and AJCEP. By contrast, how can the paradox of Korea’s efficient progress 
with its regional approach of negotiation, initially perceived to be inefficient, be explained? 
The following sections will examine the institutional dimensions of Korea and Japan to 
address these questions in detail. 
 
6.3 Korea 
 
6.3.1 Korea’s Centralised Institutional System and the Role of Bureaucracies. In 
Korea, the trade negotiation authority, as is the case for all other treaties, lies in the power of 
the executive branch of the government80 (The Constitution of the Republic of Korea n.d.). 
In contrast to countries such as the US or Japan, the legislative branch, the National 
Assembly, is only indirectly involved in the decision-making process by monitoring and 
giving consent to the negotiation results before ratifying FTAs (The Constitution of the 
                                   
80 Article 73 of the Constitution stipulates that: 
The President shall conclude and ratify treaties; accredit, receive or dispatch diplomatic 
envoys; and declare war and conclude peace. 
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Republic of Korea, n.d.).81 Therefore, the power of the legislative branch is weak when it 
comes to shaping the scope and content of the negotiations. It is more common that 
bureaucratic agencies correspond with legislators during the process of FTA negotiations by 
disclosing related materials to facilitate the ratification process (MOFA official, personal 
communication; Cheong and Cho 2009, 3). Interest groups cannot easily influence the 
political parties within the National Assembly because the party system is weakly linked to 
voters.82 Politicians deliberate their opinions directly to the National Assembly, and the 
differences in their opinions are adjusted within the party to which they belong. 
Moreover, administrative jurisdiction over the trade and goals of foreign economic 
policy are subject to changes in administrations. For example, Korean FTA strategies were 
based on the East Asia region promoted by the Kim administration until the end of 2002 (Cho 
and Park 2014). Although the elongated FTA negotiation with Chile83 was an exception to 
the region-based strategy of the Kim administration, the launch of FTA negotiations with 
Singapore was announced in October as the first step in negotiating more bilateral FTAs with 
the rest of the ASEAN members. The FTA between Korea and Japan had promised improved 
diplomatic relations between the two countries since the signing of the Joint Declaration of 
the New Korea–Japan Partnership for the Twenty-First Century and the Twenty-First Century 
Korea–Japan Economic Relations Study Group in 1998 (MOFA (Japan) 2003). In particular, 
the PTAs with Japan and Singapore were considered one of the major stepping-stones toward 
accomplishing East Asia-based economic regionalism. Hence, it was expected that the next 
administration would continue to carry out a negotiation for the Korea–Japan FTA.  
                                   
81 Article 60 of the Constitution stipulates that: 
[t]he National Assembly shall have the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of 
treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important 
international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to 
any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or people 
with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative matters. 
 
82 Bae et al. (2005, 158) suggested that there was no direct route for KPL or KAFF to 
communicate with the executive branch of the government, until the government officially reached 
the agricultural sector to explain the government’s position and persuade the farmers. 
83 Korea’s first FTA with Chile was an experiment with bilateralism and overcoming the 
trade diversion posed by NAFTA, but it was soon considered a failure for the Korean side. For further 
discussion on this topic, see Chapter 5. 
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However, the presidential election, to be held on 19 December 2002, did not 
guarantee a continuation of President Kim’s framework for Korean bilateralism. Farmers 
were demonstrating in the streets while the Korea–Chile FTA awaited ratification by the 
National Assembly in the first half of 2003. The presidential candidates, conscious of the 
rural votes, were requesting a reconsideration and careful progress with the upcoming FTAs 
(Seo 2002). 
The new administration began in February 2003, after the Democratic Party’s Roh 
won the election against the Grand National Party (Yonhap News Agency 2002c). Although 
the goals for FTAs changed from the Kim administration to the Roh administration, the 
concentration of trade negotiation authority in the executive branch of government allowed 
the institutionalisation process under the Roh administration to work on building a highly 
centralised, top-down legal mechanism for the FTAs. Under the Roh administration, the role 
of bureaucracy increased as the president delegated significant decision-making power to his 
newly appointed trade minister. The mutual reinforcement between the president and 
bureaucracy further advanced the efficiency, scope and content for building and promoting 
FTA strategies. 
Even though Roh belonged to the leftist liberal party, he was in favour of the FTA 
policies because he was willing to promote the agreements in succession of his predecessor, 
President Kim, who also belonged to the Democratic Party. Despite strong opposition from 
the agricultural group and extreme leftists, Roh contended that “FTA is not an ideology, nor 
selling off our country—it is about eating and living (Policy Briefing 2007)”. Roh’s economic 
policy, regarding FTAs, was characterised by his role of representing the entire nation as his 
constituency and his pragmatism for considering FTAs as a means to achieve economic 
growth (Cho and Ko 2003). Unlike most of the previous administrations, Roh did not 
reassemble government organisations. He kept jurisdiction over trade under MOFAT, which 
has been restructured under President Kim in 1998.84 The trade minister continued to be 
responsible for trade negotiations and signing FTAs under the president’s direct order 
(Cheong and Cho 2009b).85  
                                   
84 President Kim rehoused the function of trade from the MOTIE to the MOFA (Korea) in 
February 1998. 
85 Article 30 (1) of the Government Organization Act stipulates that:  
184 
 
However, President Roh did restructure MOFAT’s internal design to streamline the 
trade function of the ministry to promote greater centralisation in FTA negotiations. The 
power of MOFAT was demonstrated during this process. Starting in late 2003, discussions 
within the government continued for almost a year on how to centralise the institutional 
aspect of FTAs. The Presidential Committee on Government Innovation (PCGI)86 and 
MOFAT had contrasting opinions on whether to separate the trade function as an independent 
body under the president’s direct orders, similar to that of USTR, or to supplement the 
existing system. MOFAT argued that it would be too costly and inefficient if all of the trade 
functions of the ministry were transferred again only five years after it had been merged 
under MOFAT. Conversely, PCGI contended that the existing system was insufficient to 
overcome the conflict between various ministries and the drastic changes in global trade 
trends (Kim and Chae 2013).  
Facing strong opposition from MOFAT, the Roh administration decided to keep the 
trade function under MOFAT with internal restructuring. Hence, the president issued the FTA 
Negotiation Procedure Rules as an executive order in June 2004 to “regulate FTA related 
organization, management, negotiation procedure to promote FTAs efficiently, and 
encourage people’s understanding and participation” (National Law Information Center, 
n.d.). The FTA Negotiations Bureau was also created in October 2004. The bureau was 
divided into four divisions: policy planning, regional negotiation, goods, and services and 
investment. Newly appointed officers mostly comprised civilian experts and officers from 
other ministries to reinforce the expertise and openness of the trade sector of the ministry 
(Policy Briefing 2004). 
PCGI’s concern that the conflict between various ministries would cause delays in 
FTAs was resolved efficiently through close executive–bureaucratic relations. As Yoon-Jae 
Cho (2009), who was economic advisor for President Roh, explains, one distinctive feature in 
                                   
“[t]he Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade shall exercise general supervision over 
diplomacy, trade negotiations with foreign countries, and general management and 
coordination of trade negotiations, treaties and other international agreements, protection of 
and support for Korean nationals abroad, and research on international situations and 
immigration.” (as cited in Cheong and Cho 2009b) 
86 PCGI was established on 7 April 2003 to systemically assess state affairs to innovate and 
promote national development. PCGI is under direct presidential order. 
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Korea’s appointment of ministers was that the selection was made according to their 
bureaucratic background, expertise and personal relationship with the president. Therefore, 
the president’s role, judgment and connection with the trade minister, instead of the party’s 
discipline, became the most crucial factors in determining a policy. The former minister for 
trade, Taeho Bark (personal communication), reaffirms these features: 
 
In Japan, the prime minister is politician, and the ministers of the different 
bureaucracies are also politicians. Everyone is politician. Therefore, the prime 
minister cannot wield big influence. In contrast, Korea has a presidential system. The 
trade minister does not have a great power, but in an event of conflict, it becomes 
easier for him to grasp the overall situation. For example, if an FTA negotiation is 
stalled due to opposition from the Ministry of Agriculture, the trade minister can 
report this situation to the president for his orders. This kind of system eases the inter-
bureaucracy conflict, making it conducive to come up with a unified strategy. 
 
Furthermore, the discretion of the minister of trade was strengthened. The role of 
minister for trade had been constrained by the minister of foreign affairs due to the 
administrative structure, and the function of trade had been rehoused under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Therefore, under MOFAT, the trade minister is subordinate to the minister of 
foreign affairs, despite its equal label as “minister” in English.87 However, as the importance 
of trade grew, the Roh administration gave a significant degree of discretion and power to the 
minister for trade, and the trade part of the ministry witnessed an unprecedented change 
(Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication).  
For example, Roh personally approached Hyun Chong Kim, then a senior lawyer in 
the WTO’s Appellate Body Secretariat and Legal Affairs Division, for his expertise in trade 
affairs. He was requested to take part in MOFAT as a deputy director instead of minister for 
trade considering his relatively young age—he was still in his mid-forties (H. Kim 2006, 15). 
Kim had initially declined the offer because he had already experienced how little discretion 
                                   
87 MOFAT and Organization Act (외교통상부와 그 소속기관 직제, Presidential Decree 
no. 17959) Article 22(2) stipulates that the Chief Director of Trade Negotiation should function as the 
representative of trade and be labelled as “Minister for Trade” in English (National Law Information 
Center n.d.) 
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he had in the deputy role in the WTO Legal Affairs Division. However, due to President 
Roh’s strong request, Kim initiated his position at MOFAT as the deputy director and soon 
became the minister for trade from 2004 to 2007. As the Minister for Trade, Kim was granted 
independent decision-making on the appointment of personnel, received strong budget 
support, and was backed by Roh when faced with criticism or stagnant decision-making 
processes (H. Kim 2006; Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication), 
which had a significant influence on centralising the institutional features of the FTAs. 
In regard to the detailed scope and content of the FTAs, MOFAT bureaucrats with 
expertise in this area played central roles, except for Korea’s two contentious FTAs with 
Chile and the US. Therefore, the early stages of making FTA policy were mostly shaped 
through a bottom-up process. MOFAT officers first wrote an internal report; then they put it 
through inter-ministry co-ordination, and only then did they report it to the president. During 
this process, the policy direction itself was easily determined (Hansu Kim, former KAFTA 
Chief Negotiator, personal communication).  
The National Assembly was actively involved in the ratification process of Korea–
Chile FTA and Korea–US FTA; other FTAs were given consent without much debate due to 
their relative insignificance in terms of their trade impact or drawing domestic public 
sentiment (Hyung-dae Park, Policy Director of KPL, personal communication; Minsu Han, 
General Manager of KAFF, personal communication). To give an example, the Korea–Chile 
FTA demonstrated that even though negotiation processes are relatively isolated from 
domestic constituencies, the ratification process is not (Yu 2006). When conducting FTA 
negotiations with domestically contentious counterparts, most opposition from domestic 
interests occurs during the last stages of negotiations. This can cause serious delays or 
fragmentation in public opinions and push the government to come up with reactive 
compensation measures (Hansu Kim, former KAFTA Chief Negotiator, personal 
communication). This also meant that little information was disclosed to the public, which 
raised the anger of the sensitive sectors, such as agricultural and fishery, in the absence of a 
channel for lobbying the government. To quote Policy Director Park of KPL, 
The National Assembly only has the authority to take a yes-or-no vote in ratifying an 
FTA. According to the current law, the National Assembly has access to the text of 
the negotiated FTA, not to the information on how the agreement is actually 
negotiated. There had always been complaints about the lack of accessibility to this 
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kind of information. The politicians, too, did not present their opinions based on the 
party discipline, but presented their opinions based on the president’s orders. These 
problems existing across the executive and the legislative branches of government 
meant that our (agricultural groups’) pressure through the National Assembly did not 
have any decisive and direct impact on shaping FTA policies. (personal 
communication) 
 
6.3.2 Institutional Elements in the FTA Roadmap and the KAFTA. Soon after the 
inauguration of President Roh, the government announced new strategies for the FTAs. A list 
of strategic goals, labelled as the FTA Roadmap (roadmap), were announced in August 2003, 
which established Korea’s short- and long-term plans to become a global hub for the FTAs. 
This indicated that Korea shifted away from its region-oriented economic co-operation to 
pursue cross-regional FTAs. President Roh firmly believed the principles of market economy 
and that “FTA policy needs to be pursued proactively under a big unified frame” (H. Kim 
2006, 53). This broad strategy was solely based on the power of the executive branch of the 
government; Trade Minister Kim’s professional expertise and his personal development of 
relationship with President Roh strengthened the President’s conviction that FTAs could 
promote Korea’s economic growth. The roadmap was quickly adopted despite the existence 
of internal opposition because the president pushed for the strategy believing it would 
enhance Korea’s market access and its diplomatic leverage.88 
The roadmap was created based on the four core partner selection criterions (see 
Figure 2). The first was about the selection of an FTA partner, which emphasised the 
counterparty’s economic characteristics. For example, the negotiators would evaluate the 
potential partner country by asking questions, such as whether the partner is “an advanced 
country with a large economy” or “a developing country but abundant in human and natural 
resources” (Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication). The basic aim 
in assessing the economic benefit and cost was to secure an external source of economic 
growth, considering Korea’s high dependence on trade. The second criterion focused on the 
political and diplomatic implications of the FTA. The third criterion involved how much the 
                                   
88 See Chapter 5 for details on Korea’s region-based strategy changed to the global-hub 
strategy. 
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counterparty wanted to have an FTA with Korea. The final criterion considered the 
possibility in which the conclusion of an FTA with a counterpart would help promote FTAs 
with economically significant partners, such as the US and the EU (Taeho Bark, former 
Minister for Trade, personal communication; FKI 2004; Y. Kim 2014; C. Kim 2015). 
The roadmap was pursued under what is called the “simultaneous multi-track 
strategy”. Through this strategy, Korea aimed at signing multiple FTAs simultaneously with a 
selective list of countries. In the short term, which was roughly defined as less than five 
years, Korea aimed to conclude negotiations with relatively small economies that would have 
a smaller economic impact, such as Singapore, Chile, Mexico and the members of ASEAN. 
Japan, Canada and EFTA would have a greater economic implication for Korea but were 
selected as potential partners for their political and diplomatic relations with Korea and their 
significance in its promotion of future FTAs with big and advanced economies. In the 
medium and long term, approximately defined by the government as five to ten years, Korea 
aimed to expand its effort to approach bigger economies. The medium-term goals specifically 
targeted the US and the EU, whereas the long-term goals targeted China, which was expected 
to have a greater conflict with Korea due to the agricultural sector. Under this single 
framework, Roh placed a priority on ASEAN because it would be one of the most practical 
goals to achieve in the short term. The short-term goals considered the fact that Korea has a 
five-year, single-term presidency (Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal 
communication; FKI 2004; H. Kim 2006; Y. Kim 2014; C. Kim 2015). 
The details regarding Korea’s FTA with ASEAN were mostly delegated to the FTA 
Negotiations Bureau. The specifics included assessing negotiation approaches with ASEAN, 
the scope of trade to be included, and the degree of trade liberalisation. In the joint study 
meetings held five times between March and August 2004, bureaucrats provided crucial data 
to support the decision to initiate the KAFTA negotiations. FTA Deputy Director General 
Han-Su Kim led the Korean side of the negotiations, and Singapore’s David Chin, Director of 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, led the ASEAN side of the negotiations.  
The first meeting was held in Jakarta in March and was a preliminary meeting 
between the government officials and industry representatives of both parties, where the two 
parties exchanged market trends, systems, and plans for their respective countries; set the 
timeline and structure of the joint study result; and exchanged ideas on the negotiation scope 
and methods (J. Lee 2004). The Korean side was composed of government officials from the 
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different ministries, including MOFAT, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the 
Ministry of Industry and Resources. It was in the second meeting, held over two days in 
Seoul, that the ASEAN side demanded that the KAFTA progress as quickly as possible 
(Yonhap News Agency 2004). Moreover, the two parties both agreed that it would be best if 
Korea and ASEAN negotiated multilaterally, instead of through 10 bilateral FTAs (Ryu 
2004).  
The hierarchical division between the executive leadership and the administrative role 
of bureaucracy based on its expertise further strengthened Korea’s commitment to KAFTA. 
In regard to the content of KAFTA, FTA Deputy Director General Han-Su Kim (personal 
communication) explained that it was “solely decided on by the bureaucracy group”, based 
on their experience and expertise in the area, and “the only occasion the President showed 
great interest and exerted direct influence on the choice of bilateral partner was with the 
United States”. Deputy Director Kim further added, “When we reported (the details of 
negotiations) about our FTA with ASEAN, the case did not receive particular attention nor 
orders from the president”. Thus, in regard to negotiation scope and technique, the 
negotiators had leeway in deciding the content as long as it fit the broader framework of the 
roadmap.  
In contrast, interest groups had little room to participate in these negotiations. The 
opportunity for public or private interest groups to participate in the negotiation approach was 
provided by the government, twice in August of that year, and only as a one-time event. As 
former MOFA (Korea) official notes (personal communication), the Korean government 
considered that it would be more efficient to deal with the opposition in one queue through 
KAFTA, rather than having to face the opposition through 10 bilateral FTAs. Confronting 
fierce opposition from the agricultural groups during the Korea–Chile FTA negotiations, the 
region-based approach was seen much more realistic. Such consideration demonstrates that 
the agricultural groups had an indirect way of pressuring the government but did not have any 
official gateway to influence the government’s unilateral decision-making processes. 
When the first Korea–ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting was held in Jakarta in September 
2004, Minister for Trade Hyun Chong Kim (2006, 53–82) made substantial progress with 
ASEAN. As president’s direct delegate, he was given discretion and responsibility in the 
practical negotiations. Trade Minister Kim considered that accessing the ASEAN market 
faster than China and Japan was the most important goal. Thus, he aimed to approach them 
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all together as fast as possible. Trade Minister Kim suggested that KAFTA conclude before 
the target years of the CAFTA or the AJCEP, which were 2010 and 2012, respectively. This 
was seen by the ASEAN counterpart, who initially proposed 2014 to Korea as the target year, 
as a pleasant surprise. The ASEAN counterpart thought Korea would be conservative in its 
liberalisation considering its little experience with FTAs. The target year had not been 
previously approved in the inter-ministerial meeting or by the president when the agreement 
was made, but Trade Minister Kim’s decision was welcomed when he returned from the 
negotiations. President Roh and Trade Minister Kim expected that progressive FTA strategies 
would cause domestic backlash, but they also considered them inevitable and necessary for 
the Korean economy to move on to the next stage. 
 
Figure 6.1 The FTA Roadmap 2003 
◆ Partner selection criteria: 
1. Economic benefit 
2. Political and diplomatic implications 
3. Counterparty’s will 
4. Whether the FTA and the partner will help promote FTAs with big and advanced 
economies 
◆ Strategies 
1. Simultaneous multitrack strategy 
2. Advanced and big economies 
◆ Short-term goals: Japan, Singapore, ASEAN, Canada, EFTA, Mexico and Chile 
◆ Medium- and long-term goals: China, India, the US, the EU, Korea–China–Japan FTA, 
EAFTA, MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) 
 
(Source: Taeho Bark, former Minister for Trade, personal communication; FKI 2004, 6; C. Kim 
2015) 
 
 
6.4 Japan 
 
6.4.1 Japan’s Decentralised Institutions and the Role of Bureaucracies. The power 
of the executive branch in Japan is known to be weak, even among other world parliamentary 
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systems. Even after the electoral reforms in 1996 and the civil service reforms conducted 
from the late 1990s through the early 2000s (Kaihara 2008), fragmented and reactive 
decision-making trends continued to dominate Japanese politics. Institutionalisation of PTAs 
was no exception. Japanese Constitution Article 73 stipulates that the Cabinet shall “conclude 
treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval 
of the Diet (The Constitution of Japan n.d.)”. Therefore, the Cabinet has the formal authority 
to make decisions on PTAs, but the influence of the Diet can intervene with flexibility, 
depending on how it is interpreted. The Constitution has never been revised since its 
implementation in 1947, and most decision-making procedures have been shaped by informal 
practices (Oros 2014). In the realm of PTAs, the de facto negotiation authority has been 
delegated to the related bureaucracies, which have been heavily influenced by the Diet (Solís 
2010). The PTA decision-making, therefore, have been a bottom-up process. 
The fact that the early stage of the PTA institutionalisation was promoted under the 
three prime ministers of LDP—Prime Minister Keio Obuchi (July 1998 to April 2000), 
Yoshiro Mori (April 2000 to April 2001) and Junichiro Koizumi (April 2001 to September 
2006)—meant that it was also subject to faction-based politics within the party. Under the 
two-party system, LDP managed to dominate Japanese politics until the 1990s. However, it 
became fragmented due to intra-party competition triggered by its electoral system—a 
multimember district with a single non-transferrable vote. It has caused LDP candidates to 
compete with one another to attract loyal voters and receive funding from the party instead of 
co-operating to promote a unified ideology. Even after the system has been reformed to some 
extent since 1994 through the adoption of Mixed Member Majoritarian system, it did not 
fundamentally eliminate the LDP traditions (Krauss and Naoi 2011).89 Executive turnover is 
frequent due to the strong presence of factions. Therefore, the prime minister’s main tasks 
involve co-ordinating differences that exist across factions and making sure that members of 
the Cabinet represent all factions within the party. The prime minster is first among the equal 
faction leaders instead of a powerful representative of the party or an executive leader. For 
                                   
89 According to Krauss and Naoi (2011, 59), the Mixed Member Majoritarian system is a 
“hybrid of 300 Single Member District seats and 180 Proportional Representation seats”. Although 
the characteristics of the previous electoral system were not completely eliminated, the change gave 
rise to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPF). Representatives in each district were made to respond to 
the greater variety of interest groups than before.  
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this reason, Cabinet appointments have been more about the distribution of power within the 
party rather than capability or shared goals (Neary 2004). 
Also, LDP’s fragmentation has been divided by special interests and rivalry among 
bureaucracies, namely between METI and MAFF. These two bureaucracies are popular 
among LDP, as opposed to other ministries, such as MOFA, because they relate directly to 
votes and fundraising (Tatebayashi 2004). The party–bureaucracy relationship reflects the 
importance of domestic constituencies, particularly for MAFF. Since the 1950s, LDP’s 
“agricultural tribe” (nōrin zoku) has built its political support on an over-representation of 
rural areas and an institutionalised link with organised agricultural groups (Yoshimatsu 2012, 
197). In contrast, other LDP politicians, who have a close relationship with industries, have 
coalesced with METI (Mulgan 2008, 172). Although bureaucrats and politicians have the 
same end goals, the primary motivations for PTA policy among bureaucrats and politicians 
diverge because politicians are driven by parochial interest, which causes internal conflicts.90 
In this process, Keidanren (The Japanese Business Federation)’s participation in shaping 
Japan’s trade policy is more direct (e.g. government study groups, policy papers, and 
interaction with international and domestic businesses and politicians) than the agricultural 
groups that pressure the government as constituencies.  
Third, in addition to the division by sectoral interests, the four bureaucracies directly 
related to PTAs—MOFA, METI, MOF and MAFF—have been divided over their policy 
orientations. When it comes to the scope of trade agreements, in particular, METI, MOFA 
and MAFF have competed over the negotiation content. MOF has been less involved in this 
process because its responsibility concerns the implementation of PTAs. These bureaucracies 
have traditionally occupied central roles shaping Japanese policy throughout the post-war 
period, especially policies regarding economic growth. Because the bureaucracies consisted 
of a group of elites with expertise, they also produced many of Japan’s prime ministers 
(Nakasone 1995). Furthermore, because of the high turnover rate of the Cabinet, bureaucratic 
                                   
90 At times, MAFF and LDP politicians diverged over how to implement the same policy 
goals. For example, the agricultural sector was shrinking at a fast pace due to the rise of 
manufacturing industries throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While both MAFF and LDP politicians 
shared the view that Japan’s agricultural sector needed a change, their suggested approaches were at 
the opposite ends. MAFF wanted a fundamental change to increase the agricultural sector’s 
competitiveness, while LDP wanted more protectionist and closed policies, such as imposing an 
import quota or providing subsidies to keep its rural vote intact. 
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elites have had greater discretion in shaping public policies. According to Nester (1990, 142–
143), Japanese bureaucrats can be characterised by “elitism, mission, and intelligence”, 
which are “reinforced by their socialisation into their particular ministry, the role in 
promoting their ministry’s interests, and their constant turf battles against other ministries”. 
As a result, the role of the minister is limited to leading turf battles across bureaucracies, 
instead of shaping actual policies. 
Due to the complex power relationship between executive, legislative and 
bureaucratic, the institutionalisation process of PTAs has been characterised by informal 
practices of bottom-up decision-making, referred to as the “pre-evaluation system (事前審査
制度)” and the “ruling party and government’s dual structure (与党と政府の二元構造)” 
(Fujisue 2013). The pre-evaluation system includes LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council; 
special interest politicians; Executive Council; and the bureaucratic vice ministers’ meeting, 
where PTA policies are evaluated by the ruling party in the different ministries, such as 
MOFA, METI, MOF and MAFF, which acts separately from the Cabinet. When the parties 
submit proposals, they are examined at the Cabinet meeting, and the results are deliberated by 
the Diet. The decision-making at the party level is particularly important because their 
decisions are adjusted prior to deliberation by the Diet. Once the decisions are passed to the 
Diet, LDP legislators are obliged to agree with the decisions that have been made at the prior 
level under the pre-evaluation system (Mulgan 2008, 172–173; Solís 2010, 227).  
 
6.4.2 Japan’s Institutional Elements in Its Bilateral EPAs and AJCEP. The 
influence of Japan’s bottom-up institutionalisation of PTAs is apparent in the way it 
negotiated PTAs with ASEAN. Even though Japan places high priority on trade, support for 
agricultural sector is mainly due to political divide between ministries and the weak decision-
making power of prime minister, rather than for the economic reasons. (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communication Official, personal communication).  
From the late 1990s to 2001, no substantive effort had been made to institutionalise 
PTAs. The idea of bilateralism itself was very contentious during this period, as illustrated in 
Chapter 5. Therefore, Japan’s first EPA with Singapore, proposed under Prime Minister 
Obuchi—with the first negotiation initiated under Prime Minister Mori—was considered a 
test case, which would not cause substantial impact on the Japanese economy. For this 
reason, it was mostly bureaucrats with technical expertise who were involved in the 
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negotiations, instead of higher-ranking bureaucrats or politicians (METI Official, personal 
communication). 
The scene did not change much when the Koizumi Cabinet came into power in April 
2001. Prime Minister Koizumi was an anomaly in Japanese politics because he was elected 
for his popularity instead of his factional status in LDP. His popularity was based on his 
promise to perform structural reforms and bring change to the discredited political system 
under the slogan “destroying the LDP” (Mulgan 2005; Solís 2010). With regard to PTAs, 
Koizumi had promised to revitalise the Japanese economy and agricultural sector through the 
promotion of PTAs (Koizumi 2003; Mulgan 2006). Also, his policies favoured PTAs with 
ASEAN, following the LDP’s pro-ASEAN policies (Kamikubo 2010). 
For example, in the House of Councillors election in 2003, Koizumi emphasised the 
PTA progresses with Korea, Thailand, Phillipines, Malaysia and Mexico as a way out of 
Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation; but he also underscored Japan’s commitment to 
bring growth to the agricultural sector through structural reforms and doubled expansion of 
exports within 10 years, raising the self-sufficiency rate up to 50 per cent (Koizumi 2003). 
Also, he had declared to co-ordinate the inter-bureaucracy discords through the establishment 
of the “Meeting on FTA-Related Bureaucracies” in December 2003 and the “Economic 
Partnership Related Ministers’ Meeting” in March 2004 (Mulgan 2006, 9; Song 2012, 115)91 
Even though Prime Minister Koizumi began with ambitious aims to reform the 
agricultural sector and coordinate inter-ministry conflict, his goals were achieved with 
limitations. To quote Mulgan (2006, 9), “in the clash of interests between Japan’s 
manufacturing exporters and investors on the one hand, and agricultural interests on the 
other, the latter set the ultimate limits to any agreement.” Moreover, Koizumi considered 
policies as tools to win political victories and maintain his popularity; thus, he was sometimes 
criticised for being “deaf to diplomacy,” despite his reputation for being a “lion prime 
minister” for his strong leadership. (Kamikubo 2010; J. Kim 2008, 703–704).  
Illustrating this point, MAFF, METI, and MOFA shaped most strategy details for 
Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN, both as individual members and as a region, after Prime Minister 
                                   
91 See the next section (6.4.3) for further the development on Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
endeavor to resolve for the inter-ministry conflict. 
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Koizumi provided broader policy goals by proposing Japan–ASEAN initiatives92 in January 
2002 (Kamikubo 2010). In regard to the PTA strategies, the inter-bureaucracy conflict mainly 
involved METI, MOFA and the competition over bureaucratic goals based on expertise and 
elitism. When it came to the content of the PTAs, METI and MOFA (Japan) faced opposition 
from MAFF, which was divided along sectoral lines of interest due to domestic political 
pressures. MOF was rarely involved in these battles because its interest mainly involved 
technical issues as it dealt with the PTA implementation stage (e.g. customs procedures). 
In the absence of the executive branch’s overarching power, and due to the strong 
existence of bureaucratic expertise, it was mainly the technocrats of MOFA and METI that 
shaped the negotiation approaches for the PTAs with ASEAN (METI official, personal 
communication; Makio Miyagawa, former Director of Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), 
personal communication; Solís 2010). According to the former director for JSEPA 
Negotiations, Makio Miyagawa (personal communication): 
Prime Minister Koizumi thought that there should be good integration between Japan 
and ASEAN. So he proposed in January 2002 that Japan seek AJCEP. We were quite 
happy to see the prime minister’s political initiative. After the prime minister took the 
initiative, the bureaucrats discussed the negotiation details. 
High level of discretion given to MOFA and METI bureaucrats further drove 
fragmentation across the two ministries. Due to the co-equal power MOFA and METI had 
over PTAs, the process in which the decisions were made tended to be improvised in 
reflection of the expertise demanded by bureaucrats of both ministries. In particular, MOFA 
gave greater focus to diplomatic and security objectives than economic ones, by emphasising 
                                   
92 Kamikubo (2010, 65) well summarises Koizumi’s five initiatives:  
“(1) cooperation in education and human resources development including the dispatch of 
governmental missions to ASEAN to promote exchange between universities; (2) 
designation of 2003 as the Year of Japan-ASEAN Exchange (the stimulation of exchange in 
a broad range of areas, including cultural and intellectual exchange); (3) a Japan-ASEAN 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (strengthening economic partnership in areas ranging 
from trade and investment to science, technology and tourism; it was suggested that concrete 
proposals should be put forward at the Japan-ASEAN Summit); (4) East Asian Development 
beginning with the convening of a meeting at which participants could discuss the best 
courses for future development and cooperation to achieve a higher level of prosperity and 
development in the region; and, (5) enhanced security cooperation between Japan and 
ASEAN including transnational issues”.  
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strategic use of PTAs such as promoting regional ties, political stability, governance, 
democracy and the WTO standards.93 MOFA’s advocacy for the bilateral approach of 
negotiation with individual ASEAN countries was in line with this position. MOFA (n.d.) 
considered that reaching ASEAN as a region is not efficient, because it prioritised: 
• strengthening relations with ASEAN as the basis of Japan’s diplomacy with Asia; 
• promoting economic stability of ASEAN as an essential factor for the stability of East 
Asia; 
• considering a Japan–ASEAN economic partnership as the core of East Asia’s overall 
economic partnership; 
• aiming for EPA/FTA integration with ASEAN; 
• concluding an agreement with member countries that are ready and have capacity for 
                                   
93 MOFA, independently from METI, announced “Our Country’s FTA Strategy (我が国の
FTA戦略)” in October 2002 (Nihon Keisai Shimbun 2002; MOFA (Japan) 2002a; MOFA (Japan) 
n.d.). The strategy included five criteria to decide when and with whom Japan should prioritise its 
PTA negotiations: economic, geographic, political and diplomatic, feasibility and time factors (MOFA 
(Japan) n.d.): 
1. Economic standards: revitalise the economies of Japan and the counterparty, respond to 
Japan’s industries, overcome disadvantages caused by the negotiation of FTAs in other 
countries, promote domestic reforms by relaxing restrictions and conducting structural 
reform, and respond to countries with slow liberalisation; 
2. Geographical standards: strengthen regional ties (East Asian regional economic ties in 
response to the RTAs in North America and the EU, and stabilise East Asian economies), and 
strengthen strategic relations with other regions and countries; 
3. Political and diplomatic standards: strengthen friendship through economic ties, diplomatic 
use of economic ties (in particular in response to changes in strategic relations with major 
powers), and promote political stability, governance, and democracy; 
4. Feasibility: determine the realistic negotiability of an agreement (reviewed through feasibility 
studies, proportion of sensitive goods, counterpart’s will and Japan’s domestic needs); and 
5. Time standards: consider Japan’s negotiation capacity, relationship with WTO negotiations, 
FTA/EPA progress in other countries, changes in political, diplomatic, and economic 
relations, and feasibility. 
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EPAs in ASEAN; and 
• providing integrated support and trade-related technical co-operation for CLMV. 
Further, MOFA further explained that “we will agree with ASEAN [on AJCEP at the 
upcoming APT Summit in Cambodia], but our principle is to prioritize EPAs with Thailand, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, and other members, for agreements with high quality (Yomiuri 
Shimbun 2002a)”. Because the development statuses of the 10 ASEAN countries varied 
significantly, the region-based agreement would pose greater challenge in meeting the WTO 
standards. MOFA’s announcement of its goals was considered to have significant implication 
for Japan’s following strategies, as it was the first time the country had officially defined its 
priority in economics and security promoting PTAs. As Thailand and the Philippines 
proposed to initiate EPAs with Japan, the scene was leaning toward MOFA’s argument.  
METI disagreed with MOFA’s unilateral announcement. It considered that Japan 
should reach ASEAN as a region to prevent Japan from losing to China its market influence 
with ASEAN, and to strengthen its existing supply chain network with ASEAN (Asahi 
Shimbun 2002; METI official, personal communication). The debate between MOFA and 
METI in the end led to the pursuit of both bilateral and regional approaches of negotiations 
with ASEAN by the end of 2003. In a process of reducing inter-ministry differences with co-
equal power, the bureaucrats came to the conclusion that there should be no problem 
promoting both approaches simultaneously; both ministries agreed that PTAs with ASEAN 
were necessary and that both ministries should cooperate to realise the initiatives. Also, the 
end result of Japan’s PTA strategy toward ASEAN was influenced in part by the existing 
bilateral EPA negotiations, which were improvised and shaped as the negotiations 
progressed. (METI official, personal communication; Makio Miyagawa, former Director of 
Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), personal communication; Yoshimatsu 2007, 85).94 Thus, 
the double-track approach was agreed upon between MOFA and METI.  
According to former Director Miyagawa (personal communication), the double-track 
approach considered the following three criteria: 
 
                                   
94 According to the author’s interviews, the disagreement between MOFA and METI was not 
as serious as the press or the public viewed it (METI official, personal communication; Makio 
Miyagawa, former Director of Regional Division, MOFA (Japan), personal communication).  
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• Because Japan already had an agreement with Singapore, Japan would pursue similar 
agreements with the rest of ASEAN.  
• Japan would not pick and choose with which ASEAN members it would pursue FTAs. 
Japan would let ASEAN decide. 
• Japan would expand EPAs with ASEAN nations and seek regional co-operation in 
economics and in politics. EPAs would be a means and pillars of political regional and 
economic integration in the future of East Asia. 
In terms of the scope of trade, bureaucracies were divided across sectoral interests in 
the absence of central co-ordination within the government, mainly between MAFF, which 
was against MOFA, and METI. The division was mainly driven by the agricultural interest 
represented by the close interaction between LDP politicians and MAFF, which became an 
obstacle for Japan’s EPA negotiations. LDP and MAFF’s strong pressure against the 
liberalisation of the agricultural sector has been demonstrated by Japan’s selection of 
Singapore as its EPA partner for its insignificant share of agricultural products. As study 
groups for bilateral EPAs with Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia proceeded throughout 
2003, and Thailand’s agricultural exports became particularly controversial.  
For example, during the inter-ministry co-ordination meeting held in May 2003, 
MAFF strongly opposed the launch of JTEPA negotiations due to Japan’s sensitivity in 
agriculture, particularly with regard to Thailand’s rice and chicken. In contrast, METI was 
unable to reach a consensus with MAFF because it was pressured by a strong call from 
Japan’s three industrial groups—Keidanren, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Japan 
Association of Corporate Executives—to launch negotiations within the month (Asahi 
Shimbun 2003a; Yomiuri Shimbun 2003). While maintaining a pro-bilateralism position, 
MOFA tried to act as a middleman between METI and MAFF without much success (Nihon 
Keisai Shimbun 2004a). Also, in the midst of inter-bureaucracy conflict, MAFF, MOFA and 
METI each continued to build their own PTA bureaus (Asahi Shimbun 2003b).  
 The breakdown of the Japan–Mexico EPA negotiations in October 2003 called for 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s attention to resolve the bureaucratic PTA turf battles, which 
contributed to the institutionalisation of PTAs. The “Meeting on FTA-Related Bureaucracies” 
in December 2003 and the “Economic Partnership Related Ministers’ Meeting” in March 
2004 aimed to change the protectionist policies of MAFF, as well as co-ordinate the 
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differences among the four bureaucracies (Mulgan 2006; Song 2012, 115). Even though 
Keidanren criticised the absence of a centralised agency to co-ordinate the PTAs and argued 
that a unified institution like the USTR was needed (Nihon Keisai Shimbun 2003b), physical 
institutionalisation did not occur under the Koizumi Cabinet.  
Koizumi believed that he could resolve the bureaucratic turf battles through his own 
leadership. Therefore, at the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in December 2004, 
Koizumi stated, “it is often argued in the business circles that a minister of state for FTAs 
should be set up. In reality, there will be no change even if such a minister would be 
established. Accordingly, I myself would like to assume the role of the minister” (Mulgan 
2006; Yoshimatsu 2012, 200–201). Koizumi also utilised the Cabinet appointment as a means 
to co-ordinate the differences between MAFF and METI by appointing the former MAFF 
minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, as the minister for METI without much success (Nihon Keisai 
Shimbun 2004b; Mulgan 2005, 292). 
 
6.5 Testing the Hypotheses 
 
The examination of the cases of Korea and Japan suggest that intra-democracy 
variation had a critical influence on the institutionalisation of PTAs for the two countries and 
their PTAs with ASEAN. Moreover, bureaucratic expertise and discretion were significant 
factors in shaping the PTA negotiations in both countries. Thus, the hypotheses established in 
the analytical framework section hold true for both Korea and Japan:  
In the case of Korea, where a strong executive branch was present, (a) FTA 
institutions were centralised and produced a top-down and coherently planned FTA 
strategy, and (b) the presence of bureaucratic expertise strengthened centralisation 
by maintaining a close relationship with the executive branch and shaping the degree 
of liberalisation, scope, and efficiency of the negotiations. As a result, Korea was able 
to overcome potential negotiation inefficiencies attached to KAFTA. 
 
Under Japan’s parliamentary system, with a close relationship between the executive 
and the legislative branches, (a) the trade institutionalisation process was 
decentralised, which led to the fragmentation of consensus-based strategies reflected 
by the legislator’s domestic interests, and (b) the presence of bureaucratic expertise 
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further fragmented Japan’s PTA strategies in the absence of strong executive 
pressure. As a result, Japan’s two-track PTAs with ASEAN tended to be improvised 
and suffered delays during their negotiations. 
 
The degree of centralisation in the PTAs was strengthened in Korea’s case because 
the Korean Constitution gives trade negotiation authority to the executive branch entirely. 
The president, the trade minister, and bureaucracy mutually reinforced each other under the 
centralised system, which led to a more liberalising and efficient negotiation outcome with 
ASEAN. The strong centralisation was possible because the influences of legislative and 
domestic interests were minimised. Hence, Korea’s FTA institutionalisation process can be 
defined as de jure institutionalisation, which first established institutional frame, followed by 
an FTA strategy, and then pursued specifics regarding the negotiations. Under the unified 
institutions, the president appointed his trade minister for his experience and shared policy 
goals, instead of appointing personnel from his party. Therefore, despite the high degree of 
discretion given to MOFAT, negotiations proceeded in a direction that bolstered its broad 
goals regarding the roadmap. The Korean example confirms case three of Figure 3.1, 
suggested in Chapter 3. That is, Korea had a strong executive branch and almost no 
legislative branch, which led to a strong centralisation in institutionalising FTAs. Mutual 
reinforcement with bureaucracy led to greater liberalisation.  
In contrast, Japan’s PTA strategies were established through de facto 
institutionalisation. Because there was no formal institution, strategies were established as the 
negotiations progressed. The Japanese Constitution does not clarify to what extent the Diet 
can intervene in the Cabinet’s authority, which empowers various actors in the decision-
making process. The prime minister competed with his own Cabinet, and the Cabinet led the 
bureaucratic battles, not only in the pursuit of bureaucratic missions, but also as politicians. 
Prime Minister Koizumi assumed the leadership role to co-ordinate these differences; 
however, instead of promoting a coherent strategy from the beginning, his use of leadership 
led competing bureaucracies to create their own strategies as their PTA negotiations 
progressed. Thus, Japan’s case confirms case four in Figure 3.1. Japan had a weak executive 
branch, a strong legislative branch, and high bureaucratic discretion, which led to the 
decentralised, bottom-up process of PTA institutionalisation. Liberalisation was limited, and 
201 
 
the negotiations progressed slowly due to the mixed influence of interest and bureaucratic 
discretion by politicians.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the institutional factor links interests and ideas, 
where institutions act as a frame to alter the emphasis placed on political and economic 
interests by providing a pathway for the exchange of the actors’ ideas. Both Japan and Korea 
were institutionally ill-equipped to promote PTAs until the early 2000s. Even though the 
countries shared similar economic and political circumstances, the institutional developments 
of each country resulted in significant differences. The balance of power between the 
executive branch and the legislative branch, and their relationship with bureaucracy, had a 
significant influence on centralising or decentralising their PTAs. In the case of Japan, the 
parliamentary system did not clearly define the decision-making boundaries between the 
Cabinet and the Diet, and the fragmented bureaucratic discretion caused the greater clash 
between domestic interests. Unable to find a common ground, Japan ended up pursuing both 
negotiation approaches. In contrast, Korea’s presidential system delegated the negotiation 
authority to the executive branch of the government – the president and the trade minister, a 
bureaucratic organisation that gave administrative power to MOFAT entirely, and the low 
accessibility of the interest groups to the government drove it to pursue one coherent FTA 
strategy with ASEAN after its trial FTA with Singapore. 
Although a swift generalisation that a strong executive branch produces a centralised 
decision-making system in foreign economic policies should not be made, this chapter has 
demonstrated that when the executive branch perceives the need, its actions can be conducted 
in an uncomplicated manner. In contrast, when the trade negotiation authority is distributed 
among diverse actors, as in the case of Japan, it is more often the case that conflict arises 
while trying to achieve the same end. Korea and Japan illustrated that their response to the 
regional competition, triggered by CAFTA, is not entirely shaped by outlying interests or 
ideas. The supply side of the policies determined the mechanisms that distribute power across 
the key decision makers in PTAs. The finding from this chapter is also consistent with the 
literature that focuses on the effect of the power relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches of government in foreign policies with the US or the EU. 
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The stark contrast between the cases of Korea and Japan leads to an additional 
question, “How much is too much?” between efficiency and democracy. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to address this question. However, Korea’s centralisation of FTA 
policies has been promoted at the cost of incorporating domestic interests. On the other hand, 
Japan’s decentralised PTA institutions have allowed different domestic interests to interact 
and compromise, while its degree of liberalisation in the agricultural sector was narrowed due 
to the involvement of numerous actors in its decision-making processes.95 In this regard, this 
chapter provides room for decision makers, given the political and economic circumstances, 
to contemplate the extent that centralisation in policy-making can be reconciled with 
democratic decision-making processes to achieve an optimal outcome.  
  
                                   
95 Japan’s leverage against individual ASEAN countries compensated for this relative loss of 
institutional efficiency, while maintaining high protection in agricultural sector. See Chapter 4 for 
further discussion on this topic. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
As of 2017, ASEAN+1 level PTAs continue to be the most comprehensive form of 
RTA in East Asia today. With the US’s withdrawal from TPP, the slow progress of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and still a largely visionary Free Trade Area of 
the Asia–Pacific (FTTAP), the prospect for further regional economic co-operation is ever 
more complex. In view of this uncertainty, this chapter concludes by recapping the theoretical 
and practical additions of this research in the realm of trade policies and providing implications 
for future negotiation efforts for regionalism in East Asia.  
This thesis started by questioning the causes behind Korea’s and Japan’s notably 
contrasting approaches to negotiations with ASEAN. When China announced its framework 
agreement for CAFTA in 2001, Japan and Korea consecutively announced ASEAN PTAs the 
following year. Although both countries began with bilateral negotiation approaches with 
individual ASEAN members, Korea soon changed its approach to the region-based KAFTA. 
Japan continued to work with bilateral PTAs while promoting its harmonisation through the 
AJCEP framework. Because the two countries were facing very similar international political 
and economic challenges, the thesis compared Korea and Japan as live counterfactuals to 
examine the influence of domestic variables determining the preferences for bilateralism and 
regionalism in trade policy. Specifically, it examined when and how domestic interests and 
ideas determined Korea’s and Japan’s preferences, and what institutional restraints or 
opportunities enabled those interests and ideas.  
This concluding chapter begins by assessing the thesis’ initial hypotheses through an 
integrative summary of empirical findings. Next, it revisits the more theoretical issues of the 
three I’s analytical framework, set forth in Chapter 3. Then, it takes the discussion a step further 
by locating the findings of the thesis in the existing debate of the compatibility between 
bilateralism and regionalism. The fifth section addresses more practical implications of the 
thesis for the policy world. In the final section, the limitations of the study and outstanding 
issues that are beyond the scope of this dissertation are discussed. This section finishes the 
thesis by contemplating what lies ahead for future research in the field of IPE. 
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7.2 Assessing the Hypotheses 
 
The primary hypothesis of this thesis established that: 
 
Domestic factors, rather than systemic factors, account for the different negotiation 
approaches taken by Korea and Japan in their PTAs with ASEAN. Korea’s and Japan’s 
preferences vary at the different stages of negotiations, depending on the relative 
influence of domestic interests, ideas and institutions. 
 
To test the validity of this hypothesis, the thesis additionally investigated under what 
circumstances one variable matters more than another in the negotiation processes of Korea 
and Japan, through the establishment of sub-hypotheses. In short, the empirical analysis in 
Chapters 4–6 demonstrate that the primary thesis holds valid; a combination of factors, 
including domestic interest, ideas and institutions, have constituted Korea and Japan’s 
preferences at the different stages of their negotiations. When it comes down to the detailed 
sub-hypotheses, however, the findings presented greater complications than initially expected 
by the author.  
Figure 7.1 summarises the details of the findings. As the figure illustrates, domestic 
actors’ interests and ideas primarily shaped Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation preferences, 
which were constrained or empowered by their respective institutional structures. At the same 
time, interests and ideas also shaped the institutional dimensions of the two countries. Neither 
Japan nor Korea had an institutional basis on which to negotiate PTAs in the late 1990s to the 
early 2000s; domestic actors’ preferences also fed backed the development of the two 
countries’ PTA institutionalisations. Due to the prematurity of Korea’s and Japan’s PTA 
institutions, empirically untested interests and ideas at times gained greater leeway to shape 
the two countries’ negotiation preferences. 
In the beginning, both Korea and Japan preferred bilateral negotiation approaches 
because they both faced opposition from domestic agricultural groups and considered 
bilateral PTAs to be more efficient in time, negotiation capacity, and quality. Japan, 
particularly MOFA (Japan), further expected the bilateral negotiation approach to be easier to 
negotiate, considering its relatively strong diplomatic leverage against ASEAN, which arose 
from its pre-established economic relationship with ASEAN since the post-war period. Japan 
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also had greater political motivations to deepen its bilateral ties with individual ASEAN 
members to establish a regional rule of law regarding PTAs in order to counterbalance the 
Chinese influence in ASEAN. Even though Korea and Japan had varying degrees of 
diplomatic leverages and different foreign policy objectives, they were not determinant 
factors in distinguishing the two countries’ choices of negotiation preferences. In fact, neither 
Korea nor Japan could calculate their relative diplomatic leverage against ASEAN until they 
faced the responses from the ASEAN counterpart. 
The early development paths of Korea’s and Japan’s PTA approaches with ASEAN 
were neither strategic nor coherent. Their preference for the bilateral approach of negotiations 
did not mean region-based agreements were any less important. Domestic actors in both 
countries had recognised that region-based negotiations would grant greater market access to 
domestic industries and overall welfare of their economies.  
In Japan, METI and Keidanren strongly supported this view, arguing that AJCEP 
would yield greater trade gain for Japan by securing its production network in Southeast 
Asia. Due to the weak power of the executive branch in Japan, however, the prime minister’s 
role was limited to co-ordinating the differences across the ministries. Because of the high 
turnover rate of the prime minister and cabinet, the executive branch had relatively weak 
influence in shaping actual policies, giving greater discretion to bureaucratic elites. In the 
absence of clear policy preference by Prime Minister Koizumi, both MOFA’s (Japan) and 
METI’s preferences were reflected in their negotiations with ASEAN by 2002. To borrow a 
then-negotiator’s words, the two-track approach was closer to a “coincidence” rather than a 
strategic choice (METI official, personal communication). In Korea, no visible domestic 
division occurred due to the presence of strong executive power, at least until mid-2003, 
despite the recognition among the government officials and industrial groups that KAFTA 
would give greater opportunities to the Korean industries. Facing strong opposition from the 
agricultural groups on the Korea–Chile FTA, the Korean government remained reserved 
about the announcing KAFTA. 
During this period, there were no substantial differences between Korea and Japan in 
their ideas of bilateralism and regionalism. When they diverted their focus from WTO-based 
multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism during the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s, East Asian economic regionalism emerged as a new key idea in their trade policies. 
To Korea and Japan, ASEAN was geographically natural, one of the most important strategic 
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PTA partners and symbolic stepping-stones for the economic integration of East Asian 
countries. Because neither country had much experience in PTAs, they considered ASEAN a 
safety zone to test the influence of the new trend, which could then be further expanded into 
PTAs with partners such as the US and the EU. In other words, Korea and Japan were still 
relatively conservative and wary about the idea of bilateralism and regionalism.  
The influence of ideas became more evident when Korea took a sudden turn in its 
preference in late 2003, which directly accounted for the divergence between Japan’s and 
Korea’s negotiation approaches. Domestic preferences, as a combined result of existing 
interests and ideas, remained consistent—although fragmented—in Japan, as values, such as 
meeting “the WTO standard” and building “East Asian regionalism”, became deeply 
entrenched across the domestic policymakers. In particular, Japan’s trade war with the US in 
the mid-1980s continued to influence its firm adherence to the multilateral rules. Japan’s 
policy direction was reconfirmed through its earliest EPAs with Singapore and Mexico; 
negotiators referred to them as learning experiences for further EPAs, and the domestic actors 
arrived to a mutual understanding that the issue of sensitivity in Japan’s agricultural sector 
could be resolved through communication.  
In the absence of such corresponding memory, Korea’s emphasis on “East Asian 
regionalism” quickly collapsed when Prime Minister Hyun-chong Kim introduced neo-liberal 
ideas. Under Prime Minister Kim’s leadership, ASEAN became a symbolic instrument to 
gain leverage for Korea’s FTA Roadmap, which aimed to simultaneously negotiate cross-
regional FTAs with multiple partners. The diffusion of new ideas occurred through the 
process of persuasion and competition with the existing values that emphasised East Asian 
economic regionalism. In particular, the trade minister’s success in convincing President Roh 
further empowered his leadership, which was facilitated by Korea’s institutional structure that 
give treaty negotiation authority wholly to the executive branch of the government. More 
microscopically, the policymakers’ perception that the Korea–Chile FTA was a failed 
negotiation further augmented the need for a breakthrough through the pursuit of the new 
strategy.  
Japan’s and Korea’s cases also demonstrate that diplomatic leverage was not a direct 
factor policymakers could utilise to calculate the costs and benefits of the different 
negotiation approaches. Its influence, instead, was exhibited through the ASEAN 
counterpart’s willingness to negotiate PTAs with Korea or Japan. For instance, Japan’s 
207 
 
bilateral EPAs initiated much faster than those of Korea’s due to the ASEAN members’ 
political and economic demands. The Korean side also preferred the bilateral negotiation 
approach in the beginning but began to consider the approach may not be realisable, because 
the ASEAN members, except for Singapore and Malaysia, were not interested in bilateral 
FTAs with Korea. The country’s increase in diplomatic leverage with ASEAN was shown 
much later in the 2010s, through Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand’s additional proposals for 
FTAs. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Summary of the findings 
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7.3 Revisiting the Three I’s Approach: Interests, Ideas and Institutions 
 
The systemic IPE theories provide explanations for the influence of exogenous forces 
on Korea’s and Japan’s macro-level trade policies. Yet, they are limited in providing analytical 
guidance to microscopic decision-making processes, as the puzzle of Korea’s and Japan’s PTA 
negotiations with ASEAN presented. Highlighting domestic aspects of decision-making 
provide a better understanding of trade policies, as they often involve greater participation of 
domestic actors for their direct domestic consequence compared to most other foreign policies. 
Thus, this research developed an analytical framework, building from the existing theories, to 
bridge gaps in the foreign economic policy literature. It sought to provide the influence of the 
three I’s and the causal interactive map of the three variables in Korea’s and Japan’s decision-
making processes. If exogenous factors explain the rise of PTAs and account for the broader 
landscape of trade policies, then to what extent do domestic factors explain variations existing 
in trade policies? In addition, if interests are indispensable factors determining domestic actor’s 
preferences, as political scientists often claim, then to what extent can ideas be said to have 
played an independent role in Korea’s and Japan’s PTA negotiations? How do the domestic 
actors’ preferences and institutions influence each other? This section returns to the theoretical 
dimensions of the three I’s and assesses (1) the contribution of the analytical framework 
suggested in this thesis to the domestic approaches of IPE, and (2) the development of existing 
theories through identification of new variables. 
The systemic IPE approaches and the existing literature that focus on the international 
factors to explain the motivations of ASEAN+1 PTAs are limited in explaining foreign 
economic policies; they neglect the influence of domestic factors in the decision-making 
processes by focusing on states as unitary actors and examining international factors as the 
sources of policy outcomes. The focus on state and systemic factors explain the rise of PTAs 
and account for the broader landscape of trade policies seen from the international level, but 
they risk the possibility of oversimplifying Korea’s and Japan’s differences in their strategies. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, they found the motivation behind Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs 
with ASEAN from regional rivalry, or Korea’s and Japan’s relative economic gains from the 
reduction of trade barriers. Thus, the thesis adopted an inside-out approach of analysis to 
examine how domestic factors shape trade policies both independent from and in response to 
international factors.  
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The cases of Korea and Japan have shown that interstate rivalries or economic 
formulas are insufficient to explain the choices of the two countries’ negotiation strategies, 
and further, to account for the changes in their strategies when international factors remain 
consistent. For instance, Chapter 5 has shown that the constructivist elements were crucial in 
shaping Korea’s and Japan’s foreign economic policies; policymakers’ ideas constructed 
domestic actors’ preferences, causing the divergence in the two countries’ PTA strategies. 
Also, even when Korea and Japan faced similar international backgrounds and chose the 
same bilateral approaches of negotiations, they originated from a combination of different 
domestic motivations. Chapter 4 has pointed out that Korea and Japan had both considered 
agricultural interests and negotiation efficiency, but Japan’s domestic interests further 
accompanied the use of diplomatic leverages and achieving foreign policy objectives. The 
subtle differences explain the intentions behind the two countries’ different motivations for 
the different choices of negotiation approaches, which in turn explain the long-term 
development of trade policies in the two countries. Furthermore, Korea’s and Japan’s reversal 
of negotiation progress with ASEAN is difficult to understand if seen from the perspective of 
mainstream theories—Japan has had a closer political and economic relationship than Korea 
with ASEAN. Thus, Chapter 6 has illuminated the democratic variations existing between 
Korea and Japan. Because Korea’s decision-making power is concentrated to the executive 
branch of the government in comparison with Japan’s strong legislative branch, KAFTA was 
negotiated much faster than most of Japan’s bilateral EPAs and AJCEP. 
In addition, the thesis contributes to the approaches taken in foreign economic policy 
by rediscovering the domestic variables shaping Korea’s and Japan’s PTA decision-making 
processes. To better understand the relative influence of interests, ideas and institutions, the 
thesis has (1) fleshed out the political and economic interests influencing preferential choices 
between bilateralism and regionalism, (2) examined how domestic policymakers respond to 
the ideas surrounding their trade environment and accommodate them internally, which in 
turn shapes their perception on preferences, and (3) demonstrated how institutional structures 
distribute decision-making power across the domestic actors who hold different interests and 
ideas. It listed all essential domestic factors influencing the two countries’ policies while not 
dismissing the influence of external factors. It also extended the existing theories mainly 
developed in the West to be applicable for the cases of Korea and Japan, particularly for 
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PTAs that are based on vertical trade relationships, and reinterpreted the theories suitable for 
comparative case study analysis. 
Regarding interests, various possible political and economic variables, determining 
domestic actors’ preferences for the choices between bilateralism and regionalism, were 
defined and incorporated by examining Korea and Japan’s private interests and their 
governments. Among the key interests, the empirical findings suggest agricultural groups 
were particularly concerned about maintaining existing trade barriers; thus, they did not 
welcome PTAs. However, less opposition was observed in bilateral PTAs, as they preferred 
to be exposed to a smaller market with a better chance of gaining concession. The 
manufacturing industries were concerned with enlarging market access or reducing the costs 
in utilizing PTAs. The Korean and Japanese governments considered factors, such as 
increasing negotiation efficiency, advancing trade gains, using asymmetrical power as 
diplomatic leverage and achieving foreign policy goals. The different combinations of these 
domestic interests constructed Korea’s and Japan’s initial negotiation preferences with 
ASEAN. 
Despite the importance of the political and economic interests in shaping trade 
policies, the thesis has also shown that ideas and institutions have had indispensable influence 
in Korea’s and Japan’s decision-making processes. It has identified how ideas can be isolated 
from interests and whether they have independent influence in shaping the two countries’ 
negotiation preferences. The self-ruling effect of ideas was observed when Korea shifted its 
negotiation preference only in a year’s time, from 2002 to 2003, officially agreeing on the 
initiation of a KAFTA joint expert group in October 2003. Japan’s status quo in its 
preferences provided a counterfactual development of trade policies when existing values 
continue to prevail across the domestic society. Korea and Japan both emphasised building 
region-based PTAs in the beginning, but Korea soon changed its priorities to cross-regional 
FTAs attributable to the less constraining antecedent conditions and the negative 
reinforcement, which allowed the new ideas to enter at a relative ease. Thus, the Korean 
policymakers started to consider that FTAs with bigger economies, such as the US and the 
EU, are strategically more important for Korea. KAFTA began to be considered one of the 
stepping-stones for further FTAs. In Japan, the bilateral EPAs with ASEAN and AJCEP 
continued to be considered as the key to the country’s PTA policies, due to its trade conflict 
with the US and positive experience in its earliest EPAs. Thus, even the strongest proponents 
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of PTAs focused on developing PTAs based in East Asia. In short, the influence of ideas was 
critical in the development stages of the two countries’ PTA negotiations. 
In the institutions section, the thesis revised George Krause’s atypical principal–agent 
model to be applicable to the qualitative analysis to compare Korea’s and Japan’s cases. To 
examine the influence of political institutions on the centralisation of trade policies, the thesis 
newly included intra-democratic variations and bureaucracy discretion. Taken together, the 
institutions demonstrated a mediating role between domestic interests and ideas. They at 
times assisted the progress of PTA negotiations, but at other times, caused severe delays due 
to the concentration or diversion of decision-making power. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
Japan’s parliamentary system did not clearly define the decision-making boundaries between 
the Cabinet and the Diet, and the fragmented bureaucracy discretion caused the greater clash 
between domestic interests. Thus, Japan’s trade policies tended to be consensus-based and 
improvised by immediate needs rather than through long-term goals. In contrast, Korea’s 
presidential system delegated the negotiation authority to the president, who gave full 
administrative power to MOFAT. Fewer individuals had the power to change policy direction 
in Korea; thus, one coherent FTA strategy was pursued under the FTA Roadmap.  
To summarise, the thesis aimed at reinterpreting the three I’s approach as an 
integrative and interpretative tool to provide a balanced view in the IPE literature. The 
approach has been designed to examine the processes rather than outcomes—an approach 
often neglected in the systemic IPE literature. As Cohen (2007) observes, the field of IPE has 
become increasingly divided by what he distinguishes as the US-style scholarship that 
emphasises positivism, empiricism, and rationalism, and the British-style scholarship that 
focuses on interpretive, normative, institutional and historical in nature. After all, IPE only 
emerged in the 1970s to bridge the gap between political science and economics. Therefore, 
Cohen (2008, 5) argues: 
 
Each style has its strengths-but also its weaknesses. Neither may lay claim to 
comprehensive insight or exclusive truth. To complete the construction of IPE, it is 
not enough to build bridges between economics and politics. Bridges must be built 
between the field’s disparate schools, too. 
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The approach taken in this thesis is closer to the “British-style of IPE”, according to 
Cohen; it has relied on the qualitative method of research to acquire data that would 
otherwise have been difficult to collect, and emphasised the significance of normative, 
historical and institutional elements in shaping trade policies. The primary contribution of the 
thesis, however, is in its attempt to connect the systemic approaches with the domestic 
approaches, and further, the rational approaches with the normative–institutional approaches 
in IPE. The question of Korea’s and Japan’s divergence in their PTA negotiations with 
ASEAN would not have been fully accounted by dismissing any of the three I’s.  
 
7.4 A Step Toward East Asian Regionalism? Compatibility Between Bilateralism and 
Regionalism 
 
A major aim of this thesis has been to address whether bilateralism and regionalism 
are compatible. This section accomplishes its goal through recapping the relationship 
between Korea’s and Japan’s respective bilateral PTAs and RTAs with ASEAN and 
evaluating whether Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with ASEAN help take a step toward East 
Asian regionalism. The cases of Korea and Japan demonstrate positive interactions between 
bilateralism and regionalism, which balance the pessimistic views dominant in the existing 
literature. The two countries’ cases are limited in their generalisability, but they provide a 
modest yet important addition to the literature through the examination of the domestic 
politics involved in their economic diplomacy. 
The dominant view in the literature is pessimistic about the relationship between 
bilateralism and regionalism (Chapter 2). For example, Choi (2005), Corning (2009) and 
Medalla (2011) see AJCEP and Japan’s bilateral EPAs as the two clashing forms of PTAs, 
rather than complementary pacts, when they compare the efficacy between the result of the 
two negotiation approaches. Corning (2009), Medalla (2011) and Dent (2010) concern that 
complexity caused by the tangled web of PTAs are more likely to deepen complications to 
building an East Asian RTA than to facilitate the region’s integration process. Moreover, as 
Dent (2005) predicted, the Japan–China rivalries and differences in the PTA standards 
continue to obscure the future of East Asian regionalism. The lessons from the existing 
literature give important implications to the trade relations in East Asia today. 
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Yet, there is a room to reduce the seemingly ever-growing gap between bilateralism 
and regionalism. The positive outlook the thesis offers is based on the examination of Korea 
and Japan’s negotiation processes rather than outcomes. The two countries’ decision-making 
processes demonstrate that bilateralism can serve as the basis for regionalism when bilateral 
PTAs provide learning experiences and there is a strong political willingness to take the 
bilateral PTAs as the stepping-stones for regional integration.  
First, PTA experiences can change the perception of regionalism and provide new 
understanding in negotiation techniques and the availability of diverse topics in PTAs. For 
example, Chapter 5 illustrates that when Japan did not have any experience in PTAs, and 
even had a negative impression of bilateralism and regionalism, its EPAs with more 
experienced partners, such as Singapore and Mexico, not only changed Japan’s perception 
that PTAs could be building blocks to the WTO-based multilateral co-operation, but also it is 
comprehensive enough to go beyond the WTO standards while not excluding the non-
members of PTAs. The EPAs with Singapore and Mexico were also essential in shaping 
Japan’s negotiation techniques on how best the different negotiation tools can be utilised to 
realise the East Asian regional integration. As Japan learned from their very first PTA 
partners, Japan also provided precedents for many Southeast Asian countries that did not 
have experiences in PTAs. In similar ways, KAFTA and AJCEP provide precedents for 
Korea and Japan in negotiating with multiple partners that vary in their developing status for 
negotiations like RCEP and TPP.  
Second, Korea’s and Japan’s domestic politics involved in the PTA negotiation 
processes indicate that the policy orientation toward the regional economic integration 
heavily depends on the political willingness of those with the decision-making power. Japan 
promoted AJCEP along with the bilateral EPAs but progressed much slower because the 
Japanese side wanted to make every aspect of AJCEP mutually intersect with its individual 
EPAs. In other words, Japan had the leverage to derive a deal that was beneficial bilaterally, 
but not enough to convince all ASEAN member states, which varied in their developing 
statuses, to agree on a unified term under AJCEP. For this reason, Japan has only negotiated 
the provisions for a Goods Agreement to date under AJCEP, despite its initial goal to take the 
single undertaking negotiation approach. However, it is not fair to claim that AJCEP is a 
failed attempt, as most existing studies do, by understanding them as substitutional 
agreements rather than complementary ones.  
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Although internal disputes existed, Japan promoted AJCEP and individual EPAs as a 
package since the end of 2002 to complete the supply chain network in Southeast Asia and 
utilise it as a building block for a wider RTA. As the former director of AJCEP notes 
(personal communication), one of the major tasks of the negotiators was to harmonise the 
bilateral EPAs under the AJCEP framework, particularly concerning RoO. In the author’s 
interviews, every Japanese negotiator who engaged in these PTAs in the early to mid-2000s 
showed satisfaction with Japan’s two-track approach for their contribution to its trade policy 
today. Japan’s East Asia-focused PTAs provided the basis for Japan’s active engagement in 
the regional integration initiatives.  
In contrast, Korea’s political goal focused more on cross-regional FTAs than East 
Asia’s exclusive regional economic integration. Thus, KAFTA did not extend further effort to 
build East Asian PTAs. Instead, the growth in intra-regional economic transactions naturally 
led to further demand for bilateral PTAs. After KAFTA’s trade in goods agreement took 
effect in 2007, economic exchange between ASEAN rose by 182%. In particular, the volume 
of trade with Indonesia and Vietnam rose remarkably during this period, approximately two- 
to threefold; this led to additional initiation of FTAs by the end of 201296 with Vietnam and 
Indonesia.  
These bilateral agreements are partially market-driven because increasing market 
transactions within the KAFTA framework triggered the call for bilateral FTAs. KAFTA 
provided an arena in which trade could be facilitated by lowering the barriers of trade 
between Korea and ASEAN, creating and deepening the production network between the two 
parties. The individual FTAs would be more specific and liberalised for the benefit of the two 
specific parties, while allowing the suppliers to use RoO most beneficially to their own. To 
the decision makers, these negotiations were perceived relatively easier compared to previous 
FTAs, having established a closer economic tie through the existing rules within KAFTA and 
the newly created supply chain network.  
However, because the Korean government does not intend to extend either KAFTA or 
bilateral FTAs as a basis for a broader regional agreement, these FTAs have been ineffective 
in promoting further regional integration. Nonetheless, the Korean case of regionalism 
triggering more intra-regional bilateral FTAs does not imply that it is impeding the 
                                   
96 See Chapter 4 for detailed figures. 
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development of East Asian regionalism. The bilateral FTAs have been promoted to the extent 
that it benefits both parties beyond what KAFTA can offer, thus, strengthening intra-regional 
relations rather than obstructing the regional co-operation.  
The differences in Japan’s and Korea’s political intentions may provide explanation to 
Japan’s faster commitment to TPP and Korea’s focus to the FTA with China, which diverted 
its trade negotiation capacity for East Asian regionalism. 
 
7.5 Practical Contributions: Providing Strategic Information to Policymakers  
 
By examining Korea’s and Japan’s different approaches to negotiation, this thesis 
provides a reference to policymakers in East Asia and other regions to strategically foster 
economic co-operation. First, it provides relevant information to policymakers to enhance 
their understanding of the counterpart strategy, on when and why one negotiation method 
works better than another. When policymakers do not have enough information, either due to 
the lack of their own experience or other’s examples, their decision outcomes become much 
less predictable. This had been the case with Korea and Japan. When Korea and Japan began 
their negotiations, both of their strategies were short-sighted. The two countries did not have 
a well-planned strategy, mainly because they did not have much experience in PTAs, and 
there were no other examples to learn from other than CAFTA.  
Because both KAFTA and AJCEP have taken effect for several years now, the 
comprehensive overview of Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation approaches provides useful 
precedents. It also provides brief information about Korea’s and Japan’s PTAs with partners 
other than ASEAN. For example, it gives account to why the Korean negotiators considered 
Korea–Chile FTA a failure, why Korea–Japan FTA was stalled, or what kind of negotiation 
techniques the Japanese negotiators learned from JSEPA and Japan–Mexico EPA, which 
shaped the two countries’ subsequent trade policies. 
Second, policymakers seeking PTA with ASEAN may also find this research useful. 
Korea’s and Japan’s negotiation processes with ASEAN demonstrate that countries with 
strong diplomatic leverage gain more benefits through bilateralism than through regionalism, 
because they have stronger influence in shaping the content of the negotiations while also 
influencing the rules of trade. The US’s recent shift in its negotiation approaches from the 
multilateral TPP to bilateralism demonstrates a case in point. As far as economic gains are 
216 
 
concerned, however, the group-based approach still provides greater market access and 
reduced trade diversion effects. For smaller economies seeking an ASEAN PTA, group-based 
negotiations can be considered more beneficial for several reasons. As KAFTA 
demonstrated, small diplomatic and economic leverages make it difficult to attract the 
counterparty bilaterally. ASEAN as a group, however, is easier to reach because of its agenda 
to drive East Asian regional integration. The increase in economic transaction through the 
group-based agreement can lead to further in-depth, country-specific agreements.  
Third, the thesis provides a useful reference to the policymakers of the countries 
seeking PTAs with Korea and Japan. For instance, Korea and Japan have significant 
differences in their institutional structures, which distributed the varying degrees of decision-
making power to the domestic actors. Korea’s decision-making power is concentrated under 
presidential leadership, whereas Japan’s decision-making power is distributed among 
politicians across the different ministries. Thus, in the case of Korea, negotiation with key 
decision makers should be most important. In the case of Japan, one should expect to see 
diversification of responsibilities to the different ministries with different issues at stake; 
thus, policymakers should devote separate effort to convincing the politicians and ministries 
involved in sensitive sectors of the economy. When thinking of the two countries’ interests 
regarding PTAs, they can also consider country-specific goals: Korea’s interest is highly 
focused on economic gains, whereas Japan’s geopolitical motivations, for example, 
maintaining and expanding its regional leadership, are greater.  
 
7.6 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
A main limitation of this research is one that would be inherent in any comparative case 
study method: its generalisability. Comparative case studies, although better than single-case 
study methods, are far from controlled experiments. This research is constrained by a complex 
combination of domestic and international factors, which makes its conclusions difficult to 
generalise to other cases. The goal of this research has been to examine the PTA negotiation 
strategies developed in Korea and Japan from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Thus, it provides 
an in-depth analysis of the two countries and their negotiation approaches with ASEAN during 
this specific period of time, but it does not examine other existing ASEAN+1 level PTAs or 
other countries’ perspectives on the choices of their negotiation approaches with ASEAN or 
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with other regional actors. For example, AIFTA and AANZFTA came after CAFTA, KAFTA 
and AJCEP, but both opted for group-based negotiations. The US considered an ASEAN PTA, 
but it has been suspended because US officials are finding it difficult to negotiate an agreement 
that meets its high standards.  
Globally speaking, there are also cases in which their studies can contribute to 
generalising the factors shaping preferences between bilateralism and regionalism. For 
example, Chile’s FTA with the EU came into force in 2005, but Chile also negotiated a bilateral 
FTA with Turkey, which came into force in 2011. Mexico has an agreement with Uruguay 
since 2004, but also promoted an FTA with MERCOSUR, entered into force since 2016. The 
examination of these outstanding cases will provide an important reference for explaining the 
variables that determine a country’s PTA negotiation strategy. 
Moreover, further research is needed to account for Japan’s efforts for cross-
regionalism today. Chapter 5 of this thesis demonstrated that Japan’s strong commitment to the 
East Asia region has prevented it from taking bold strategies toward ASEAN. Chapter 6 then 
explained why Japan’s progress with PTAs lagged behind that of Korea’s, based on their 
institutional differences. The international political economy has changed since then. Korea 
and Japan have often competed with one another when it comes to their progress with PTAs 
because they are geographically close and share many overlapping economic interests with the 
PTA counterparty, which can easily cause trade diversion. So far, Korea’s cross-regional 
strategy has been comparatively fruitful when it comes to broadening its FTA partnerships, 
particularly with large trade partners such as the EU and the US. Therefore, Japan considered 
that TPP would be its game changer when it was signed at the end of 2016. Japan’s participation 
in TPP would accomplish its goal of developing the wider economic community to a high 
standard while lowering its trade barrier with the US.  
Construing from the findings of this research, Japan’s dual-track approach can be 
considered successful, although as a late bloomer; by taking negotiations step by step, Japan 
established regional norms bilaterally while building East Asian regionalism. Because the US 
has withdrawn from TPP and instead announced a bilateral trade agreement with Japan; 
however, it is unclear now whether Japan’s approach will be seen as more effective in the future. 
Coincidently, Korea has not been advancing many FTAs since 2013 due to changes in 
administrations and the reshuffling of ministries. This may be explained by the rationale in 
Chapters 5 and 6: Korea’s efficiency in FTA strategy is closely dependent on institutions and 
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the leader’s ideas. Thus, further attention needs to be paid to the changes in Korea’s FTA 
policies after the new administration takes over in May 2017. These on-going changes 
demonstrate that it is still too early to evaluate Korea’s and Japan’s approaches and conclude 
that the findings of this research are valid not only in the short run, but also in the long run. 
Next, the applicability of the mutual reinforcement between bilateralism and 
regionalism found in this research is limited with regard to the question of 
bilateralism/regionalism and multilateralism. The nature of bilateralism/regionalism and 
multilateralism differs to a significant degree: bilateral and regional agreements are 
discriminative to non-participants, whereas multilateral forums offer public good to all 
members. Article XXIV of GATT accommodates bilateralism and regionalism by making an 
exception for MFN to the extent that they are building blocks for multilateralism. It specifies 
that the parties should liberalise substantially all areas of trade.  
However, whether bilateralism complements multilateralism is still an unresolved 
query. Korea’s and Japan’s cases are also equivocal when it comes to their contribution to 
multilateralism today. Both have proactively promoted bilateralism and regionalism, but not 
equally so for multilateralism. One reason can be inferred from the fact that the member 
countries find no incentive to liberalise unilaterally because they can enjoy the free lunches the 
WTO has to offer. For example, Korea is still maintaining a strong protectionist approach when 
it comes to liberalising rice in the WTO, utilising its developing status in the organisation, even 
though Korea has been actively promoting FTAs. Thus, future research could examine whether 
bilateralism and regionalism have been building blocks for Korea’s and Japan’s multilateralism. 
In addition to these outstanding issues, future research could also examine how ASEAN 
compares with other regional blocs as an PTA counterpart. One starting point could be Korea’s 
FTA negotiation with the EU. As the Korean chief negotiator for KAFTA and Korea–EU FTA, 
Hansu Kim (KBSi interview 2012) recalled that the negotiation methods of the two countries 
are very different, even though KAFTA and Korea-EU FTA are negotiations with regional 
entities. For one, their institutional structures diverge. An independent decision-making body, 
or the European Commission, leads the EU’s FTA negotiations. In contrast, ASEAN’s PTA 
negotiations are led by the negotiators of all 10 member states, which means that consensus 
among all 10 parties is necessary before a decision is reached. Moreover, the EU is a more 
advanced economic group relative to ASEAN—and thus prefers higher standards of 
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liberalisation. In addition to these two factors, future research could further investigate what 
other factors should be considered when negotiating with different regional blocs.  
Finally, future research should further develop various political and economic issues, 
including trade policies, in economic diplomacy. When this thesis project began, the author 
aimed at conducting research connecting IR theories with the real world—economic diplomacy 
is an important scholarly platform that provides the link between the two. However, in the 
author’s fieldwork to interview policymakers, a deep gap was found between academics and 
practitioners. Academics often place too much focus on theories that are constrained by too 
many unrealistic assumptions, whereas negotiators frequently go to negotiations unaware of 
the rigorous research on how PTAs can be best negotiated and implemented. In the era of free 
trade agreements, the study of economic diplomacy could narrow this gap. 
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